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Abstract
Alphanumeric authentication, by means of a secret, is not only a powerful mecha-
nism, in theory, but prevails over all its competitors in reality. Passwords, as they
are more commonly known, have the potential to act as a fairly strong gateway.
In practice, though, password usage is problematic. They are (1) easily shared,
(2) trivial to observe and (3) maddeningly elusive when forgotten. Moreover,
modern consumer devices only exacerbate the problems of passwords as users
enter them in shared spaces, in plain view, on television screens, on smartphones
and on tablets. Asterisks may obfuscate alphanumeric characters on entry but
popular systems, e.g. Apple iPhone and Nintendo Wii, require the use of an
on-screen keyboard for character input.
A number of alternatives to passwords have been proposed but none, as yet,
have been adopted widely. There seems to be a reluctance to switch from tried and
tested passwords to novel alternatives, even if the most glaring flaws of passwords
can be mitigated. One argument is that there has not been sufficient investigation
into the feasibility of the password alternatives and thus no convincing evidence
that they can indeed act as a viable alternative.
Graphical authentication mechanisms, solutions that rely on images rather
than characters, are a case in point. Pictures are more memorable than the
words that name them, meaning that graphical authentication mitigates one of
the major problems with passwords. This dissertation sets out to investigate the
feasibility of one particular observation-resilient graphical authentication mech-
anism called Tetrad. The authentication mechanism attempted to address two
of the core problems with passwords: improved memorability and resistance to
observability (with on-screen entry).
Tetrad was tested in a controlled lab study, that delivered promising results
and was well received by the evaluators. It was then deployed in a realistic
context and its viability tested in three separate field tests. The unfortunate
conclusion was that Tetrad, while novel and viable in a lab setting, failed to
deliver a usable and acceptable experience to the end users. This thorough testing
of an alternative authentication mechanism is unusual in this research field and
the outcome is disappointing. Nevertheless, it acts to inform inventors of other
authentication mechanisms of the problems that can manifest when a seemingly
viable authentication mechanism is tested in the wild.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Password problems are the stuff of legend, as is evident from the tale below:
Two brothers lived in a small town. Cassim was wealthy and wanted
for nothing, Ali Baba was poor and cut wood tirelessly to support his
family. While cutting wood in the forest one day, Ali Baba spotted a
flock of fierce men on horses heading his way and so hid in a nearby
tree. The leader walked right up to the tree and uttered a simple,
secret word. A huge rock rolled back to reveal a vast cave, covered in
treasure.
Stunned and shaken, Ali Baba stayed silent in the tree as the men
entered the cave and the rock rolled shut. The men eventually left,
at which point Ali Baba leaped from the tree and spoke the simple,
secret word. The rock rolled back and Ali Baba grabbed as much
treasure as he could and ran back to his family.
Cassim, shocked by Ali Baba’s sudden wealth, demanded answers.
Ali Baba recanted the story and agreed with his brother to return in
the morning. Cassim, always the greedier, set out earlier. Once at the
cave, Cassim spoke the simple, secret word and, to his amazement,
the rock rolled back. Cassim entered and the rock rolled shut; he
began grabbing as much treasure as possible. However, when Cassim
wanted to leave, he could not recall the simple, secret word. He tried
in vain to remember, spouting word after word.
The thieves returned to the cave to deposit more treasure. The leader
spoke the simple, secret word. The rock rolled back to reveal Cassim
cowering in the corner of the cave. Cassim never left.
The tale of Ali Baba and Cassim is more commonly known as Ali Baba and
the Forty Thieves from 1001 Arabian Nights. Some lessons emerge from this
narrative:
• The first paragraph illustrates that passwords are not resistant to surveil-
lance. Ali Baba, after all, was able to enter the cave because he was eaves-
dropping. The problem still persists today, as attackers can easily observe
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individuals entering their passwords by shoulder-surfing. Passwords need
to be resistant to eavesdropping and observation, otherwise their strength
is weakened. Passwords need to be secret and kept safe.
• The second paragraph showcases secrets being shared with others. Ali Baba
is able to communicate the password to his brother and, as a result, Cas-
sim was also able to access the cave. Passwords should be known only to
the individual accessing the cave, no-one else. Otherwise, it weakens the
strength of the password as it is no longer secret.
• The third paragraph demonstrates that passwords are not memorable. Cas-
sim’s life literally depended on his remembering the password that Ali Baba
shared with him. A good password is a lengthy string of gibberish with no
meaning. The lack of meaning is what makes such passwords difficult to
remember. If a user does not write it down, they will almost certainly reuse
it. While a memorable password has meaning, it also makes it predictable
as it has some structure or pattern. Such passwords are easily compromised
by brute-force or social engineering attacks.
• The final paragraph exemplifies the fact that users and organisations only
become aware of the attack when the attacker is unsuccessful. When the
leader of the thieves rolls back the rock, he is confronted with Cassim.
The secret has been compromised, the password is pointless. In modern
day electronic systems there is often no way to detect that an attacker has
successfully used another person’s password.
These problems have always plagued passwords, even when they were first de-
ployed on the Compatible Time Sharing System (CTSS) in 1962 [56]. The key
difference between then and now is that CTSS was aimed at scientists and en-
gineers. The password pitfalls could be combatted with training and education.
Passwords are undeniably powerful, if used properly. Organisations can craft se-
cure locations, make surveillance difficult, and use security policies and training
to mitigate the aforementioned problems. The real problem is everyday users,
managing an increasing number of passwords to achieve more and more tasks.
Users are increasingly turning to online services, relying on passwords, to
complete tasks. Consequently, passwords are being pushed into the hands of
users and being used in environments never envisioned. The initial envisioned
password user was a scientist in a laboratory, now the list has expanded to include
children in playgrounds and pensioners in living-rooms. In effect, passwords have
become the mythical silver bullet for authentication; the default solution for
authentication for every context and for every user.
However, the reality is that passwords are incredibly problematic, even in the
hands of experts and professionals. Therefore, given the many problems associ-
ated with passwords, an alternative authentication approach is needs to be con-
sidered. It should be tailored to the needs of the average user of popular consumer
products such as the Nintendo Wii and Apple iPhone. Such an authentication
approach should tackle the problems of observation, memorability and sharing of
8
secrets. Such an authentication approach should be targeted at consumers and
popular products rather than professionals and tele-type terminals.
A possible solution is graphical authentication. This approach relies on im-
ages rather than alphanumeric characters. There are several advantages to using
images, a primary one being that images are more memorable than the words
that name them. Unfortunately, despite considerable research into graphical au-
thentication mechanisms, as well as other approaches, a viable alternative is yet
to emerge.
There could be several reasons for a lack of a viable alternative. Dunphy et al.
argues the reason for the slow uptake of graphical authentication approaches is
due to designers and researchers not tackling practical issues such as deployment
[76]. Nevertheless, there are many caveats or negative elements that detract
from the overall story, e.g. sourcing images and creating graphical authentication
secrets. The reality is that graphical authentication mechanisms, like many other
alternatives, are rarely evaluated beyond the bounds of a laboratory or other
controlled environments. Consequently, many aspects of authentication that are
equally important, in ensuring that an authentication process is viable, are often
neglected. The sourcing of images, as well as the creation of the authentication
secret, are often neglected areas in the evaluation of graphical authentication
mechanisms.
Furthermore, authentication context is another aspect that is often not dis-
cussed, i.e. the envisioned task and target user of the alternative authentica-
tion approach. Moreover, many alternative authentication mechanisms are often
constructed as pseudo prototypes or not evaluated on actual target hardware,
e.g. paper and pen is substituted for an actual software-based mechanism or an
authentication mechanism designed for mobile phones is assessed on a desktop
computer.
Consequently, many evaluations for an alternative authentication mechanism
have relatively poor ecological validity. Nevertheless, controlled evaluations are
invaluable in assessing aspects of authentication, e.g. cognitive load. The point
is that controlled evaluations are not necessarily best suited for determining the
overall performance or suitability of an authentication mechanism for a given
context. Therefore, arguably much of the data collected in controlled evaluations
is not relevant in determining the viability of an authentication mechanism itself.
The lack of a viable alternative to passwords is concerning as the approach is
becoming increasingly stretched. The password approach was simply not designed
for popular consumer based products that do not rely on physical keyboards and
can used in environments with many wandering eyes.
Consequently, an alternative authentication approach is required that is de-
signed for the aforementioned context. Here it will be argued that the viability
of the alternative authentication mechanism can only be assessed through field
evaluations to ensure it is fit-for-purpose.
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1.1 Approach
A graphical authentication mechanism was developed that was designed to ad-
dress the password problems outlined earlier, namely: memorability, observation
and sharing. The problems were addressed (1) using memorable images, (2) entry
of images in full view of onlookers without leaking the authentication secret and
(3) knowledge of the images can not be easily shared with others. Nevertheless,
the focus of the design is observation-resilience.
A prototype of the authentication approach was designed, implemented and
assessed using a controlled evaluation to ensure the authentication mechanism
was acceptable for use and ready for use in the field. Subsequently, variations of
the graphical authentication mechanisms were evaluated using field investigations
to determine the viability of the alternative authentication approach.
1.2 Thesis Statement
Therefore, the thesis statement is as follows:
The viability of a recognition-based graphical authentication mecha-
nism can only be evaluated in the wild.
Thesis Statement
The steps and research questions needed to confirm or reject the above thesis
statement are outlined in the next section.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The thesis structure is outlined below:
• The direction of the graphical alternative authentication approach is out-
lined in the next chapter. The Literature Survey outlines the various
forms the alternative authentication approach could take before settling on
a knowledge-based approach. Subsequently, the chapter states that recogni-
tion is the most effective way to extract knowledge from the user’s memory.
The chapter also outlines the various graphical authentication approaches
proposed and discussed in research before concluding the alternative ap-
proach will rely on images. Consequently, the chapter outlines states faces
are the best image-type for use in the authentication. Lastly, the chap-
ter ends with a review of observation-resilient approaches before stating a
software-based strategy will be used for the alternative approach.
• The design, implementation and evaluation of the approach is outlined in
the Alternative Authentication Mechanism chapter. The conclusion
is that the alternative authentication mechanism showed promised in con-
trolled evaluation and that the mechanism can move to inclusion in a task
and deployment to the field.
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• The potential authentication context is outlined and discussed in the Eval-
uation Task chapter. Numerous contexts and authentication tasks are
discussed and evaluated for risk before a task is selected for the field eval-
uations of the authentication mechanism. Furthermore, several research
questions are outlined for exploration in subsequent evaluations.
• The alternative authentication mechanism is evaluated as part of an appli-
cation in three field investigations. The three applications are codenamed:
Tom, Dick and Harry. The design, implementation and evaluation of the
first application are outlined and discussed in the Tom chapter. The con-
clusion of the evaluation is that the selected image set is unsuitable and an
alternative must be sourced.
• The design, implementation and evaluation of the first application are out-
lined and discussed in the Dick chapter. The application relied on a per-
sonal image collection sourced from a popular social network. The images
were analysed and face images extracted. Furthermore, users were expected
to select distractor and target images. Consequently, the registration pro-
cess took too long to complete. Moreover, there was concern that attackers
may be able to identify friends selected. Subsequently, the next iteration of
the application had to source an alternative image set.
• The design, implementation and evaluation of the first application are out-
lined and discussed in the Harry chapter. The application continued to rely
on a personal image collection sourced from a popular social network. How-
ever, face images were generated using tags rather than analysis. Moreover,
more images were sourced for each target and distractor to cycle through
images to ensure resilience against attackers and improve retention of the
authentication secret. However, the approach was not well received by
users.
• The penultimate chapter is the Discussion. The chapter essentially argues
that field evaluations were the most apt tool for assessing the viability of the
alternative authentication mechanism. However, the alternative authenti-
cation mechanism was simply not viable for the envisioned authentication
context.
• The final chapter is the Conclusion. The final chapter essentially offers
an overview of the entire thesis before concluding that field investigations
should be used to determine the viability of an authentication mechanism
for a given context. The outcome of this evaluation, the alternative au-
thentication mechanism assessed was not viable. Alternative directions for
future study are outlined in a discussion on future work.
11
Chapter 2
Literature Survey
Passwords are among the most powerful and prominent authentication solutions
in use. Nevertheless, the problems with passwords are long established, since early
use, passwords have proved difficult to use and recall [55]. Furthermore, poor
passwords not only have the potential to inflict their users but countless others
as well [80]. Moreover, password replacement and recovery cost is estimated at
$17 per incident and generates an estimated 30% of support calls [157].
Nevertheless, while the need to advance beyond passwords is clear, the direc-
tion is not [38]. The assumption is often that as tokens are easily misplaced and
knowledge easily forgotten, the only direction for authentication is the dependable
and indisputable biometric [199]. However, password popularity persists, most
likely due the numerous advantages and benefits the concept posses. Therefore,
an alternative knowledge-based solution may allow authentication to progress
beyond the password in some key contexts.
Consequently, the following chapter justifies the foundation of an alterna-
tive knowledge-based solution that relies on face images. The ensuing section,
§2.1, offers an overview of authentication before outlining a taxonomy of various
approaches, §2.2. The conclusion is that knowledge-based solutions are still ad-
vantageous for mainstream use. Consequently, various knowledge-based solutions
are considered, §2.3, before determining a graphical recognition-based authentica-
tion approach is optimal, §2.4. Therefore, various images types and obfuscation
solutions are considered for use in such an approach — §2.5 and §2.6, respec-
tively. Lastly, §2.7 summarises the foundation of the alternative authentication
mechanism.
2.1 Authentication Overview
There are several potential authentication definitions and uses. Section 2.1.1
defines authentication in terms of users before outlining potential uses in §2.1.2.
Lastly, §2.1.3 outlines a minimal set of goals for user-facing authentication.
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2.1.1 Definition
Needham and Schroeder provide one of the earliest definitions of authentication
in digital networked systems, as follows:
“verifying the identity of the communicating principles to another”
Needham and Schroeder [187, p. 993]
The above definition, published in 1978, offers a clear, concise explanation of au-
thentication. However, while succinct and applicable to authentication as whole,
it less informative of the process when individuals are involved. Shockley outlines
an definition, 15 years later, that incorporate users:
“In general, we can think of the authentication data as consisting
of two parts: an authenticator which is held by the actual user and
an authenticand which is stored as part of the account data record.
An authentication algorithm is built into the trusted computing base
that, given an (authenticator, authenticand) pair determines, with an
appropriately high probability of success, whether or not the given
authenticator and authenticand match.”
Shockley [251, p. 185]
Shockley’s definition is far more comprehensive and incorporates the typical steps
or implementation of an authentication process. Moreover, Shockley highlights
the involvement of users in the process. This aspect is admittedly absent from
the succinct definition offered by Needham and Schroeder. Rao and Yalamanchili
evolve the definition further, 19 years later, explaining authentication in far
plainer terms, as follows:
“Authentication determines whether a user should be allowed access
to a particular system or resource”
Rao and Yalamanchili [215, p. 163]
Rao and Yalamanchili, in the above definition, essentially frame authentication as
a process designed to serve a user. Nevertheless, the aforementioned definitions,
spanning 34 years, share a common thread: that authentication is a process of
confirming a claimed identity.
The aforementioned definitions all have similar foundations. The process of
authentication has remained consistent between 1978 and 2013. The definition
offered by Needham and Schroeder is as relevant and accurate as the one outlined
by Rao and Yalamanchili.
However, there has been an evolution in terms of the principles or parties
involved in authentication. The definition offered by Needham and Schroeder
delineates authentication in a purely mechanical fashion, involving seemingly re-
liable and infallible actors. The definitions offered by Shockley, as well as Rao
and Yalamanchili, focus on users, actors that are unpredictable and unreliable.
Therefore, the user must be factored into any authentication process and must
be given due consideration in the use and goals of an authentication process.
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2.1.2 Use
There could be many reasons for the use of authentication in a system. Berson
et al. outlines two key uses for authentication [26], as follows:
• Access control
The need to regulate access to a restricted object. The regulation is granu-
lar; it could be system-wide or of very fine-grain nature. An authentication
mechanism could be used to regulate access to entire operating system,
e.g. Microsoft Windows, access to a specific file, e.g. password protected
Microsoft Word document, or access to a system service, e.g. Google email.
• Accountability
The need to attach responsibility to a user action. An authentication mech-
anism could be used required to authorise the removal of a document or to
uninstall an application. An authentication mechanism could also be used
to confirm a transaction, e.g. purchasing a song from a digital music store.
However, not all authentication solutions necessarily support such uses, e.g.
group-based schemes that rely on shared authentication secrets can be used to
regulate access but do not ensure accountability. Nonetheless, the aforementioned
uses are likely the two most common uses of authentication and solutions that
do not support both should be avoided.
Furthermore, an authentication solution can only support such uses, if the au-
thentication mechanism itself is usable and reliable. Consequently, a minimal set
of specific goals must be set to ensure the success of an authentication mechanism.
2.1.3 Goals
Kurzban outlines a minimal set of goals that all authentication mechanisms
should achieve [164], as follows:
• Avoid false positives
An authentication mechanism must strive to ensure that attackers or un-
desirable individuals are not authenticated. If the primary uses of authen-
tication are control over access and accountability for actions, then there
must be confidence in an authentication mechanism. An authentication
mechanism that permits too many false positives is not functionally fit for
purpose.
• Avoid false negatives
An authentication mechanism must minimise the scenario where an actual
user is not authenticated. If legitimate users are unable to access services
or complete transactions it does not only have a serious impact on an indi-
vidual but on an organisation as well, potentially impacting profits.
• Minimal burden
The authentication mechanism must impose minimal burden on the user.
The authentication mechanism can not be overly demanding.
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• Cost-Benefit Balance
The authentication mechanism should represent a cost-benefit balance. If
the purpose of the authentication process is to regulate access or confirm
payment then the expected user-effort should, proportionally, reflect the
risk.
The user interface of an authentication mechanism is important in achieving these
goals. The password approach will not necessarily be superseded by an authenti-
cation approach with a similar user interface. An authentication mechanism can
take many forms and some interfaces may prove more suitable for modern applica-
tions and devices. Therefore, the user interface of the authentication mechanism
must be considered.
2.2 Taxonomy of Authentication Approaches
The National Institute of Standards and Technology categorises authentication
approaches [180], as follows:
• Knowledge-based
The authentication secret takes the form of knowledge, known to the claimed
identity.
• Token-based
The authentication secret takes the form of a physical token, possessed by
the claimed identity.
• Biometric-based
The authentication secret takes the form of a physiological and/or be-
havioural trait, belonging to the claimed identity.
Wood labels the categories in much plainer terms, as something the user knows,
has or is [295]. The NIST categorisation is a typical taxonomy adopted by many
authentication researchers [90, 134, 212]. Nevertheless, there are authentication
mechanisms that rely on cognitive processing [248] and social relationships [41]
that are, arguably, unclassifiable using the above labels. Therefore, an additional
category is:
• Emerging Approaches
The authentication secret is not knowledge, token or biometric-based, in-
stead the approach relies on another form of secret. The authentication
secret itself, depends on the approach, e.g. a mechanism based on social
relationships relies on a user’s relationship with other individuals.
The aforementioned classifications can be used to categorise most authentication
solutions involving individuals. Nevertheless, authentication approaches from
each category or several from one category can be combined to provide additional
security [194]. Therefore, an another category is:
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• Multi-factor Approach
There is more than one authentication secret or authentication approach
involved in the authentication process, e.g. a token in the form of bank
card coupled with knowledge of a personal identification number (PIN).
The aforementioned category is primarily used to improve the strength of authen-
tication within a task. However, there are other authentication solutions that are
not necessarily designed for inclusion in primary tasks but are used to recovery
from authentication failure. The user may be unable to complete the primary au-
thentication process as they have forgotten the authentication secret. Therefore,
the last remaining classification in the taxonomy is authentication approaches
designed to recover from failure:
• Recovery Approaches
These are back-up authentication approaches, used when an individual
needs to reset or recover a secret used in the aforementioned approaches.
The aforementioned categories comprise an authentication taxonomy that acts
as umbrella for several authentication solutions that involve individuals. The
categories are outlined and discussed in §2.2.1 to §2.2.6. Lastly, §2.2.7 outlines
the optimal category for the alternative authentication solution.
2.2.1 Knowledge-based Approach
Knowledge-based authentication is the process of confirming a claimed identity
through knowledge of a secret, one known only to you and the other party. The
knowledge needs to remain a secret if is to be used for authentication. Therefore,
individuals are advised to memorise such knowledge and not to record or share
it. The knowledge itself could be a public event or record, but the use thereof
must be kept a secret, e.g. date of an anniversary.
In actuality this is a terrible secret to use since a date is information, has
meaning and, worse still, is connected to the individual. This makes the title of
this category rather misleading, since the word knowledge implies information, an
object, which an individual has extracted or developed personally through expe-
riences or learning. Knowledge-based secrets are ideally prodigious, impersonal
and meaningless.
Alphanumeric authentication is the best known implementation of knowledge-
based authentication. There are two reasons for this: (1) the concept of passwords
is one which is centuries old and is easily understood by many (2) the interaction
mechanism, i.e. keyboard, is over a century old and one can easily enter passwords
without additional training or expense. This made passwords the authentication
mechanism of choice for early systems, such as the Compatible Time Sharing
System (CTSS) [56], and operating system designers such as Ken Thompson and
Dennis Ritchie.
Once again, password is a misnomer as, ideally, it should be a lengthy indeci-
pherable string of characters and symbols and certainly not one with meaning or
found in a dictionary. The reality is that many individuals use words which are
familiar to them as passwords [231].
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Morris & Thompson discuss the problems of alphanumeric authentication as
early as 1979, specifically stating effort had to be spent in ensuring that individu-
als created passwords which were ‘less predictable’ [183]. Indeed, Klein was able
to uncover 25% of the passwords used, in 15,000 accounts [155].
Klein used various strategies to extract passwords, the first one was to use
personal information. The project leader behind CTSS, Fernado J. Corbato´,
stated that although passwords seemed theoretically practical, in practice, they
presented many problems. Corbato´ argues passwords are difficult to remember,
easily compromised and difficult to revoke when shared [55].
2.2.2 Token-based Approach
Token-based authentication relies on an individual presenting an object or token.
The object itself acts as an authenticator and it does not need to be kept secret,
just safe. Consequently, an individual is expected to carry the token at all times
to avoid inconvenience.
Spender argues driving licenses are likely the most common form of token-
based authenticator [256]. However, modern token-based authentication relies
on increasingly sophisticated tokens or objects. These modern tokens are far
more expensive than knowledge-based authentication but comparatively cheap
when contrasted with biometric-based authentication. Table 2.1 outlines the
principal costs of modern authentication tokens. Bojinov and Boneh state modern
authentication tokens are comparatively expensive and rely on a central system
or server [37].
Device Price Power Usability
Token Reader Token Reader
RSA SecurID $50 >$10,000 Low Low Poor
Vasco Digipass Go $10 $500 Low Low Poor
Car RKE fob $5 $5 Low Low Average
HID Proximity $2 $100 None Average Good
RFID (or NFC) <$1 $50 None Average Good
Smartcard $2 $10 None Low Poor
Magnetic stripe <$1 $50 None Low Poor
QR (via camera) <$1 $10 None Low Poor
Bluetooth $10 $5 Average Low Average
Table 2.1: Hardware tokens and principal concerns [37, p. 15]
The tokens or devices outlined in Table 2.1 are not traditionally targeted at
consumers but rather deployed by enterprises. However, variants of RSA SecurID,
a popular token-based authentication approach with enterprises [234] are being
deployed to consumers, e.g. online bank customers.
However, while such tokens are tamper-proof, they are still susceptible to
theft. An attacker could continue to use the token until it is reported and de-
activated. Moreover, while the attacker-effort necessary to steal a token may
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be more laborious than compromising knowledge-based authentication, the ap-
proach does not necessary reduce attacks, merely transfers an attacker’s focus
and energy elsewhere [232].
Therefore, while token-based authentication may be considered by enterprise,
as a more practical approach to achieve security objectives, the approach is not
without flaws. Nevertheless, token-based authentication is particularly suitable
for large organisations. Tokens can be produced relatively inexpensively if created
on a large scale. The tokens themselves can offer dynamic entry and fine-grained
access to resources, unlike traditional door-keys. Furthermore, sophisticated to-
kens can support the modern-day bureaucracy associated with large-scale organ-
isations.
2.2.3 Biometric-based Approach
Prabhakar et al. defines a biometric-based authentication approach, as follows:
“A biometric system is essentially a pattern-recognition system that
recognizes a person based on a feature vector derived from a specific
physiological or behavioral characteristic that the person possesses.”
Prabhakar et al. [213, p. 33]
Therefore, a biometric-based approach relies on authentication secrets generated
from one of two characteristics [172]. The characteristics are, as follows:
• Physiological
The physical characteristics of an individual, such as an individual’s finger-
print, palm-print or retina.
• Behavioural
The behavioural traits of an individual, such as an individual’s gait, voice,
signature or mouse movements.
These characteristics represent the primary advantage of biometric-based authen-
tication, at least from a user perspective, as they are traits relatively distinct to
an individual. The user is not required to carry an authentication token or mem-
orise a meaningless string. The authentication secret is an aspect of the user,
that is always with them, thus, an individual will never forget it or misplace it.
There are many aspects of a user, that could be used as a biometric authenti-
cation secret. Jain et al. states any aspect of an individual could be used as a
biometric authentication secret, as long as it fulfils certain requirements [127].
The requirements are, as follows:
• Universality
The feature is one that is possessed by everyone.
• Distinctiveness
The feature is unique, in that it is discernible from another individual’s.
• Performance
The feature itself should be relatively constant over a significant amount of
time, i.e. not rapidly degrading or changing.
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• Collectibility
The feature itself can be quantified.
Biometric-based authenticators are arguably difficult and intrusive to collect when
contrasted to, say, the user-generated authentication secrets used in knowledge-
based approaches. However, biometric-based authentication secrets do not re-
quire the user to carry tokens or remember passwords; indeed, little is required
of the user. Nevertheless, physiological biometric-based authentication secrets
require an extraction step, e.g. the user’s fingerprint is taken. The hardware
involved in the extraction step may have a higher failure rate, such as several
failed attempts in every 100, than a traditional keyboard or token reader [194].
The equipment may also suffer from any number of environmental effects, e.g.
condensation, lighting or dust, all may result in errors in biometric-based authen-
tication. Prabhakar et al. states biometric-based authentication suffers from two
types of recognition error [213], as follows:
• False match rate (FMR)
The biometric-based system when presented two patterns from different in-
dividuals, incorrectly determines the patterns belong to a single individual.
• False non-match rate (FNMR)
The biometric-based system when presented two patterns from a single in-
dividual, incorrectly determines the patterns belong to different individuals.
Prabhakar et al. states a biometric-based system makes a balance between the
aforementioned rates. The data being extracted is incredibly complex and the
speed at which a sophisticated system is able to extract salient components and
match these against a large database of such features could be time-consuming
and pointless, especially if it generates a false match. Jain et al. argues the speed
and success of results depends on the function of the biometric system [128].
Furthermore, asides from the speed and accuracy another concern is the au-
thentication secret itself. The features used in biometric-based authentication
cannot be replaced. If an individual’s fingerprint has been extracted and com-
promised as an authentication secret, it is no longer suitable for use as an au-
thenticator. However, a biometric secret does not need to be collected and stored
in such a way that it can be repurposed. An example would be the use of fin-
ger geometry rather than a fingerprint, storing measurements rather than the
print itself. This process is incredibly common and used throughout the world,
including controlling access to attractions in Walt Disney World, Florida [285].
However, such questionable low-level operations is the limitation of such sim-
plistic biometric-based authentication secrets, since geometry is not a unique,
distinct or reliable secret. Thus, it holds little to no repurposing benefit.
The popularity of the geometric approach, among corporations, is partly due
to the simple and inexpensive implementation cost associated with using such
biometric-based authenticators. Furthermore, as advances are made and costs
are reduced, biometric-based authentication is likely to increase in popularity,
as it requires little from individuals and offers vast amounts of information to
organisations.
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2.2.4 Recovery Approaches
An authentication approach can fail for many reasons. However, there is al-
ways the possibility that authentication fails simply because the user is unable
to present the necessary information or object required to authenticate. These
situations are usually addressed by offering an auxiliary recovery approach or
procedure. The recovery approaches for the aforementioned authentication ap-
proaches, are, as follows:
• Knowledge-based
The recovery process concludes with the replacement of the authentication
secret. Just argues that good recovery approaches are designed to rely
on information the user already knows rather than information they are
required to memorise [143]. Therefore, challenge-questions are a promi-
nent and widespread approach for authentication secret replacement. The
approach essentially presents a user is a series of questions, if answered
correctly, the user is permitted to replace the authentication secret.
Unfortunately, challenge-questions may introduce more problems than they
solve. Schechter et al. discovered that 20% of users could not recall challenge-
question answers within six months and that 13% of challenge-question
could be guessed within five attempts [240]. Furthermore, Just and Aspinall
argue challenge-questions reliant on personal information are not necessar-
ily painless to answer or difficult to guess [145]. The reality is that many
challenge-questions can be answered by consulting public records [106] or
social network services [214]. However, Just and Aspinall argue security
can be improved by simply asking more questions [146]. Furthermore, the
strength of the approach may be improved by using other channels, such as
by post [144].
Nevertheless, researchers have proposed alternatives to the dominant challenge-
question approach. Renaud and Just proposes a recovery approach based on
graphical cues [221]. The approach is essentially a challenge-based approach
with an added graphical hint or cue. Schechter et al. adopts a different re-
covery strategy and outlines an approach based on retrieving recovery-codes
from various trustees [241]. The process requires an individual to specify
a number of trustees or insurers, in advance of failure. Unfortunately, nei-
ther solution is able to overcome the concern of close friends and relatives
successfully completing the recovery process.
• Token-based
The authentication token is replaced, e.g. replacement of driver’s license.
However, a recovery approach does not necessarily need to result, only,
in the replacement of a token. The system and recovery process can be
designed to generate a temporary token or authentication secret. Brainard
et al. proposes an approach that relies on somebody you know, acting as a
temporary token [41]. The concept is not dissimilar to the aforementioned
trustee solution, the approach expects another individual vouching for a
user, i.e. another individual confirms the identity of a user.
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• Biometric-based
Biometric-based authentication approaches are similar to token-based ap-
proach in that immediate password recovery or replacement is not viable.
If an individual loses their limbs, hands or eyes, then another biometric
authentication secret would need to be generated.
The interesting aspect of the aforementioned recovery approaches is that they
are not specifically distinct from authentication approaches. A recovery process
is essentially an authentication process. However, recovery processes are generally
unsuitable as they are typically protracted and required effort to complete [144].
Nonetheless, many of the ideas and concepts used in recovery approaches
are present in authentication approaches, evident from the nascent emerging ap-
proaches that rely on somebody you know.
2.2.5 Emerging Approaches
The primary categories for authentication approaches are knowledge-based, token-
based and biometric-based. Nevertheless, there are authentications approaches
that may be deserving of distinct branches [41, 248]. The proposed additional
branches are:
• Something you process
Shah et al. proposes algorithmic-based authentication or something you
process [248]. These authentication approaches rely on knowledge of a secret
formula to authenticate. The authentication secret is generated with the
secret formula, using variables presented by the authentication approach.
• Somebody you know
Brainard et al. proposes social-based authentication or somebody you know
[41]. These authentication approaches rely on social relationships to authen-
ticate. The authentication secret could be anything but is obtained from
an ally or acquaintance.
However, while the authentication approaches, contained within these categories,
are certainly novel, they are arguably not distinctive enough to warrant specific
branches.
2.2.6 Multi-factor Approaches
O’Gorman defines a multi-factor authentication approach, as follows:
“Different types of authenticators can be combined to enhance secu-
rity. This is called multi-factor authentication. For security purposes,
each authenticator result must be satisfied; in effect a Boolean AND
operation is performed for each factor’s authentication results so all
must be affirmative.”
O’Gorman [194, p. 7]
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Therefore, multi-factor authentication is essentially the use of two or more au-
thentication approaches to authenticate an individual. Table 2.2.6 outlines a
comparison of the various multi-factor combinations [194].
O’Gorman argues the combination of authentication approaches, e.g. owner-
ship of a plastic card token and knowledge of a secret PIN, is superior to relying
on a single authentication approach [194]. Furthermore, Bhargav-Spantzel et al.
argue that multi-factor authentication not only offers superior strength but is nec-
essary to make some authentication approaches, such as biometrics, practical [27].
Similarly, Jin et al. argues that many of the problems associated with biometrics,
Authenticator Security Convenience Example
Combination Advantage Drawback
Knowledge Lost/stolen token Must carry token PIN-enabled
and Object- protected by and memorise bank card
based password password
Object- and Lost/stolen token Must carry token, Photo-ID
ID- protected by ID but not ID if it is a
based biometric
Knowledge- Two factors Have to memorise Password and
and ID- provide security in password and have biometric for
based case either ID computer
compromised access.
Knowledge-, A third factor to Have to memorise Military
Object-, and provide security in password,carry applications
ID- case two other token, and have requiring photo-
based factors are ID ID checked by
compromised guard, plus
password
Table 2.2: Security and convenience assessment of multi-factor combinations [194,
p. 8].
i.e. difficult to revoke and inconvenient to use, can be addressed by incorporating
the approach into a multi-factor solution [133]. Moreover, Aloul et al. argues
expecting users to manage multiple multi-factor authentication approaches has
become increasingly realistic, as mobile phones for most consumers have been
superseded by slimline and sophisticated smartphones [2]. Lastly, multi-factor
authentication has been widely deployed to users.
The Chip and PIN approach serves as popular and successful example of
multi-factor authentication in the United Kingdom [18, 19]. Nonetheless, rather
than eradicated fraud, attackers are simply adopting more sophisticated tactics
and strategies [20]. Furthermore, Murdoch et al. argues that the multi-factor
authentication approach is far from successful and is fundamentally broken [184].
Nevertheless, while Chip and PIN may have problems, its popularity indicates
the potential for multi-factor authentication with users.
However, others argue multi-factor approaches, such as Chip and PIN, do not
solve many of the problems associated with the approach they replace [5, 243].
Schneier asserts users will still write authentication secrets down, they will reuse
them and they will still share them [243] . Nevertheless, Henry argues such
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remarks discount the fact that authentication is only part of an organisation’s
infrastructure [115]. Nonetheless, Henry arguably discounts the importance users
place on convenience [287]. Consequently, users will behave insecurely and adopt
novel strategies to improve convenience.
Nonetheless, multi-factor could arguably be used to improve the convenience
of some authentication approaches, such as biometrics. However, Rathgeb and
Uhl argue multi-factor approaches encompassing biometrics make assumptions
that are not necessarily valid, such as presuming other authenticators are not
compromised [217]. Rathgeb and Uhl state researchers and designers of some
multi-factor solutions make illogical assumptions, e.g. a password or random
number can not fall into the wrong hands. However, if that was the case, there
would be no need for multi-factor authentication approaches in the first instance,
the impervious password or one time random string would suffice [217]. Further-
more, Rathgeb and Uhl highlight an interesting aspect of multi-factor authen-
tication, in that such solutions are essentially strong chains of weak links. The
authentication approaches contained with a multi-factor solution are essentially
flawed, otherwise they would not need to be combined with others in the first
instance.
Therefore, a multi-factor authentication solution is akin to making lemonade
from lemons. The primary benefit of such a solution is strength [194]. The cost is
complexity, users are expected to manage several authenticators, leading to a po-
tentially less convenient solution, e.g. lengthier authentication times. Moreover,
increasingly complexity only serves to undermine security, as developers and im-
plementations struggle to manage such solutions [296]. However, such complexity
costs can be avoided if the multi-factor solution is avoided in favour of a single
strong authentication approach.
Unfortunately, there is no single strong authentication approach. Authen-
tication mechanisms are invariably flawed, suboptimal or undesirable in some
respects. Therefore, authentication approaches must be carefully considered to
determine if such flaws represent a serious threat within a particular context
before resorting to a multi-factor solution.
2.2.7 Comparison of Approaches
The reality is that when users are confronted with the choice between conve-
nience and security, they favour convenience [287]. Consequently, users have
adopted tactics when using passwords that ensure convenience but nonetheless
erode security. Therefore, the aim is to progress beyond the password as the de
facto authentication approach by developing an alternative solution that is both
convenient and secure.
Consequently, the previous sections outlined the interface direction considered
for the foundation of the alternative authentication mechanism. Three of these
interface branches, namely: emerging, recovery and multi-factor, were quickly
discounted for several reasons. The ‘emerging’ branch contained approaches that
were either loosely defined or were not particularly compelling or distinct. The
‘multi-factor’ branch is focused on improving security rather than convenience.
Lastly, the ‘recovery’ branch while focused on improving convenience overall,
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arguably the branch covers authentication solutions unsuitable for primary au-
thentication due to complexity.
Consequently, research was quickly curtailed to the traditional NIST cate-
gories [180], as any could from the foundation for the alternative authentication
approach. Table 2.3 outlines the distinct aspects of all three categories [194].
The competing authentication approaches, i.e. knowledge, token and biomet-
User Authentication
Knowledge- Object- ID-
based based based
Commonly Referred Password, Token Biometric
to as: Secret
Support Authentication Security or Possession Uniqueness and
by: obscurity personalisation
Security Defense: Closely kept Closely held Forge-resistant
Traditional: Combination Metal Driver’s
Example lock key license
Digital: Computer Key-less Fingerprint
password car entry
Security Drawback: Less secret with Insecure Difficult to
each use if lost replace
Table 2.3: O’Gorman categorisation of authentication approaches [194, p. 7]
rics, all have associated costs as well as different strengths and weaknesses. To-
ken and biometric-based authentication approaches are essentially stronger than
knowledge-based approaches but are far less convenient [194]. O’Gorman argues
both token and biometric-based authentication approaches should be delivered
as part of a multi-factor solution [194].
The motivation is that a token without an additional factor is easily com-
promised if stolen. In case of biometrics, coupling the approach with a token
containing identifying information can make the authentication process more ef-
ficient. However, as part of networked systems and services both tokens and bio-
metrics are far more problematic [194]. The recover and replacement approaches
are far more complex than knowledge-based approaches, as users need to visit
specialised facilities or wait on delivery of sophisticated tokens. The approaches
are simply far less convenient and cost considerably more due to the complexity
of additional hardware.
Furthermore, most successful consumer applications are coming from small
software houses and sole-traders [10]. Apple recently announced that 40 Billion
such applications had been downloaded by users, 20 Billion being delivered in the
past year alone [235]. Consequently, sole-traders and small software houses will
heavily scrutinise administration costs of authentication solutions. Nevertheless,
smartphone manufacturers could simply provide hardware and software solutions
[2] and subsume the administrator costs. However, authentication is part of many
systems and services, not just smartphones, consequently the device would need
to communicate with a wide-range of others, introducing further complexity and
potentially weakening the overall solution.
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Furthermore, another concern is that a small group of large and powerful
smartphone manufacturers would have amass vast amounts of information about
individuals. The smartphone manufacturer would have an overview of all the
systems and services an individual uses. Moreover, in terms of biometrics, an
organisation would have access to a wealth of data that may have applications
beyond authentication. The data an individual provides for authentication could
be applied in health or even advertising ventures.
The user may simply not be aware of the potential applications for the data
they are providing for authentication. Furthermore, another aspect of token and
biometric authentication is that the transaction can be performed passively. An
arguable advantage of knowledge-based authentication is that the user has to be
engaged to authenticate. The authentication approach has to interact with the
user and keep them in the loop. A potential concern for biometric and token-based
authentication approaches is that users can be removed from the authentication
loop.
Therefore, there are several concerns surrounding biometric and token-based
authentication. Furthermore, these concerns only serve to highlight the advan-
tages of knowledge-based solutions. The reality is that knowledge-based authen-
tication secrets are are vastly superior in terms of convenience to token and bio-
metric approaches [194]. A knowledge-based authentication secret is (1) easily
replaced, (2) has little to no applicability beyond the process itself and (3) users
need to be engaged for it to be extracted. Therefore, given these advantages
knowledge-based authentication was selected as the foundation for the alterna-
tive authentication solution.
Therefore, the aim was to develop a knowledge-based alternative to the pass-
word. Nonetheless, the key concern of knowledge-based authentication is that
users do not memorise the authentication secret. In term passwords, users create
simple strings that are memorable but are not strong enough to withstand assaults
from attackers. The concern can be characterised as the ‘password problem’, i.e.
users are expected to generate lengthy meaningless strings and memorise them
[292]. The problem is that users find it very difficult to memorise meaningless
information, never mind memorising a meaningless string for every system and
service they use. Wiedenbeck et al. states:
“A better way to overcome the password problem is to develop pass-
word systems that reduce fundamental memory problems”
Wiedenbeck et al. [292, p. 105]
Consequently, memorability became the focus of the design of the alternative
knowledge-based authentication approach. The aim was to improve the memo-
rability of the authentication secret used within the alternative knowledge-based
approach to negate the need for coping strategies.
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2.3 Taxonomy of Knowledge-based Authentica-
tion Approaches
The reality is that many users adopt undesirable coping strategies to bear the
burden of memorising knowledge-based authentication secrets. Users resort to
creating simple authentication secrets, reusing them or recording them. These
actions are unsurprising, as users are motivated out of concern, namely that they
will be unable to complete tasks as they will not be able to complete authentica-
tion.
Therefore, in designing and developing knowledge-based authentication ap-
proaches, researchers have focused on improving memorability of authentication
secrets. Unfortunately, the human brain is still very much a black-box in some
respects - making it perfect for storing secrets but difficult for scientist to under-
stand and investigate. Nevertheless, many researchers have contributed greatly
to the study of memory.
Scoville and Milner investigated patients who had received bilateral brain
surgery and reported that a memory defect was always present when the hip-
pocampus and hippocampal gyrus had been bilaterally corrupted [246]. Thus,
these regions of the brain are deemed central to memory.
Therefore, forgetting could be the result of natural decay within this region.
However, Underwood argued forgetting was not necessarily natural decay but
caused by previous memories [277]. Craik and Lockhart suggested development
of memory traces should be considered in terms of depth of processing, i.e. extent
of sensory and semantic interpretation [59]. Memory traces deemed weak are
those which progress little beyond sensory interpretation, thus are susceptible to
decay. Furthermore, Craik and Lockhart suggest information that sits well with
existing knowledge will be rapidly processed to greater depths. However, Wixted
argues that there are limited resources in memory creation and development,
when those resources are taxed it leads to the detriment of previous memories
[294].
Therefore, while there is still much discussion surrounding the creation and
destruction of memories, there does appear agreement on the key stages of mem-
ory. Memory can be decomposed into three key stages or processes, as follows:
1. Encoding
Information is extracted from various senses and encoded into a format
suitable for storage.
2. Storage
An encoding is stored in memory, for retrieval.
3. Retrieval
An encoding is extracted from storage in response to some sensory infor-
mation or activity.
The aforementioned steps are important in the design of alternative solutions.
The aim of alternative authentication solutions to the password have often focused
on one, if not all three stages to improve the memorability of knowledge-based
26
authentication secrets. The proposed solution may aim at improving the initial
encoding or may focus on improving the interface to retrieve the authentication
secret when required.
The authentication solutions to overcome the shortcomings and concerns of
passwords can be roughly classified using one the following categories:
• Alphanumeric authentication
The proposed solutions are iterations or improvements on the original pass-
word, still relaying on alphanumeric characters.
• Alternatives to alphanumeric authentication
The proposed solution is arguably still an iteration on the original password
concept but relying on sound and/or graphics rather than alphanumeric
characters.
The knowledge-based authentication solutions proposed by researchers to over-
come the problems of passwords are outlined discussed, in terms of the aforemen-
tioned classification.
2.3.1 Alphanumeric Authentication
The many advantages of passwords has lead to much interest in addressing the
primary disadvantage, namely memorability. Therefore, rather than disregard-
ing passwords completely, researchers have instead attempted to iterate on the
approach to improve the strength and memorability of authentication secrets.
Zviran & Haga outline various alternative approaches that could be used to gen-
erate stronger passwords [305]. The approaches are, as follows:
• System-generated passwords
Allowing a system to create a secret, rather than a user, ensures the secret
is closer to gibberish than predictable information. Random strings of gib-
berish are strong against brute-force attacks, but are difficult for users to
recall [298].
• Passphrases
Porter proposes the concept of a passphrase [212]. The user creates a se-
quence of words, that together, act as an authentication secret. Porter
argues the phrase is more memorable to the user but harder for an attacker
to guess, as it contains many more characters than a simple traditional
password.
• Associative passwords
Smith proposes the use of word association to authenticate users [253]. The
user creates a collection of cues and responses. A pair is randomly selected
and a user must provided the respective response for the cue presented.
• Cognitive passwords
Zviran refines the process of associative passwords by probing a user’s per-
sonal experience [304]. This quiz-based approach extracts several pieces of
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knowledge from the user. The individual is presented a series of fact-based
and opinion-based questions. A fact-based question would be ‘What was
the first school you attended?’, while an opinion-based question would be
‘What is your favourite film?’.
However, while the proposed approaches aim primarily to strengthen the memo-
rability of alphanumeric authentication secrets, others have focused on increasing
the strength of them, namely:
• Persuasive Text Passwords
Forget et al. propose persuasive text passwords (PTPs), an approach that
attempts to couple the strength of user and system-generated passwords
[86]. The approach expects users to initially create a password, then the
system randomly inserts characters into the secret authentication string.
The user then using the result string to authenticate.
• Password Algorithms
Crabb adopted the use of password algorithms at the NASA-Ames Re-
search Center [58]. Passwords sheets were widely distributed to employees
at the research centre. However, out of concerns that individuals other than
employees could observe the passwords an algorithm was separately com-
municated to employees. Consequently, the freely distributed passwords
acted more like seeds for a secret algorithm that individuals were required
to internalise.
• One-time Passwords
Lamport originally proposed the idea of one-time passwords (OTPs) to
tackle the problems of insecure communication and password breaches [165].
The concept is simple, an individuals uses a different password every time
they authenticate with a system. Therefore, a used password is worthless
as it can only be used once.
The aforementioned iterations and improvements represent an attempt to address
the problems of passwords with novel authentication solutions. However, an
alternative is to support the user in using the password approach, properly. The
password is incredibly powerful, versatile as well as inexpensive to implement and
explain. Unfortunately, the concept is riddled with problems as users continue to
wield it improperly. Therefore, the following approaches could be used to support
users in creating passwords:
• Policy and Education
A combination of strict policies and education could be used to improve
passwords [306]. Users could be provided with training and tools to create
stronger, more superior passwords.
• Proactive Password Compliance
Proactive password checkers could be used to assess the suitability of user-
generated passwords [34]. The user would still generate a password but the
system would provide feedback informing the user of the potential strength
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of the authentication secret. Furthermore, the system could enforce com-
pliance, rejecting passwords that have perceived, insufficient strength.
• Password Managers
A software solution that simply adopts the burden of users memorising
passwords. The software would simply manage the passwords issued and
created by users. The user would simply be expected to memorise a single,
strong password to access the manager. Alternatively, the password man-
ager could rely on another form of authentication to access it, such as token
or biometric-based authentication.
The aforementioned approaches for improving passwords as well as strategies for
improving user choice are discussed over the ensuing sections.
Passphrases
Shay et al. explored the performance of system-assigned passphrases and discov-
ered that they perform similar to system-assigned passwords [250]. Passphrases
were not easier to recall than passwords and users still recorded them. Further-
more, Shay et al. states passphrases take a longer time to enter and suffer from
‘typos’. Therefore, Shay et al. propose use of auto-correction to avoid typing
mistakes in passphrase entry. However, Shay et al. caution about the relevancy
of their results as the authentication mechanism was not explored as part of a
system or workflow. They argue the performance of passphrases in the real-world
could be dramatically different.
The focus of passphrases is to promote the use of lengthier, alphanumeric
strings. If an individual mistypes a character, the entire phrase is rejected. There-
fore, the concept of passphrases seems little more than marketing. There is no
technical difference between a long password and a passphrase. However, Spec-
tor & Ginzberg propose Pass-sentence [255], an authentication approach based
on semantics and natural language analysis to authenticate an individual. The
approach allows for the interchange of words, as long as those words have the
same semantic primitive, e.g. ‘buy’, ‘sell’ and ‘trade’ as all distill down to the
concept of ownership transfer. Spector & Ginzberg state user could neglect words
from the sentence, that system could subsequently probe or base access controls
on. Spector & Ginzberg claim superior memorability with a developed prototype,
although these claims have yet to be assessed in real-world use.
Associative & Cognitive Passwords
Similarly, associative and cognitive passwords have displayed, strong levels of
recall, with both approaches being resilient to guessing, even from allies in the
laboratory [109]. However, Bunnell et al. argues cognitive passwords are superior
to word association [44]. Bunnell et al. evaluated the performance of both on
86 psychology students and their significant others by issuing questionnaires to
each. Bunnell et al. reveals fact-based cognitive elements have superior recall
to opinion-based elements but fact-based elements are easily compromised by
close associates. Bunnell et al. states specific opinion-based elements had strong
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recall and are not easily guessed, arguing these strong elements be extracted and
assessed to improve the overall approach. However, Bunnell et al. emphasise
that performance in the field may be dramatically different from their findings.
Furthermore, they caution about the relevancy of results that do not closely
model a system in the real-world.
Furthermore, while associative and cognitive passwords are promising and in-
teresting they are still fairly complex and elaborate for regular use. Consequently,
small iterations on the original password approach may be more desirable as many
strengths of the approach can be maintained while addressing weaknesses.
Persuasive Text Passwords
Forget et al. proposes Persuasive Text Passwords (PTPs) as an iterative password
approach that maintains much of the strength of the original approach but tackles
the weaknesses of it [86]. The primary problem being that desirable secrets are
essentially system-generated gibberish and users tend not to recall or create such
passwords. Forget et al. argues users ignore security policies and instead should
be influenced or persuaded to create better passwords. Forget et al. resolve this
issue by mixing user and system-generated approaches in their proposed PTP
approach. The proposed approach expects users to initially generate a password.
The system then injects random characters throughout the password. The user
can then ‘shuﬄe’ characters until they are happy with the resulting password.
Forget et al. evaluated the approach and found that when the system contributed
more characters, users reacted by creating simpler seed passwords. Therefore,
they argue PTP should be limited to insertion of 3 characters, anymore and
users resort to coping mechanisms. However, Forget et al. emphasises that these
results are not indicative of real-world performance and PTP would need to be
deployed as a field-study to determine actual practicality.
Password Algorithms
Password algorithms are one of the few examples of an alternative alphanu-
meric authentication approaches that have been deployed to actual users. Crabb
adopted the use of a password algorithm at the NASA-Ames Research Center
[58]. Crabb states that support workers had to be issued “password sheets” reg-
ularly, when passwords change for various systems. These changes could result
in 40 different passwords. These password changes were printed onto sheets and
distributed among staff. However, in-order to tackle the problem of an attacker
obtaining the sheets, a password algorithm was issued alongside a password sheet.
The password algorithm would require individuals to alter the printed password
to obtain the actual password. Crabb offers an example of such an algorithm,
“capitalise the first vowel and add a dash”. Therefore, if the printer password
was “freem3”, the actual password would be “frEem3-”, Crabb states. The ap-
proach adopted by Crabb can be considered, as a primitive password manager.
If the user does not have the algorithm or ‘master password’, the passwords are
inaccessible.
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One-time Passwords
However, while password algorithms may allow for potentially strong alphanu-
meric authentication secrets, stronger passwords do not alleviate many of the
problems associated with authentication, namely phishing, key-logging or shoulder-
surfing [85]. Furthermore, strong passwords do not stop an individual reusing the
password [126]. A strong incentive for an attacker, as they will target weaker
systems to gain passwords for stronger systems. Although, these attacks could
be tackled by using another alternative approach, one-time passwords.
Lamport. envisioned a system where users generate a set of one-time pass-
words (OTPs) [165]. The user creates the set by entering their password locally.
The password acts as a seed for a function that generates a OTP. The OTP is
then fed back into the function to generate another OTP. The process contin-
ues, until an arbitrary number of OTPs are generated, for example, a 1000. The
server stores the last OTP and discards the rest. The user discards the last OTP
and authenticates with the penultimate one. The server receives the penultimate
OTP from the user, feds it into the function and compares the output with the
OTP stored. If they match, the user is authenticated and the previously stored
OTP is discarded by the server. The next time the user authenticates they would
enter the 998th OTP. The S/KEY authentication approach is based on Lamport’s
vision [110]. Long & Blumenthal argue a drawback is the fact an individual would
need to carry around several lists of OTPs, one for each service they use, and
instead propose a Manageable One-Time Password (M-OTP) [173]. Long & Blu-
menthal argue an individual would log-on to a M-OTP module, e.g. a browser
extension, using a typically password and the module would issue OTPs to the
respective services.
There have been variations of OTP deployed widely to both enterprise and
consumer markets. RSA SecurID outlined in §2.2.2 is one such example of an
OTP variation deployed widely to users. RSA SecurID has proved popular with
various users but is not without problems, also outlined in §2.2.2. Consequently,
attackers merely evolve and escalate attacks to undermine the authentication
solution. Therefore, a different direction may be to teach and train users to
produce better passwords, rather than offer alternative authentication solutions.
Policy and Education
An alternative direction is to improve password strength through education and
policy. The password approach is powerful but is flawed due to the passwords
created by individuals. Consequently, if strict policies are adopted and users are
offered education, individuals could potentially create powerful passwords and
keep them safe and secret. Vu, Bhargav & Proctor argue such password policies
do not guard against weak passwords [283]. Similarly, Dell’Amico, Michiardi &
Roudier in their analysis of password datasets, argue such policies do not prevent
weak passwords and individuals spend more time creating their username, than
their password [66]. Hoonakker found users regularly deviate from security poli-
cies, after surveying 836 employees at a large organisation [119]. Hoonakker found
users either created simple passwords, regularly reused them or recorded them.
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Furthermore, Hoonakker states the reality is probably much worse, as users are
unlikely to fully confess to breaking rules outlined by the organisation. Hook-
nakker argues research should focus on user perceptions, such as convenience, as
a balanced approach will be more appealing to users.
Shay et al. investigated the response of users to a change in password policy
at Carnegie Mellon University by surveying them [249]. The institution moved to
a new password policy, requiring users to create stronger alphanumeric authen-
tication secrets. Shay et al. discovered that although users were annoyed by the
change, they still complied with it, as they perceived a benefit. However, Shay et
al. states users did experience difficulty in adopting the policy. Although able to
create compliant passwords, 19% of users could not recall it. Furthermore, nearly
half of participants claimed they simply altered the existing password to comply
with the change in policy.
Barton & Barton argues such policies are scripted from the perspective of
a system, rather than a person [15]. Therefore, it is not surprising when users
deviate from them. Barton & Barton propose password creation should har-
ness cognitive processes, relying on semantic and episodic memory. They argue
passwords drawn from a user’s personal experience and transformed using simple
rules, e.g. transliteration, would be more memorable. However, Barton & Barton
concede that such passwords would not be as strong as system-generated secrets.
Therefore, strict policies and education appear to have advantages but are not
without faults and difficulties. However, tools and techniques can still be used,
outside of strict policies to improve the strength of passwords.
Proactive Password Compliance
Proactive password compliance affords users feedback on the password they have
created, informing individuals of the perceived strength of it. Users can then tailor
and adapt the password inline with the feedback given. The approach is aimed
at persuading users to create stronger passwords. The process typically conveys
strength through a meter. The meter often comprises of a colour, segmented bar,
oscillating between red and green, representing low-strength and high-strength,
respectively. Users can then edit their password in response to the rating, until
they arrive at a strong password.
Ur et al. argues the use of password meters do influence users to create length-
ier passwords [278]. However, Ur et al. caution that for all the user-effort expelled
there is little benefit, as passwords are only incrementally stronger. Nevertheless,
Ur et al. does state meters that are more strict, but not overly, result in stronger
passwords. However, such strict meters are not in wide-spread use.
The assessment of strength and acceptance of low-strength passwords is de-
termined by the organisation. An organisation can either use proactive password
compliance independently of or in conjunction with password policies. Yan et al.
argues proactive password checking could improve compliance with security poli-
cies [299]. However, the process needs to be configured properly to ensure they
reject weak passwords [300].
Nevertheless, even if strict policies are adopted and password meters only
accept incredibly powerful password, there is no guarantee an individual can
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remember such passwords. The problem is not necessarily the generation of strong
password, system-generated gibberish is a powerful password. The problem is user
being unable to manage such complex and meaningless password. Consequently,
another direction is to adopt software that manages complex passwords for an
individual, relieving them of the burden.
Password Managers
Password managers maintains and stores all the various passwords an individual
creates, negating the need to memorise them. Moreover, an individual can use
complex and lengthy system-generated passwords as they are not required to
memorise themselves. The user merely has to create one strong, solid password
to regulate access to the password manager. However, Chiasson et al. argues
users are hesitant to relinquish control to password managers [50]. Chiasson
et al. investigated the usability of two passwords managers with users and found
that users had inaccurate or incomplete mental models of how they worked. Users
thought a new password was being generated every-time they accessed their email,
for example. Furthermore, Chiasson et al. emphasised that users were aggravated
by the fact they did not know the actual password for many services. This
represents a limitation of password managers, as users would need to have access
to them everywhere, in-order to access all the services and systems they use.
Nevertheless, Jobusch and Oldehoeft outline the need for stronger passwords
by highlighting some specific examples where weak passwords resulted in several
systems being compromised [135]. Jobusch and Oldehoeft highlight how the
Morris Worm relied on weak passwords to compromise 6,000 machines connected
to the Internet [77].
2.3.2 Alternatives to Alphanumeric Authentication
The usability problems associated with passwords coupled with advances in mod-
ern technology has led to an increasing number of researchers considering knowledge-
based alternatives.
The majority of alternative authentication research has focused on three of
the five senses, namely: sound, vision and touch. The remaining senses of smell
and taste, although not explored in terms of knowledge-based authentication
have been proposed for use in biometric authentication [14, 216]. The primary
motivation for exploring alternative authentication solutions that rely on senses
is memorability. However, memorability is only a single aspect of many to an
authentication solution.
Renaud and De Angeli propose a number of criteria to assess authentication
mechanisms for use on the web, from a user perspective [220]. The web is arguably
the biggest single consumer application of the enterprise-era, if not the genesis of
the consumer-era. The Renaud and De Angeli criteria are percipient as they are
concerned with the user and not with application or platform specific concerns.
Therefore, criteria designed by Renaud and De Angeli are at least applicable to
assess authentication mechanisms tailored for consumers. The criteria are, as
follows:
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1. Accessible
The mechanism should not require any additional software, hardware or
expertise. Furthermore, support must be provided for those suffering with
disabilities, affecting sight and hearing.
2. Convenient
The mechanism must not be time-consuming, either at the enrolment or
authentication phases.
(a) Enrolment Time
Lengthy enrolment times could deter users from experimenting with
an application or service.
(b) Authentication Time
A time-consuming authentication process could deter on-going use of
an application or service.
3. Memorable
The authentication secret and process is easy-to-remember.
4. Secure
The authentication secret and process is suitable for use in authentication.
Renaud and De Angeli state the secure principle is multi-dimensional, defining
these dimensions as unpredictable, abundant and undisclosed. De Angeli, Coven-
try, Johnson and Renaud outline the following dimensions to assess the security
of authentication mechanisms [63]. They are, as follows:
(a) Guess-ability
The ability for an attacker to simply guess the authentication secret.
(b) Observability
The ability for an attacker to observe entry of the authentication secret.
(c) Record-ability
The ability for an attacker to utilise a user-generated recording, either of
or associated with an authentication secret.
Therefore, the combination of the criteria outlined by Renaud and De Angeli and
the security dimensions stated by De Angeli et al. offer an overall set of criteria.
The criteria can be used to assess the suitability of an authentication mechanism
for consumers. Consequently, many of the aforementioned aspects as well as
memorability should be considered when determining the value of alternative
sense-based solutions. The following sense-based solutions were considered:
• Vision
Alternative authentication solutions based on graphics.
• Sound
Alternative authentication solutions based on audio.
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• Touch
Alternative authentication solution based on touch.
The advantages and disadvantages of each sense as the basis for an authentication
solution are discussed over the following sections.
Vision
Craik and Tulving’s research provides interesting insight into the development of
memory traces. Nonetheless, such limitation are arguably limited to the retention
of words and depth of processing does not necessarily apply other stimulus, such
as images, sound and touch. Bower and Karlin reported that depth of processing
does indeed have relevance in the retention of faces [39]. Bower and Karlin
requested individuals to make judgements of faces based on sex, likableness and
honesty, i.e. progressing similarly from physical to semantic analysis. Bower and
Karlin reported improved recognition for faces processed to greater depths, i.e.
judged on honesty.
Therefore, depth of processing is applicable beyond the retention of words.
However, Intraub and Nicklos argue the depths are reversed when processing im-
ages or scenes, in that analysis of traditionally shallow physical characteristics
result in better recall [124]. However, Bower et al. argue comprehension of im-
ages improves retention, specifically when those images are meaningless to the
individual [40].
The difference between images and words is not particularly surprising. Paivio
proposes a dual-coding approach, in that we processes verbal and visual informa-
tion through separate channels. The information from each is encoded differently,
verbal information produces symbolic codes while visual information generates
analogue codes [198]. Nelson et al. report images have superior recognition to the
words that name them, i.e. picture superiority effect, due to the coding employed
[188]. Furthermore, Anderson and Bower report that encoding of verbal informa-
tion is strengthened when coupled with a suitable visual stimulus [4]. However,
Kinjo and Snodgrass argue that although there is a picture superiority effect in
explicit tasks, there is not necessarily such effect in implicit tasks [154]. Never-
theless, the potential of images sparked the imagination of many individuals.
Blonder first proposed the notion of a graphical password [35]. The proposal
was that an individual would create a secret sequence of pixels, limited by the
boundaries of a specific image. The user was expected to replicate the sequence
of pixel points to authenticate.
Similar concepts had been explored previously. IBM Technical Disclosure
Bulletin proposed the use of menu-items that only become active when an indi-
vidual enters a sequence of specific pixels [120]. Nevertheless, the concept did
not rely on a specific image but others have proposed the use of images in au-
thentication. King proposed the use of images to improve the memorability of
system-generated passwords [153]. King suggests users form associations between
images and chunks of the complex, meaningless passwords.
However, the approach proposed by King is more an attempt to improve the
password approach rather than offer an alternative graphical approach. Blonder
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proposed approach expects users to create a sequence of pixels using an image and
then recreate that sequence, over the same image to authenticate. Nevertheless,
while interesting, Blonder never throughly explored his proposal but the concept
inspired others to create graphical authentication mechanisms.
Nonetheless, Blonder proposed approach has inspired many researchers. More-
over, Blonder has clearer inspired designers and developers as graphical passwords
have also by deployed by large organisations such as Google and Microsoft in
their respective operating systems offerings. However, while inspiring and well
received, graphical authentication is not without its challenges.
There are, for example, real concerns surrounding the observability of graph-
ical authentication solutions. Wiedenbeck et al. argues that graphical authenti-
cation solutions are incredibly vulnerable to shoulder-surfing [293]. The reality
is that many authentication alternatives rely on interaction that is vulnerable
to observation and recording. The advantage in alphanumeric authentication in
many ways is that the keyboard can be wielded or shielded from the wandering
eyes of others.
Therefore, while there are potential advantages to using graphical authenti-
cation solutions, they are not without concerns of flaws. Consequently, it is not
surprising that researchers have been exploring sound and touch-based authenti-
cation.
Sound
There is a great deal of potential for sound in authentication. LeDoux suggests
that sound or rather music is less susceptible to interference as processing occurs
at lower levels of the brain [167]. Such resilience is desirable due to the potential
impact of interference on memory and in-turn knowledge-based authentication
secrets [277]. Furthermore, much like vision, Peretz et al. suggests the brain may
contain specialised channels for processing audio [202].
Moreover, Bigand and Poulin-Charronnat argue users are primed for mu-
sic and additional training is not necessarily required [33]. Bigand and Poulin-
Charronnat assessed different in terms of processing between trained and un-
trained individuals in regards music and argue that the human brain is already
specialised and trained to process music through extensive exposure in everyday
use [33]. Scherer and Zentner also argue that listeners typically agree on the
particularly emotion conveyed in a particular emotion [242].
The power of emotions are important, as positive emotions are potentially
important in forming memories [129]. Ja¨ncke states that music stimulates emo-
tions, that in turn act as memory enhancers [130]. However, the potential of
music has both negative and positive applications. Alpert et al. demonstrated
that when music within a product commercial stimulated emotion in an individ-
ual, purchase was far more likely [3]. While Hirsch discussed the weaponisation
of music, outlining its use in torture and in deterring loitering [117].
Nevertheless, the strengths of sound have inspired authentication researchers
to design and develop alternative solutions. Liddell et al. propose Audio Visual
Associative Protocol (AVAP) an authentication solution that uses a combina-
tion of sound as well as images to authenticate users [169]. The approach relies
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mnemonic associations, users are required to associate or pair a series of audio
clips and images. The users is required to create five pairs of images and sounds.
The user is then present an audio clip during authentication and select the associ-
ated image from a collection, containing distractor images. The user is expected
to recreate all five associations to authenticate. Liddell et al. evaluated the au-
thenticate approach and concluded that it was cumbersome and complex while
providing little to no advantage to users [169]. Nevertheless, Liddell et al. stress
that users enjoyed the authentication approach found it interesting and inspiring.
Consequently, Liddell et al. argue efforts should be made by researchers to ensure
authentication approaches are not only functional but delightful and enjoyable as
well.
Figure 2.1: Musipass authentication screen [98, p. 127]
However, while AVAP may not have presented any advantage, it was arguably
not a pure audio password. Gibson et al. argues pure audio passwords may be su-
perior, specifically for certain users and context and propose Musipass [98]. The
authentication approach expects users to create an audio password comprising of
four audio clips. The user is then presented four collections of nine audio clips and
asked to select their audio clip from each to authenticate. Gibson et al. report
that when evaluated with users, Musipass does offer improved performance in
terms of memorability over alphanumeric authentication. However, Gibson et al.
stress the time taken to complete authentication was undesirable.
Furthermore, Gibson et al. outline the challenges of guess-ability, observabil-
ity and record-ability. The reality is that there are several tools that allow an
individual to share their music preferences, that may make it trivial to guess an
authentication secret. Moreover, eavesdropping and recording an audio authen-
tication secret is a concern as sound travels and could be heard or recorded by
hidden attackers. Nevertheless, Gibson et al. argues observability is a bigger chal-
lenge for graphical password than audio, as individuals could use headphones to
shield music. Lastly, Gibson et al. argues record-ability is an issue for almost all
authentication approaches not just the novel sense-based authentication secrets.
Therefore, much like graphical passwords, while audio passwords certainly
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have potential they also have numerous challenges. Consequently, it is unsurpris-
ing that some researchers have explored other senses for authentication, namely
touch.
Touch
Touch is another sense that researchers have been inspired to explore for use in
authentication. The memorability of tactile information is argued to be similar
to audio [176]. Mahrer and Miles argues the capacity for tactile information
is between four and six items [175]. However, there is disagreement about the
specific capacity and decay of tactile information [176].
Furthermore, Millar argues tactile information is best recalled when coupled
with other sensory information [181]. Therefore, touch or tactile information may
not be a strong candidate for alternative authentication as there is potentially
no real memory advantage. However, tactile information is potentially stronger
than audio and visual alternatives in terms of observability and record-ability. An
alternative authentication solution based on touch has the potential to afford the
user the ability to enter an authentication secret, free from observation. Moreover,
such solutions could be more accessible to users with specific requirements.
The potential of tactile information has sparked the imagination of a few
researchers. Deyle and Roth proposes a tactile PIN entry mechanism that affords
users the ability to enter an authentication secret free from observation [67]. The
authentication secret compromises of a sequence of specific fingers, e.g. right
index, left middle, left middle, left index finger. The user enters each finger
through a series of rounds and using a custom tactile PIN entry device. Deyle
and Roth argues the mechanism has the potential to improve authentication for
all users and at the very least has the potential to improve authentication for
blind users at ATMs.
Similarly, Bianchi et al. proposes the Secure Haptic Keypad (SHK) as an
authentication approach that affords users the ability to authenticate in public
spaces [29]. The authentication secrets comprises of a series of vibration patterns.
The user enters the correct sequences of patterns by recognising the correct pat-
tern among a set of distractor patterns. Bianchi et al. evaluates the SHK and
concludes that while the approach shows potentials there are concerns attack-
ers could observe and record audio vibrations emitted by the device. Moreover,
Bianchi et al. emphasises more research is required to determine the actual mem-
orability and learning processes of tactile information to ensure it is appropriate
for use in authentication.
The reality is that there is far more research surrounding the senses of sight
and sound, than touch. Nevertheless, researchers and designers are not deterred
from proposing authentication approaches based on tactile information. Kuber
and Yu proposes the Tactile Authentication System (TAS), an authentication
approach that relies on recognition of PIN-patterns [161]. The authentication
secret is a sequence of four PIN-patterns. The patterns are presented to an
individual through a tactile mouse that communicates the patterns by raising
pins. The user places one hand over the tactile mouse and is able to sense the
various pattern arrangements. The user is presented a series of 3×3 grids, each
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containing a single target pattern and 8 distractor patterns. The user needs to
select the target pattern in each grid to authenticate. Kuber and Yu evaluate
TAS and argue that the process performs similar to alphanumeric and graphical
authentication mechanisms and that tactile information could form the basis of
an alternative authentication solution.
Kuber and Sharma performed additional investigation of TAS and adapted
it for use with blind users [160]. Kuber and Sharma evaluated the process with
five blind users and argue the process is more secure but the user experience was
less than desirable. Kuber and Sharma state that while the individuals could
authenticate, the time taken to do so was undesirable and would need to be
improved to make the authentication approach acceptable.
Therefore, tactile information clearly has a place for use in authentication.
However, while tactile information could be used to reduce the observation of
authentication entry and improve accessible, it may not be the basis of an alter-
native authentication solution.
2.3.3 Importance of Context
The aforementioned criteria outlined by Renaud and De Angeli is useful in the
assessment of authentication mechanism. However, the resulting combination is
arguably flawed as all the criteria are relative.
An authentication mechanism reliant on sentences, for example, is not neces-
sarily accessible if a user is illiterate. The authentication mechanism is not par-
ticularly convenient either, if a user struggles to process sentences, e.g. dyslexics.
The sentence is also not memorable, as memorising a string of characters would
likely present a time-consuming, difficult task. Lastly, using a sentence as an
authentication secret is not particularly secure, as illiterate users will adopt any
number of coping strategies, such as relying on other literate individuals.
Hence, an authentication mechanism reliant on sentences would be deemed
sub-optimal. However, in fairness, the aforementioned assessment criteria were
outlined when the web was tailored to highly literate, wealthy westerners [302].
The criteria were crafted making the explicit assumption that any authentication
mechanism was being used as part of a web application or service.
The context of an authentication mechanism in the aforementioned criteria
was clear. The platform was an expensive computer with mouse and monitor
peripherals. The system would need a wired connection, placing it in a small
office, study or living-room. The people using the mechanism are those who
can afford such infrastructure and navigate the world-wide-web. Finally, the
assumption was that users would encounter an authentication mechanism when
they accessed protected content or services.
While the aforementioned assumed context still persists, authentication now
happens in many more contexts. The modern mobile computer or smartphone
has pushed powerful computation and access to the Internet, into many more
hands. Therefore, illiterate fishermen, on boats, in India will be able to use many
applications and services, similar to the wealthy white westerners have done from
their living rooms [151]. Moreover, in developed countries, mobile computers are
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becoming increasingly common and commoditised, e.g. some print adverts in
magazines are embedding smartphones to push live content [274].
Therefore, the suitability or success of an authentication mechanism, for a
given task, is dependent on a given context. The same task is not necessarily
performed by the same people, in the same place, on the same platform. Fur-
thermore, the mechanism may serve one purpose in one setting but another, in
another setting.
Consequently, the aforementioned criteria need to be extended by incorpo-
rating a context specification: A statement that provides a clear outline of the
envisioned user, platform, place and purpose of an authentication mechanism.
The context specification will be provide a solid foundation for a more nuanced
assessment criteria. The context specification is defined as follows:
Context Specification
A definition of the envisioned user-base, device and purpose of the
authentication mechanism.
• People
The envisioned target users of an authentication mechanism.
• Platform
The envisioned device and/or software of an authentication
mechanism.
• Place
The envisioned environments where an authentication
mechanism will be used.
• Purpose
The reason for deploying an authentication mechanism.
Table 2.4: Context Specification for Authentication Mechanism Design
The previously defined assessment criteria can and should be assessed relative
to the context specification. Therefore, if the targeted users of the authentica-
tion mechanism are illiterate, the accessible criteria should consider whether the
mechanism is accessible to these specified users.
Therefore, in determining the design direction of the prototype authentication
mechanism, the context of the process must be defined and considered. Conse-
quently, when comparing the aforementioned authentication approaches, context
will be considered along side the mechanism.
2.3.4 Comparison of Approaches
The primary design motivation of almost all knowledge-based or password alter-
natives is to improve the memorability of authentication secrets. The aim is to
deter users from adopting undesirable coping strategies for knowledge-based au-
thentication secrets. Consequently, researchers have proposed several knowledge-
based alternatives to the password. The typical design direction taken by re-
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searchers is either (1) iterate over the original text-based password or (2) con-
struct sense-based solutions.
The first design direction is desirable as any iteration would retain the advan-
tages of passwords but address the disadvantages. The proposed solutions, such
as cognitive and associative passwords, do indeed improve the memorability of
authentication secrets while maintaining many of the benefits. However, there
are concerns surrounding the increased complexity of interaction that essentially
leads to increased authentication times. Furthermore, attackers may undermined
many of the proposed approaches simply by adopting different tactics, e.g. social
engineering.
Consequently, policy and education of users may be the best direction to im-
prove passwords [47]. The use of policy and education coupled with proactive
password checkers or password algorithms could improve the strength of pass-
words. However, there is arguably limited mileage in education and policy as
there is no guarantee that users will actually follow policy [119, 123]. Further-
more, even if guidelines are followed they have the potential to be more harmful
than helpful [116]. Moreover, education and policy contributes nothing to the
upcoming problems facing alphanumeric authentication, namely the diversity in
consumer devices and lack of physical keyboard.
Popular consumer devices, such as the Apple iPhone, Nintendo Wii and Mi-
crosoft Kinect, forgo physical keyboards and mouse interaction in favour of touch
and natural motion. Furthermore, the audience for such devices is arguably
far wider, encompassing many more individuals with differing abilities. More-
over, audience members are not sitting in a single spot but are interacting with
these devices in a variety of environments. Consequently, context is becoming
an increasingly important aspect of authentication mechanism design. Table 2.4
outlines aspects that should considered about the context in the design of any au-
thentication mechanism. Furthermore, specific contexts may favour sense-based
solutions such as audio and graphical passwords rather than alphanumerics.
Therefore, the second design direction taken by researchers has been to de-
velop sense-based alternatives to the password. Table 2.5 summarises the strengths
and weakness of vision, sound and touch-based passwords. The superior sensory
encoding of vision and sound-based stimulus suggests they are better suited to
knowledge-based authentication than alphanumerics, in terms of memorability.
The same may not be true of touch-based authentication secrets. Nevertheless,
Vision Sound Touch
Memorability
Dedicated and expert processing No clear benefit
of visual and audio information. over passwords
Accessibility
Accessible to most with advantages for users with difficulties
with language as well as those with specific needs.
Convenience
There are real convenience challenges with all approaches,
but could be potentially overcome through further research.
Security
Concerns surrounding the observability and Resistant to
record-ability of authentication secrets observation
Table 2.5: Comparison and overview of sense-based authentication approaches.
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touch-based have strengths in others way, specifically in terms of making authen-
tication solutions more accessible for users with specific needs, e.g. blind users.
Similarly, vision and sound-based authentication solution could be more accessi-
ble for users who struggle or have difficulties with alphanumerics, e.g. illiterate
users. Therefore, sense-based authentication is potentially also more accessible
than alphanumeric counterparts.
However, asides from convenience, there are real challenges in terms of security
for sense-based authentication. There are concerns that visual and sound-based
authentication secrets could be easily observed and recorded by onlookers sur-
rounding an individual when they enter an authentication secret. In fairness,
the same problem plagues alphanumeric authentication but at the least the user
can wield interaction to shield the authentication secret. This is one area where
touch-based authentication has an advantage as the user can authenticate, in
view of others. Moreover, while tactile solutions may take longer than compara-
ble graphical solutions, users value and perceive the sense of increased security
from observation [159].
However, while sense-based authentication may be more accessible for some, it
may not offer improvements for all. The reality is that sense-based authentication
has complex and cumbersome interaction that takes time to use. Nevertheless,
many of the convenience concerns could be connected to the relatively nascent
state of alternative authentication solutions compared to the far more entrench
alphanumeric authentication solution. Moreover, specific sense-based solutions
may be more convenient in certain contexts.
Therefore, each approach clearly has strengths and weakness. Furthermore,
weakness can be potentially addressed through further research and investiga-
tion. Nevertheless, a sense-based, pseudo silver-bullet solution that can replace
passwords whole-sale across a range of tasks seems highlight unlikely. However,
while passwords are still popular, they are arguably not optimal or even sensible
on modern consumer devices. Password entry on the Nintendo Wii or Apple
TV requires individuals to enter their authentication secret using a cumbersome
on-screen keyboard, leaking the authentication secret to every individual in the
same room.
Consequently, it seems unlikely passwords will persist as the only authentica-
tion solution for consumers. However, it appears equally unlikely that an iterative
design or sense-based alternative will simply usurp the password. Therefore, a
better strategy is to consider the envisioned context of the authentication mech-
anism and design a solution to best tackle the scenario. Therefore, using the
aforementioned example of the Nintendo Wii and televisions, a graphical-based
solution is envisioned as the best direction. The following reasons outline the
motivation for selecting a graphical authentication solution, as follows:
• An alphanumeric solution seems unwise for television as the user must rely
on an on-screen keyboard that is difficult or navigate and easily observed
by onlookers.
• An audio-based authentication solution could be created but would require
the user to wear a pair of headphones. Moreover, the authentication process
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could be lengthy as the individual would need to listen to segments of music.
A process that could prove frustrating to others in the same room.
• Graphical authentication would harness the key asset of modern television,
i.e. a big, bright, beautiful and vibrant display.
• The superior encoding of images ensures they are more memorable than
text [188].
Furthermore, graphical authentication may be the best direction for most modern
consumer devices, such as smartphones and tablets, as they mimic television
in matter ways. The modern smartphone and tablet do not rely on physical
keyboard and possess detail and vibrant displays. Consequently, a graphical
authentication, while not a catch-all solution, could still be applicable to a range
of contexts and strong alternative to passwords in many settings.
Consequently, research focused on graphical authentication. Therefore, the
aim was to create an alternative knowledge-based graphical authentication mech-
anism. The next step was to investigate and assess the various graphical authen-
tication solutions. The goal was to determine how the graphical authentication
mechanism would be framed, i.e. as either a recall or recognition memory task.
2.4 Taxonomy of Graphical Authentication Ap-
proaches
The primary advantage of graphical authentication is memorability. However, the
encoding and storage of an authentication secret is only one aspect, another is
how the authentication mechanism extracts it from an individual. An individual’s
memory can be accessed in three ways, as follows:
• Recall
Information is extracted from memory when requested.
• Response
Information is extracted from memory when cued.
• Recognition
Information is extracted from memory when presented.
The information extracted is based on some stimulus. The end result is the same,
hopefully, in that something is extracted from memory. Therefore, when consid-
ering alphanumeric authentication - individuals are typically requested to recall
a password. Framed as a response task, similar to Zviran & Haga’s associative
passwords [304], a cue word would be presented and associated password would
be expected. As a recognition task, a password would be presented and the user
would be asked, if this was their password or not.
Similarly, the numerous graphical authentication approach proposed by re-
searchers can be classified in terms of how they probe memory. There are several
recall, response and recognition-based graphical authentication mechanisms. The
proposed authentication mechanisms are presented in the ensuing sections.
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2.4.1 Recall
The dominant password approach is framed as a recall memory task. An in-
dividual is presented a blinking cursor and is expect to recall the appropriate
password string and enter it. Similarly, there are several graphical authentication
mechanisms that adopt the same approach.
Naturally, recall-based graphical authentication approaches follow a similar
structure, in that they expect users to recall an image and sketch it on a canvas.
The authentication approach can heavily restrict drawing, e.g. connect the dots,
or it can be incredibly expressive, e.g. freehand drawing. Moreover, the canvas
itself can be blank or image to inspire the imagination
Draw-a-secret (DAS)
Draw-a-secret or DAS, proposed by Jermyn et al., is a recall-based graphical au-
thentication mechanism [132]. The approach expects an individual to draw their
authentication secret to access an application. DAS is designed for a stylus and
touchscreen, although a mouse and monitor can substitute. The approach mir-
rors a paintbrush and easel, inspiring individuals to be creative and unrestrained
when authenticating. An individual is not required to recreate the same drawing,
every time they authenticate.
Figure 2.2: An example DAS secret Jermyn et al. [132, p. 5]
DAS does not rely on drawings, from a semantic perspective, but on the
underlying grid sectors used to compose them. Figure 2.2 illustrates a DAS
secret, the system is interested in how the user drew the doodle, not the doodle
itself. Table 2.6 represents the encoding of the doodle, illustrated in Figure 2.2.
The first six elements are the grid sectors used to create the doodle. The last
element is a ‘pen-up’ event, the end of the drawing. An individual can draw as
many doodles as they desire, each will be separated with a ‘pen-up’ event.
The important point is that the actual doodle is irrelevant, an individual only
needs to recreate the sequence of grid sectors and ‘pen-up’ events. If a user can
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achieve the same sequence with a different doodle, then they will be able to au-
thenticate. Jermyn et al. argues this separation, of drawing and encoding, affords
a much larger, practical password-space, than alphanumeric authentication. This
practical password-space could be employed to tackle any number of traditional
password problems, such as a reply or denial service attacks [158]. Alphanumeric
authentication may have a large password-space but is undermined by the fact,
that individuals are unable to remember many potential passwords. Jermyn et al.
states:
“We take as a main criterion the need to evaluate graphical passwords’
security relative to that of textual passwords.”
Jermyn et al. [132, p. 2]
Jermyn et al. claims DAS is more secure than alphanumeric authentication, as
there many more memorable authentication secrets. There is a larger practical
password-space, than alphanumeric authentication. However, Jermyn et al. dis-
cusses, designs and evaluates DAS in the context of alphanumeric authentication,
rather than terms of an authentication scenario.
1 2 3 4 5 6 Pen-up
Secret (2,2) (3,2) (3,3) (2,3) (2,2) (2,1) (5,5)
Table 2.6: The encoding of the drawing illustrated in Figure 2.2
An authentication process is part of a system or workflow. The envisioned
workflow and end-user of DAS is rarely discussed. Jermyn et al. do detail a
prototype of DAS as part of an encrypted memo application, on a personal digital
assistant. However, they do not estimate the time taken to authenticate or outline
any of the challenges faced in such a scenario. Jermyn et al. do not outline the
expected user of the application or problems they may encounter. They do not
evaluate the application or even the approach, with any actual users.
Unfortunately, Jermyn et al. does not provide any estimations or evidence of
how DAS actually performs as part of a note taking/reviewing workflow. Fur-
thermore, although Jermyn et al. constructs a prototype there is no evidence of
how the mechanism performs on a personal digital assistant. Jermyn et al. states
potential devices as the Palm Pilot, Apple Newton or Casio Cassiopeia E-10,
none of these products were particularly successfully. Users simply did not adopt
them, suggesting they did not deliver in terms of experience.
Apple ceased production of the Newton in 1998, a year before publication
of DAS. Casio’s Cassiopeia appears to have been poorly received, at least one
reviewer stated “I think the E-10’s screen just isnt big enough” and “Using the
stylus to select and edit text is very inconvenient” [100]. The screen-size and
stylus are important as Jermyn et al. states a potential drawback with DAS
is a user may, unwittingly, cross grid-sectors when authenticating. Therefore,
although an individual may recreate a drawing, the sequence may have a different
encoding as strokes could graze other grid-sectors, a real possibility with a small-
screen and awkward stylus.
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In fairness, Jermyn et al. concedes the power of DAS is all theoretical. Without
any field investigations or user studies, there is no evidence to state DAS is a
practical authentication approach for the envisioned scenario or any others. The
approach could be slow and awkward. Furthermore, although a larger, memorable
password-space is possible in theory, it may not exist in practice. The password-
space could be reduced, for example, if memorable DAS secrets exhibit a pattern.
Thorpe and Van Oorschot postulate that memorable DAS authentication se-
crets do exhibit such a pattern [269]. They argue symmetrical graphical secrets
are a real concern, as symmetrical drawings have superior recall. Thorpe and
Van Oorschot state an attacker could craft a dictionary of symmetrical secrets
and use it to compromise DAS. They claim that while it may take an attacker
540 years to explore the entire DAS password-space, it would take only 6 days to
explore the symmetric password-space. Thorpe and Van Oorschot argue that if
users do create large numbers of symmetric passwords, DAS has a much smaller,
practical password-space. They speculate users may create many such secrets,
given that 5 of the 8 DAS examples Jermyn et al. presents, exhibit symmetry
[132, 269]. However, Thorpe and Van Oorschot did not assess the mechanism
with actual end-users, it is not clear if users would actually create predictable
DAS secrets in practice.
Therefore, Nali and Thorpe conducted an informal user-study with 16 indi-
viduals to determine if user-generated DAS secrets exhibited any patterns. The
participants were asked to draw 6 doodles and 6 logos on printed grids, using a
pen. Nali and Thorpe discovered that users do exhibit patterns, 45% create sym-
metrical drawings, 56% of the drawings were centred and 80% of the drawings
used less than 3 strokes. Nali and Thorpe argue if these results are symptomatic
of a larger user-base, then DAS has a much smaller, practical password-space.
Furthermore, 29% of drawings run along grid-lines, potentially creating difficul-
ties in encoding and later recreation. Nali and Thorpe argue this could represent
a real usability flaw in DAS as many DAS secrets would be rejected, even though
the user believes them to be accurate. However, Nali and Thorpe did not actually
inform users they were actually creating authentication secrets. The mechanism
was not part of a workflow or performed on an actual device. Furthermore, indi-
viduals did not have to recreate any drawing and the time taken is not reported.
Therefore, users could have behave differently, if they knew the drawings were
used to protect personal notes.
However, Thorpe and Van Oorschot argue that although the study may have
limitations, it clearly illustrates that users have a penchant for DAS secrets with
fewer strokes [185, 270]. They suggest users favour such secrets, as they have
to recall a start- and end- point for each stroke. Therefore, users cannot be re-
lied upon to generate complex lengthy DAS secrets. Naturally, many designers
would solve this problem by using bigger grids, with would offer more grid sec-
tors. However, Thorpe and Van Oorschot deem such increases pointless as they
do not deliver effective results, certainly not enough to justify such increases.
Instead they propose a grid selection method, essentially a grid of grids. An
individual initially selects a drawing grid from a larger selection grid. Thorpe
and Van Oorschot argue this simple, additional step potentially strengthens the
secret without burdening an individual with additional complexities.
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Thorpe and Van Oorschot argue larger grids are a greater burden to end-users
and their selection grid method is, potentially, superior. However, they do not
assess the performance of either option with any actual end-users. The mechanism
is not evaluated at all with users, either on its own or part of a workflow.
In fairness, Thorpe and Van Oorschot do argue that better security could be
achieved through creating systems that offer a healthy distribution of password in
practice rather than a purely academic distribution. Thorpe and Van Oorschot
argue user-studies are necessary to determine the properties that need to be
enhanced or relaxed to develop a mechanism that can perform well, practically.
Multi-grid Draw-a-secret (MGDAS)
Chalkias et al. proposed a method similar to Thorpe and Van Oorschot’s selection
grid but assessed with users [49]. Multi-Grid DAS (MGDAS) is designed to tackle
the problem, identified by Nali and Thorpe, of individuals centring their drawing
within the grid. This approach favours the amalgamation of several grids, with
varying sectors over the traditional singular grid used in DAS. MGDAS has been
designed to inspire creativity in the generation of secrets, reducing the number
of individuals starting from the same cell or gravitating to the same sectors.
Another aim of MGDAS is to reduce the number of ordering errors and shift
errors, i.e. entering the secret in the wrong sequence and/or in sectors adjacent
to the correct ones, respectively. Therefore, these additions should increase the
probably password space of DAS without an excessive burden.
Chalkias et al. evaluated the mechanism with 15 children and 15 students,
using a pen and paper. Initially, individuals endured a 25-minute ‘short-course’
on passwords and the MGDAS approach. Then, individuals were requested to
create a traditional password, a DAS secret and a MGDAS secret. Then after
one-hour, individuals were requested to recreate their graphical secrets. Chalkias
et al. found that while MGDAS did not prevent ordering errors, it did reduce
shift-errors. Furthermore, Chalkias et al. claim, less than 50% of MGDAS secrets
exhibit the centring effect.
However, Chalkias et al. did not assess the mechanism as part of a workflow
or on an actual device. Individuals did have to recreate the authentication secret,
although this was only an hour after they created it. Furthermore, Chalkias et al.
utilised children, aged between 6-11 years old, to act as non-technical users. It
is not clear if this was a suitable substitute. Children likely have a different
comprehension of the importance of an authentication secret. Chalkias et al. did
not state if they envisioned MGDAS approach was designed for an application for
children or young adults. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the applicability
of a child’s performance of MGDAS, with that of a non-technical adult. However,
an encouraging aspect is that 60% of the children were able to authenticate with
MGDAS, higher than DAS but lower than traditional passwords [49].
Overall, Chalkias et al. deem the results encouraging and state the approach
could be refined by adding an background image. The background image would
aid users in the creation and recall of their secret drawing.
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Background Draw-a-secret (BDAS)
Dunphy and Yan propose such a mechanism, titled Background-image DAS or
BDAS [74]. Traditionally DAS has been implemented with a white background
but BDAS allows an individual to select their own background image. Dunphy
and Yan argue this background image aides an individual in not only creating far
more complex secrets but in their ability to recall such secrets.
Dunphy and Yan evaluated the performance of BDAS in two user studies, with
21 and 46 participants, respectively. The first user-study separated individuals
into two groups. One group created DAS secrets, the other created BDAS secrets.
Individuals in the BDAS group were asked to select one of five printed background
images. The individuals then overlaid a printed 5x5 grid transparency. Individu-
als then created their secrets. The individuals were then asked to recreate their
secret five minutes later with 8 individuals reached to recall their secret a week
later. The second user study was similar in structure and procedure. The main
difference was all individuals were recorded using a video-camera and all users
drew on transparencies.
Dunphy and Yan reported favourable results in the addition of a user-selected
background image. Individuals using BDAS typically created more complex pass-
words and retained them longer than individuals using traditional DAS.
However, some individuals did generate weak secrets using BDAS, so the
approach does not completely remove simple secrets. Nevertheless, Dunphy and
Yan never assumed the mechanism would ensure the removal of such secrets.
They argue password checking should be used to steer individuals into creating
superior secrets. Furthermore, some interesting minor recall errors occurred.
A typical occurrence was recreating the secret perfectly but out of sequence.
Another example includes an individual producing a near perfect replication of
their secret but with a single element was reversed.
These outcomes could be particularly confusing for an individual and does
highlight a nuance of DAS. In that the secret is the drawing of the authentication
secret, rather than the outcome. The individual is required to recall how to
they drew their authentication secret. Furthermore, slight recall errors such as
reversing an element are likely to go unnoticed by an individual. Therefore, when
an individual’s attempt is rejected they may be able to recover from it.
However, probably the most interesting aspect uncovered by Dunphy and
Yan about DAS is that the generation of secrets relies heavily on the artist abil-
ity of the creator. Those individuals which claimed to lack any real artist ability
typically generated simplistic secrets or drew familiar characters in simplistic pat-
terns. Those inspired slightly by the freedom to draw whatever they wanted, still
opted from simplistic, familiar objects, such as a cup. Indeed, Dunphy and Yan
reported that some individuals who felt uncomfortable with their artistic ability
stated they would rather use alphanumeric alternatives. While those comfortable
in their abilities had no real preference for DAS or BDAS. Although Dunphy and
Yan claimed BDAS was more stimulating to use than DAS, suggesting it may
aide those uninspired by a blank background.
Dunphy and Yan also offered some excellent insight in that they claimed
some individuals had a great deal of trouble comprehending the BDAS process.
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Therefore, they suggest that security designers consider these ‘non-technical’ in-
dividuals when crafting new mechanisms. This is a salient point, as we should not
assume that individuals have the same familiarity with novel interaction mecha-
nisms and objects, as they do, say, with keyboards and characters.
However, although BDAS appeared promising the approach was not evaluated
as part of a workflow or on an actual device. In a recurring theme with all DAS
descendants, the mechanism was evaluated out of context, using paper and pens.
Users did not have to create an authentication secret and use it, as part of task.
The impact of a workflow could change the secrets generated by users. If users
have to authenticate regularly, they may favour simple secrets purely to complete
a task faster. Therefore, it is difficult to estimate the relevancy of results as they
refer only to a mechanism used in a laboratory, without an accompanying task.
In fairness, Dunphy and Yan recognise the limitations and concede that many
new concepts work well an laboratory setting, only to fail when deployed to
an actual user-base. Dunphy and Yan argue crafting an application to a specific
scenario that actually impacts on the user would advance research in the usability
of passwords. Dunphy and Yan state a drawback of the BDAS evaluation was
that users have no stake in the mechanism. There was no incentive to successfully
authenticate, users experienced no impact from their failure to recall. Dunphy
and Yan argue that deployed in the field, as part of an application, BDAS would
have greater ecological validity and allow for the exploration of other problems,
such as shoulder-surfing.
Shoulder-surfing is when an attacker attempts to observe entry of an authen-
tication secret. The majority of authentication mechanisms implicitly assumes
a closed context, i.e. an individual is alone. This is an acceptable academic
assumption but one that might not prove true, practically.
Qualitative Draw-a-secret (QDAS)
The reality is that a DAS secret is easily exposed to onlookers. If an attacker is
able to observe entry of a DAS secret, they may be able to authenticate using
the same drawing. Lin et al. proposes Qualitative DAS (QDAS) to tackle the
problem of observation [170].
The key difference between DAS and QDAS is that stroke encoding evolves
from a sequence of coordinates to a sequence of direction changes. Another
addition is on-going grid transformations which are used to conceal the entry of
secrets. The changes in encoding are aimed at improving the retention of secrets,
effectively increasing the practicability of QDAS. While grid-transformation are
used to extend the reach of DAS into new contexts, such as public places, where
previously, it would be practically useless.
Lin et al. evaluated QDAS with 20 computing science students, in two groups
of ten, through three stages. The first-stage of the evaluation requested students
to create an authentication secret and recreate it, using pen and paper. The
second-stage requested users to watch a video of an individual entering a DAS
and QDAS secret. The final-stage expected users to recreate their secret, one
week after creating it.
Lin et al. found QDAS more resistant to observation than DAS. The first-part
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of the study revealed that all ten QDAS users could authenticate and only 1 DAS
user could not recreate their drawing. The second-part of the study revealed that
no user could steal a QDAS secret through observation, while 7 users were able
steal a DAS secret through observation. The final-stage of the study, revealed
that 6 DAS users could recall their drawing and 5 QDAS users could recall their
authentication. However, one QDAS user withdrew from the evaluation in the
final-stage.
Therefore, QDAS shows promise and could be a potential shoulder-surfing
solution to DAS. However, Lin et al. did not evaluate the mechanism as part
of a workflow or on an actual device. Therefore, it is difficult to determine if
individuals can use the mechanism on a target device. Lin et al. do not indicate
the target platform but the assumption is that QDAS, as with DAS, is designed
for personal digital assistants. However, QDAS on a personal digital assistant
could be awkward and difficult to use. There is no way to determine if the
mechanism will be successful on mobile devices, without deploying it to them. In
fairness, Lin et al. acknowledge the lack of context and state future focus will be
on improving the ecological validity of QDAS evaluations. Therefore, although
QDAS may be resilient to shoulder-surfing, until users assess it, there is no way
to know if users would embrace it or not.
Chakrabarti et al. argues that rotating the canvas the user draws on could
improve the resiliency of DAS to observation [48].
Rotation Draw-a-secret (RDAS)
Chakrabarti et al. propose RDAS, illustrated in Figure 2.3, an approach that
allows users to rotate the DAS canvas. The separation of the doodle and the
encoding is still true with RDAS, except the angle at which an individual rotates
the canvas is appended to the encoding.
A vertical slider is positioned adjacent to the right of the DAS canvas, in the
RDAS prototype. The user pulls the slider up and down to rotate the canvas.
Therefore, a user could draw stroke, rotate the canvas, draw another stroke and
Figure 2.3: Chakrabarti et al. proposed RDAS approach [48, p. 564]
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rotate it again. The rotation value is added, even if the user does not add a
stroke. Chakrabarti et al. argues the addition of rotation not only increases the
overall password-space of DAS but improves the practical password-space.
Chakrabarti et al. claims that RDAS tackles problems, such as symmetrical
secrets, as the encodings for RDAS secrets would include rotation values. An
attacker would have to have knowledge of the rotation values, as well as the
secret, to compromise the system. Chakrabarti et al. argues rotation not only
makes DAS more secure but more user-friendly.
However, Chakrabarti et al. does not actually evaluate R-DAS with users.
Furthermore, Chakrabarti et al. does not outline the envisioned workflow or device
that would incorporate R-DAS. There is no way to determine if R-DAS would be
usable on certain devices. Moreover, there is no guarantee that users will actually
rotate the canvas, as assumed by Chakrabarti et al.. If users do rotate the canvas,
there is nothing to say that they will not do so in a predictable fashion.
In fairness, Chakrabarti et al. concedes that R-DAS would need to be de-
ployed as part of a wider user study. Chakrabarti et al. states knowledge-based
mechanism are heavily dependent on users and the mechanisms would need to be
assessed with actual users to determine real world performance.
Yet Another Graphical Password
Gao et al. proposes Yet Another Graphical Password (YAGP). A DAS-inspired
scheme with a design that afford users more expression and freedom [92]. Gao
et al. argues the central drawback of DAS is that it has too many constraints,
e.g. an individual is required to position the secret properly and avoid the edge
of grid-sectors.
YAGP relies on a finer-grid than DAS as well as a different encoding and
assessment approach. YAGP secrets are represented as pen-up, pen-moving and
pen-down events. The pen-moving event is encoded as the position of the current
cell in relation to the previous cell. These pen-moving events are book-ended
with pen-up and down events. The entire encoding is considered a stroke. A
YAGP secret can comprise one or more strokes.
The encoding produced during authentication is compared to the encoding
generated during registration. The encoding is either a complete, partial or miss
match of the original. The matching of encodings is achieved by analysing the
stroke, its direction and by computing the Levenshtein Distance.
Gao et al. evaluated YAGP with 30 participants, all seasoned computer users.
Participants interacted with the C++ prototype on a traditional personal com-
puter. The grid was designed for a 3.5” inch screen, the same screen-size as the
original Apple iPhone and iPod touch. Gao et al. investigated five different grid-
granularities with individuals. The participants were initially given ten minutes
to familiarise themselves with the mechanism before creating an authentication
secret. They were then requested to make an authentication attempt. Partici-
pants were then asked to recreate their authentication secret, two days later.
Gao et al. reports that fine grids are better for YAGP authentication, as users
do not need to concern themselves with a specific grid starting point, as is the
case with DAS. Furthermore, Gao et al. stated that user personality is infused in
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a drawn secret and consequently, makes it hard for an attacker to impersonate.
However, Gao et al. highlight the fact that users are unlikely to replicate a YAGP
secret well, every time. They argue this leads to the possibility that an individual
is not guaranteed access to a system in every instance. It is not clear a user would
favour such odds.
Furthermore, although Gao et al. evaluated the approach with actual users,
on a device, they did not incorporate it into a workflow or on a device, similar
to the one envisioned. Gao et al. envisions YAGP being used on personal digital
assistants, devices that rely on a capacitive touch-screen and potentially a stylus.
Gao et al. evaluated YAGP with a mouse and monitor. It is not clear how these
interactions are comparable. An individual will not authenticate with YAGP at
a bus-stop, on a rainy morning when the wind is blowing. They can do this with
a modern-day smartphone or personal digital assistant.
YAGP may perform dramatically different in these settings. Furthermore,
Gao et al. did not incorporate YAGP into an actual workflow. Therefore, there is
no way to determine how users might feel about not accessing a system. YAGP
may be better suited for systems a user interacts with rarely, where access is not
crucial. However, Gao et al. never outlines the envisioned workflow of YAGP.
Passdoodle
Passdoodle, proposed by Goldberg et al., is an approach similar to DAS, except
there is no grid. Users draw secrets on a blank canvas [102]. Furthermore,
users can use various stroke colours and create a secret by drawing it four times.
However, the secret is still encoded and assessed in a similar fashion to DAS.
Once again, the process of drawing is assessed to gain access, not the doodle
itself. The direction, order and number of strokes are all used to assess a doodle.
Goldberg et al. evaluated Passdoodle with 13 participants using paper and
pens. Individuals were presented with three different scenarios, although only
two scenarios were detailed. Goldberg et al. requested individuals to create a
password and Passdoodle secret for an online bank and retailer, that users should
imagine were accessed through a traditional personal computer.
Unfortunately, Goldberg et al. reported that although individuals could retain
doodles just as well as alphanumeric passwords, they did not retain the process of
creation. Therefore, while individuals were able recreate the doodle, the drawing
process was not always the same. Therefore, although users could create the
same doodle, if they deviated from the drawing process used to create it, the
Passdoodle secret was rejected. Nevertheless, Goldberg et al. argues Passdoodle
shows promise as users felt the doodle was easier to remember than passwords.
However, Goldberg et al. did not evaluate Passdoodle as part of a workflow
or on actual device. Furthermore, although Goldberg et al. states Passdoodle is
envisioned for use on a personal digital assistant and that a prototype has been
constructed, they then evaluated it in terms of traditional personal computers.
In fairness, Goldberg et al. concedes that although they tried to closely model
a real application, the next step would be to evaluate Passdoodle as part of an
actual system.
Goldberg et al. argues Passdoodle does show promise, as users found doodles
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easier to recall than traditional passwords. The problems with the approach
appear to stem from the fact the authentication secret is the process, not the
product. Therefore, an approach based on the actual outcome of the drawing
process, rather than the process itself, may make for a better authentication
approach.
Scribble-a-Secret
Scribble-a-Secret (SAS), proposed by Oka et al., is such an authentication ap-
proach, relying on the user’s actual sketch, rather than the process used to create
it [195]. Figure 2.6 illustrates
Figure 2.4: A selection of sketches produced by individuals using SAS [195, p. 3].
The approach expects a user to create a sketch during registration that acts as
their SAS secret. Users then recreate this sketch to authenticate. If the recreated
sketch is similar enough to the SAS secret, authentication is successful.
SAS determines similarity of sketches using edge orientation patterns which
Oka et al. argue are vigorous in detecting drawn objects. The registration process
requires an individual to sketch a drawing and then repeat the process several
times. This allows the system to learn the sketch. In actuality the system is
extracting various edge orientation patterns from the numerous sketches in an
attempt to make a far more robust record of the sketch. This affords the user
some freedom in that they can vary the sketch in terms of position and orientation,
i.e. it does not need to be a perfect replica.
Oka et al. emphasise the learning phase is crucial if SAS is to be successful in
correctly identifying sketches. The proposal itself is commendable and is incred-
ibly easy to understand and easily explained to others. The biggest advantage
of SAS is the utilisation of previous learning and not burdening users with novel
interaction approaches. Users know how to sketch, they do not need to learn a
new interaction method or memorise a sequence.
Oka et al. evaluated SAS with 87 individuals, using a Tablet PC. Users were
asked to sketch their secret 10 times. The investigation primarily focused on as-
sessing if edge orientation patterns could effectively distinguish between different
sketches. Oka et al. reported the approach was met with success and that the
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system did not have any significant problems in distinguishing sketches produced
by different users.
However, although Oka et al. evaluated the mechanism on an actual device,
they do not report any information regarding usability, e.g. time to sketch. Fur-
thermore, SAS is never used as part of a workflow or actual system. Oka et al.
do not indicate an envisioned application. Therefore, it is not clear if users would
endure a lengthy registration process, i.e. sketching a secret 10 times, to authen-
ticate for a simple task, e.g. browsing photographs.
Furthermore, users may not feel comfortable using the mechanism. Dun-
phy and Yan stated certain users were uncomfortable using BDAS because they
felt they had no real artist ability [74]. Moreover, SAS is easily susceptible to
shoulder-surfing, an attacker may observe a SAS sketch and be able to recreate
it. In fairness, Oka et al. state this is a potential weakness of the approach and
that further investigation will be required to determine the best way to address
it.
PassShapes
Weiss and De Luca propose PassShapes as a mechanism which offers a memorable
secret which can be conveyed quickly [289]. The approach is simple, an individ-
ual constructs secrets using eight different directional strokes, best illustrated as
eight cardinal points. The secret is encoded using these direction strokes and
a secret can be composed of several elements all separated by a pen-up event.
Weiss and De Luca evaluated the usability and convenience of PassShapes with
a user-study. Weiss and De Luca investigated two aspects, authenticating and
password regeneration, with twelve users. Individuals used a Java-based proto-
type executing on a Tablet-PC. The users were asked to authenticate once and
to change their authentication secret once. Weiss and De Luca reported that not
only are PassShapes memorable but they are quicker to enter than other graphical
authentication mechanism, although not as fast as PIN entry.
However, Weiss and De Luca are keen to stress that additional research and
investigation is required before PassShapes can be confirmed as being quicker than
all competing graphical mechanisms. Furthermore, although Weiss and De Luca
assessed the approach with users, the mechanism was not deployed as part of a
workflow or actual system. Therefore, it is not clear how users may respond to the
mechanism over time. In fairness, Weiss and De Luca acknowledges PassShapes
would need to be deployed in a longitudinal study to determine if the mechanism
will be embraced by users.
Pass-Go
Tao and Adams propose an authentication mechanism inspired by DAS and the
ancient Chinese board-game, Go [262]. Tao and Adams argue users struggle to
recreate DAS secrets where strokes cross corners or run near the edge of grid-
sectors. Therefore, Pass-Go embraces corners rather than instructing users to
avoid them. Pass-Go expects users to create a secret by selecting corners, or
rather intersections. The user’s secret compromises of a series of intersections and
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is encoded the same as a DAS secret. The intersections selected by an individual
are connected by a line. Therefore, a user would select a initial intersection and
then select another intersection point. A line is drawn between the two points.
The secret follows this path until the user performs a pen-up event.
Tao and Adams evaluated a user-study with 167 participants, mostly stu-
dents, over the fall term. A Java-based Pass-Go prototype protected a web-based
teaching tool for science and engineering courses. The tool allowed students to
access and view grades and course materials. The system also allowed teachers
to post grades and course materials. Tao and Adams state all these accounts,
including the teacher accounts, were protected using Pass-Go secrets.
Tao presented a tutorial to students using the course. The tutorial covered
the mechanism, how to use it, how to improve password length etc. Tao and
Adams state that to ensure deployment of the mechanism was to close to real-
world use, the tutorial was not marketed to students, the time and place were
not communicated to students. Furthermore, they did not record attendance or
suggest students attend. However, Tao and Adams report that 80% of students
did attend the tutorial.
Tao and Adams deem the mechanism was a success with 78% of authentication
attempts successfully. They argued the main reason for performing the user study
was to determine the convenience of the mechanism as well as learn the secrets
individuals generate with Pass-Go. Tao and Adams report that users felt the
mechanism was difficult to use of laptop using a trackpad. Furthermore, users
stated that some mice in the computer laboratory, due to age or quality, made it
difficult to use the mechanism.
However, Tao and Adams do not report the time it takes to authenticate
with the mechanism. Tao and Adams do not discuss authentication time, at all.
Therefore, it is difficult to determine aspects of convenience. Furthermore, al-
though they state that Pass-Go is not limited to just mobile devices but anything
with a web-browser connected to the Internet, they do not discuss the range of
devices that access the tool. Furthermore, it is not clear what devices could ac-
tually interact with the Java-based prototype. Moreover, Pass-Go was assessed
with highly competent computer users, students enrolled in science and engi-
neering courses. The experience of non-technical students may be very different.
Furthermore, Tao and Adams do not outline any alternative systems that allow
individuals to assess grades and content, if they do not want to use the Pass-Go
system. Students are practically held to ransom to use the mechanism. There is
no alternative.
Nevertheless, Tao and Adams should be commended for actually assessing the
authentication mechanism with a user-base. However, a concerning aspect of the
user-study is that Pass-Go was used to view and post grades. Tao and Adams may
want to create a realistic setting in which to evaluate the authentication approach.
However, using an experimental authentication mechanism seems unwise. The
mechanism could contain any number of flaws and bugs. The authentication
approach could contain loop-holes or design-flaws, that an attacker could easily
compromise.
If, for example, a student compromised a teaching account and interfered with
grades, it could cause upset and distress among other members within the class.
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Tao and Adams may have considered this eventuality and have control methods
in place to deal with potential security breaches. Furthermore, it may be the
scenario was the lowest risk of all considered. However, Tao and Adams do not
detail the design process of the application. They do not detail the authentication
scenarios considered and they do not report any risk evaluations. Therefore,
although Tao and Adams have assessed the mechanism with a user-base, they
have not detailed the envisioned use of the mechanism and if the user-study
reflects this intended use.
However, aside from these concerns Tao and Adams have created a mechanism,
that much like Jermyn et al.’s DAS, has inspired other researchers to refine and
improve it.
Background Pass-go (BPG)
Por and Lim propose Background Pass-Go (BPG) [210]. The approach is inspired
by BDAS and Pass-Go. The main difference between BPG and Pass-Go is that
a user is able to select a background image. [210] argue the motivation behind
affording the user the option to select a background image is that it may help
in the recall of BPG secret. Furthermore, it may aide users in the creation of a
BPG secret by affording user the option to decorate or focus on a particular part
of an image.
Multi-grid Background Pass-go (MGBPG)
Por et al. refine BPG further with Multi-Grid Background Pass-Go (MGBPG)
[211]. Por et al. state that MGBPG is inspired by MGDAS, BDAS and Pass-Go.
The primary difference between the BPG approach and MGBPG is that users
are able to vary the size of grid-sectors. The grid canvas has slider controls to
the left and bottom of it. Users can vary the size of the grid-sector by moving
sliders.
Por et al. claims that both BPG and MGBPG provide superior interaction
and memorability to their descendants. However, Por et al. do not evaluate
either mechanism with any actual users. Furthermore, Por et al. do not detail
an envisioned system or how either mechanism would be incorporated into a
workflow.
2.4.2 Cued-Recall
Framing authentication as a recall memory task could arguably be considered the
strongest authentication solution as the user is provided no hints. Nevertheless,
the concern is that users will merely record authentication secrets, motived by
the prospect that they will not be able to recall them. Consequently, some re-
searchers favour framing authentication as a cued-recall memory task, as the user
is supported with a cue or hint.
There are several proposed graphical authentication mechanisms that are
framed as a cued-recall memory task. Similar to the situation present in re-
call approaches with DAS, cued-recall approaches all follow a similar structure to
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the PassPoints approach.
PassPoints
PassPoints, proposed by Wiedenbeck et al. [292], is a Blonder-esque mechanism.
PassPoints expects an individual to select five pixel points from an image. The
sequence of pixel points is the authentication secret, each pixel has a small toler-
ance radius as perfect replication is not expected. The aim of the approach is to
resolve the problems of the recall-based password approach.
Wiedenbeck et al. argue that the inferiority of alphanumeric authentication
stems from two contradictory rules which embody the process, they are, as follows:
1. Passwords should be memorable.
2. Passwords should be secure.
Secure passwords are authentication secrets that are unique, lack information and
above all reside in the mind of the user. This requirement is in direct conflict
with the first rule. Memorable passwords contain information, structure, pattern.
Users creating secure passwords will resort to insecure behaviours to memorise
Figure 2.5: PassPoints prototype user interface [292, p. 113].
them, such as reuse or recording. Wiedenbeck et al. argue this is the fundamental
problem of alphanumeric authentication, a problem they label, as:
“the password problem”.
Wiedenbeck et al. [292, p. 104]
Wiedenbeck et al. claim PassPoints is the solution to this problem. The password-
space of PassPoint is vast, even with the addition of the tolerance radius, as a
single image can contain millions of pixels. The image used can be selected from
a library or provided by the user, the only requirement is the image is complex
enough to inspire users and protect the secret.
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Wiedenbeck et al. evaluated PassPoints with 40 proficient computer users.
The participants were separated into two separate groups, one using PassPoints
the other using passwords, over a period of six weeks. The participants attended
three sessions, one in the first week, one in the second week and one in the final
week. The PassPoints prototype was Java-based and executed on a traditional
personal computer, using a mouse and monitor.
Wiedenbeck et al. report that individuals found the creation of a PassPoints
secret relatively straight-forward and that they discovered no real usability is-
sues. However, participants did spend a significant amount of time entering
their graphical secret when compared to those entering traditional alphanumeric
passwords. The hope that this may subside over-time was also quashed when
graphical secrets still took longer to enter than their counterparts, six-weeks on.
Furthermore, retention was similar to that of alphanumeric authentication, there
was no striking difference.
Indeed, during the learning phase, one-fifth of individuals using graphical
passwords made around 17 to 20 incorrect entries. However, Wiedenbeck et al.
argue this should be considered from another perspective, that graphical secrets
are incredibly rare and few individuals will be familiar with them when compared
to passwords. Furthermore, Wiedenbeck et al. state the majority of errors came
from participants clicking near a PassPoint but not near enough, i.e. not within
the tolerance area. They argue memorability could be improved by thoroughly
considering the image used with PassPoints.
Therefore, Wiedenbeck et al. investigated PassPoints further with different
tolerances and images [291]. Wiedenbeck et al. explored two different tolerances,
10x10 and 14x14 pixels, with 32 undergraduate students, all proficient computer
users, in two separate groups. The participants were asked to create a PassPoints
secret and authenticate, immediately after creation and then one week later.
Wiedenbeck et al. report that no real difficulty was experience by any group
in recreating the PassPoint secret after creation. However, they do state that
participants experiencing the 10x10 tolerance condition made significantly more
errors.
Wiedenbeck et al. argue that the errors not stem from poor interaction or
usability errors but because a user is unable to precisely recall the location of
their PassPoints. Furthermore, although Wiedenbeck et al. investigate the use
of different images they did not find any significant difference between images.
However, Wiedenbeck et al. state that they did observe specific images proving
less inspiring than others. Furthermore, Wiedenbeck et al. claim that asides
from tolerance concerns, users were able to grasp PassPoints quickly and able to
authenticate with it. The retention rates and reduction of errors after learning
suggests PassPoints may be able to tackle the the password problem.
However, Wiedenbeck et al. do not actually assess the mechanism as part of a
workflow or a system. Furthermore, although Wiedenbeck et al. state PassPoints
may be suitable for use on personal digital assistants and have constructed a
prototype for such a platform. They do not assess the mechanism with actual
users on the device. Users may not perform the same on a mobile device, on a
noisy street as they do with a mouse and monitor in a quiet room. Furthermore,
Wiedenbeck et al. do not have a real sense of the actual authentication secrets
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individuals create with PassPoints. The mechanism may have a large password-
space in theory, not necessarily in practice.
The apparent strength of the PassPoints approach is the large password-space
afforded by the pixel-rich images. Thorpe and van Oorschot argue the practical
password space of PassPoints is reduced because of ‘hot-spots’, i.e. popular pixels,
as well as patterns within secret generation [271]. Thorpe and van Oorschot in-
vestigated both human-based attacks and automated attacks. They investigated
two highly-detailed images for popular pixels. They discovered that 5 points in
both images proved popular with individuals, between 24-31% for the first image
and 20-24% for the second. Similarly, Dirik et al. developed a model that they
claim can identify popular regions for points, they cautiously report that they
were able to extract 70 - 80 % of points [72]. Furthermore, Thorpe and van
Oorschot also suggest that patterns existed in sequence selection, these patterns
are as follows:
• Right to left
• Left to right
• Top to bottom
• Bottom to top
• Clockwise
• Counter Clockwise
• Diagonal
Applying the knowledge of popular pixels and possible patterns could sig-
nificantly reduce the strength of PassPoints. This is similar to using a word in
alphanumeric authentication. If an attacker determines the first character of the
word the number of possibilities is dramatically reduced.
Thorpe and van Oorschot then take the next logical step, which is to develop
an automated attack, for this they need to determine candidate click-points. They
define these points as (1) being identifiable and (2) distinguishable. Thorpe and
van Oorschot argue that the fewer candidate click-points contains, the higher
the probability of the image being undermined. A variety of image processing
techniques were employed by Thorpe and van Oorschot to extract a list of these
candidate click-points. Thorpe and van Oorschot report that 9.1% of the Pass-
Points secrets were extracted from one of the test images.
Salehi-Abari et al. argue this is because individuals have a penchant for specific
points [236]. They argue that our attention is drawn to specific points, either
through top-down or bottom-up visual processing. Top-down processing requires
knowledge about a visual object in advance, i.e. where is wally, while bottom-
up processing focuses on objects that are distinct or salient. However, when
investigated Salehi-Abari et al. claim that although bottom-up processing may
play a part in point selection for some individuals, it does not for all.
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Interestingly, Salehi-Abari et al. did have some success, determining 48% of
secrets for a test image. The same image was used by Thorpe and van Oorschot,
for which they extracted 9.1% of secrets. Salehi-Abari et al. achieved this not
through using visual attention but through image-independent guessing patterns.
Therefore, while PassPoint may have a large, theoretical password-space, it
may not have a large, practical password-space. Users could behave in a pre-
dictable way when creating authentication secrets, that undermines the strength
of the mechanism. Wiedenbeck et al. may have found PassPoints promising in the
laboratory but the performance of the mechanism may be different in the field.
Chiasson et al. conducted two user studies, one in the laboratory and another in
the field, to contrast and compare the performance of PassPoints, in and out of
the laboratory [51].
Chiasson et al. evaluated PassPoints, initially in a laboratory with 41 stu-
dents. These participants were all proficient computer users, asked to use a PHP
prototype on a traditional computer, using a mouse and monitor. The partici-
pants were given a presentation on the mechanism and were shown how to create
a secret and authenticate. The students were advised to create an authentication
secret, as if it was guarding their bank account. A session compromised of five
stages. The first stage focused on creating a PassPoints authentication secret.
The second stage was confirmation of the authentication secret. The third stage
required users to answer two questions. This was followed by a stage that ex-
pected users to complete a puzzle. The fifth and final stage required individuals
to authenticate with the CCP secret. Lastly, participants were asked to complete
a questionnaire. Students could complete as many of these five-stages stages as
they wanted within the hour, with the first two being discounted as training
sessions.
Chiasson et al. then evaluated PassPoints, in the field, with 191 computing
science students in the fall term. These participants used PassPoint to access
a web application, containing course notes. Students were educated about the
mechanism through tutorial demonstrations, emailed instructions and a support
website. Participants within the field-study experience one of two conditions,
either PassPoints with a 13x13 tolerance or a 19x19 tolerance.
Chiasson et al. report dramatic differences between the laboratory investiga-
tion of Passwords and the field-study. Chiasson et al. state the differences they
observed call into validity of using laboratory investigation to graphical authenti-
cation mechanisms. The differences between the two studies are detailed below,
they are, as follows:
• The laboratory investigation of PassPoints produced far more positive re-
sults than the field-study.
• The participants in the laboratory investigation were more successful, in
terms of authentication attempts and accuracy, than participants in the
field-study.
• The participants in the field-study had shorter authentication times, than
those in the laboratory investigation.
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• Participants in the laboratory investigation had a more positive attitude
towards PassPoints. Participants were positive about the time taken to
authenticate, even though they were slower than those in the field.
Chiasson et al. postulates the following explanations as to why these differences
might have occurred between the laboratory investigation and field-study. They
are, as follows:
• The participants in the laboratory investigation had highly concentrated
sessions with PassPoints. Users created and authenticated with several
PassPoint secrets within a single hour.
• The participants in the laboratory investigation had practice sessions and
experts on-hand to answer any questions about the mechanism. The partic-
ipants in the field-study had a brief explanation and emailed instructions.
• Authentication attempts immediately followed creation in the laboratory
investigation, whereas field participants had large gaps of time between
authentication attempts.
• The primary focus of the laboratory investigation was the PassPoint au-
thentication secret. The primary focus of the field-investigation was ac-
cess to course-notes. The PassPoints authentication secret was secondary,
a means to an end.
Chiasson et al. argue that while the laboratory investigation of PassPoints showed
it to be promising, when it was deployed in the field, it was not as well received.
The mechanism may not have performed as well in the field but Chiasson et al.
argue it still showed that PassPoints could work in practice.
However, Chiasson et al. argue the difference between the two studies empha-
sises the need to consider the evaluation of graphical authentication mechanisms.
Chiasson et al. state the majority of evaluation is in a controlled, laboratory set-
ting, rather than in the field. The differences between Chiasson et al. studies
suggests laboratory settings do not provide accurate insight into the usability of
graphical authentication mechanisms.
However, although there were differences between the studies. They both show
that popular pixels or hotspots may be a problem for the PassPoint authentication
mechanism.
Cued Click Points
Chiasson et al. proposes Cued Click Points or CCP, a cued-based graphical au-
thentication mechanism [52]. The approach is a variation on PassPoints, in the
sense that an individual selects a pixel from an image. However, the main dif-
ference is that an individual is required to repeat this action over several images.
Therefore, the secret is a sequence of pixels selected from a series of images. The
images are intended as cues, hopefully aiding recall by helping the individual
remember the pixel point they select, if any at all.
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The process begins with an individual registering a secret. During the au-
thentication phase the individual is initially presented with a image that forms
part of their secret. If they successfully select the correct pixel from that image,
then the individual is presented with another image from their secret and so on.
If an individual is unsuccessful in selecting the correct pixel point, the next image
will not form part of their sequence and this process continues.
Therefore, unlike PassPoints, subtle feedback is provided users at every step,
not just at the end. Furthermore, any attackers are taken through a false path,
shown images which do not form part of the individual’s secret. Chiasson et al.
suggest that this process is not only an overall improvement on PassPoints but
should also require less of an individual, as they will not be required to recall a
sequence of pixels for one image. An individual using CCP is only required to
remember the pixel they have selected in a image, the sequence is not required.
This is because the images are randomly presented as cues.
Chiasson et al. evaluated CCP with 24 computing science students, all en-
rolled on a security module. The participants were given a presentation on the
mechanism and were shown how to create a secret and authenticate. The tol-
erance used was 19x19 pixels. Participants used a J# prototype executing on a
traditional personal computer, using a monitor and mouse. The procedure fol-
lowed was the same, as in [52], except towards the end of the hour, participants
were asked what their personal preference was, between CCP and PassPoints.
Chiasson et al. reports that individuals strongly prefer CCP over PassPoints
but cautioned that greater investigation is required. Furthermore, Chiasson et al.
argue that CCP is far more usable as users are able to authenticate rapidly
and accurately. They state that users valued the feedback offered by CCP, in
that inaccurate pixel selection would result in an unknown subsequent image.
Moreover, Chiasson et al. state that participants become more versed at the
mechanism as they use it. However, concerns still remain about CCP, primarily
those inherited from PassPoints, such as popular pixels.
Persuasive Cued Click Points
Chiasson et al. tackles this specific problem with Persuasive Cued Click Points or
PCCP [53]. This approach uses CCP with the addition of a persuasive viewport.
During the registration phase a viewport is randomly positioned over the image.
The viewport is emphasised by reducing the brightness of the rest of the image.
The individual is only allowed to select a pixel point from within the viewport,
which they can shuﬄe if they do not like the position. The viewport itself is
positioned randomly rather to any real heuristic, as this would simply generate
new hotspots.
However, PCCP is not necessarily persuasive but more forced. This is be-
cause individuals have to select a pixel from within the viewport. Furthermore,
whatever aspects of a pixel influence an individual to select it, are somewhat
removed as individuals are required to make an assessment based on far fewer
pixels. However, the benefit is arguably a far stronger secret.
Chiasson et al. evaluated the PCCP with 39 students, all proficient computer
users. Participants used a J# prototype, executing on a traditional personal
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Figure 2.6: PassPoints prototype user interface [53, p. 124].
computer using a mouse and monitor. Students followed, essentially, the same
procedure previously used in as in [52].
Chiasson et al. report that the viewport is successful in reducing hotspots and
the spread of points. Furthermore, individuals claim they feel their PCCP secret
is far more secure than a CCP secret. However, success in reproducing the secret
was no better. Therefore, given the security benefits, the PCCP approach would
be a step forward. However, it’s clear far more investigation will be required to
determine if the viewport has any negative impact.
However, Chiasson et al. did not actually evaluate the mechanism as part of
a workflow or an actual system. Furthermore, they do not detail the intended
use of the mechanism. If the mechanism was intended for use on mobile-phones
or televisions, for example, then evaluating it on a traditional computer may not
be particularly relevant. Users may act one way in a laboratory, with say, their
lecturer, than they would with their friends at the local coffee shop.
2.4.3 Recognition
The concern with pure recall and cued-recall authentication approaches is that
individuals may be unable to remember the authentication secret, precisely. The
user may have memorised the authentication secret but may not be able to ar-
ticulate it, as expected. Therefore, some researchers favour recognition-based
authentication approaches, as users are merely presented the authentication se-
cret.
63
Nevertheless, such an approach presents challenges to designers as the au-
thentication approach must still remain secure. Consequently, recognition-based
approach follow a similar pattern of presenting users target objects mixed with
distractor objects. The authentication secret is represented as a single or series of
target objects, mixed with several similar distractor objects. The distractor ob-
jects are positioned to dissuade and confuse attackers. The PassFaces approach
is a common example of such a design, relying on targets and distractor images.
PassFaces
PassFaces is one of the few commercial graphical authentication mechanisms
[266]. The authentication approach assigns an individual a collection of faces
as their authentication secret. The user is then presented a series of challenge
stages that compromises of nine images within a grid. The eight images in the
grid that are not part of the user’s authentication secret are termed distractors
while the single image from the user’s authentication secret is termed the target
image. The user completes a challenge stage for each image in their authentica-
tion collection.
Story
Davis et al. proposes an authentication approach that requires users to create
a ‘story’ [62]. The authentication mechanism is similar to PassFaces in that a
user is presented a series of grids containing images. However, the images are not
restricted to faces but include other objects, such as vehicles and animals. The
user is expected to create a story using the images. The story is the authentication
secret. An example authentication secret is: a couple have lost the keys for their
car. Therefore, the resulting image sequence is: a male face, a female face, a set
of keys and a car.
Davis et al. evaluated the scheme, alongside PassFaces, with participants using
several categories, including vehicles, animals, food, vistas, household objects
and models. Davis et al. reports that users found the authentication secrets far
less memorable than those used in PassFaces. Davis et al. states they are not
surprised as faces have been shown to have superior recognition performance.
However, Davis et al. does state performance with story was impacted, for the
following two reasons:
1. Users ignored instructions
Users did not create a story with the images they selected. Davis et al.
states that instead users selected image they felt were memorable, distinct
or attractive.
2. Users struggled with sequence
Users were able to recognise images but were unable to remember the nec-
essary sequence to enter them.
Therefore, Davis et al. states if sequence is important in any authentication ap-
proach it should be emphasised to the user.
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De´ja` Vu
Dhamija and Perrig propose De´ja` Vu, a recognition-based graphical authentica-
tion mechanism [68]. Dhamija and Perrig argue a recognition-based approach will
require less of individuals than a similar recall-based approach. De´ja` Vu consist
of three stages: (1) secret creation, (2) training and (3) authentication.
Figure 2: Portfolio selection window
Observer Attacks. Ross Anderson shows that observa-
tion of PIN codes on ATMs has been used to imperson-
ate users [And94]. Similarly, if Mallory observes Al-
ice during multiple authentications, he can know Alice’s
portfolio perfectly. We propose the following counter-
measures.
If the size of Alice’s portfolio is larger than the
number of portfolio images in a challenge set ,
the probability that an observer sees the same port-
folio images after one observation is . Al-
though the security is still weakened after an ob-
server learns images in a portfolio, an observer still
can not impersonate Alice easily.
Assuming that the images are displayed in a way
that only Alice can see them clearly, the observer
gains no knowledge of the portfolio by observing
which images she selects, since the position of the
portfolio images within the challenge set is ran-
domized.
The method for the image selection is hidden, such
that an observer cannot see whether a given image
is in the portfolio or not. If the observer cannot see
which keys are pressed or can not determine which
images are selected, he gets no useful information.
The portfolio images can be slightly changed in
each authentication. The goal is that a legitimate
user can still recognize her portfolio images, while
leaking less information about the portfolio to an
observer. Further study is needed to explore image
distortion methods and to determine how modifica-
tions in images are perceived by users.
Intersection Attack. If all the portfolio images are part
of the challenge set, and all decoy images are changed in
Figure 2.7: De´ja` Vu portfolio creation [68, p. 5].
Secret creation with De´ja` Vu requires an individual to select a set of images from
a large collection, as illustrated in Figure 2.7. Each image is abstract in nature
and the collection is gen ra ed using a mathematical formula, the output depends
on an initial se d. The beauty of this design is that the actual images do not
need to be stored, just he small initial seed.
The set of images sele t d during the creation stage constitutes the individ-
ual’s secret. The ext step is to identify these images amongst other decoys in a
training stage. T e individual is not presented with every image in their secret
set, just a few of them. Furthermore, there is no sequence involved in selection,
all the user has to do is identify the images extracted from their secret set. The
purpose of the training stage is to strengthen retention of the images within the
user’s secret set.
The authentication stage essentially mirrors that of the training stage. Dhamija
& Perrig evaluated De´ja` Vu against other competing systems and assessed it using
two different image-types, i.e. abstract against semantic. De´ja` Vu performed well
against competing recall-based approaches such as passwords and PINs. Indeed,
Dhamija & Perrig reported that more individuals were unable to recall their user-
name than recognition the images within their secret sets. Individuals using De´ja`
Vu felt that it was overall easier to use but at the expense of time and security.
However, Dhamija & Perrig report an interesting insight in regards the image-
type used in De´ja` Vu. When using semantic images, i.e. photographic scenes,
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some individuals selected the same images. One specific image was selected by
9 out of 20 individuals. Furthermore, these images are far easier to explain and
describe, thus, as a consequence an individual’s secret set of images is easier to
convey to someone else. For example, the aforementioned popular semantic image
contained the Golden Gate bridge.
Conversely, abstract images rarely overlapped and descriptions of them rarely,
if ever, matched. This in theory strengthened the probable password space of the
approach as there was no real pattern or popular images. Naturally, further
investigation will be required but Dhamija & Perrig research does highlight the
impact the image-type can have on an approach.
Photographic Authentication
Pering et al. propose Photographic Authentication, an authentication approach
for use on public machines [203]. The approach was designed for use untrusted
computer systems, such as those found in libraries and airports. Pering et al. state
the mechanism relies on a home or personal server that manages authentication.
The personal server manages authentication with the user, not the untrusted
system. The server indicates to an external system the result of authentication.
The process presents a series of challenge grids, containing four images. Three
of the these are decoy images sourced from other users, alongside a target image
sourced from a user’s personal collection. The user must indicate the target image
in ten challenge grids to authenticate. Pering et al. evaluated the mechanism with
8 participants, using a web-based prototype of the mechanism.
Pering et al. report that participants were able to quickly determine target
images from decoy images. They state that when a user has a large collection
of personal images, authentication is typically slower. Pering et al. indicate two
users had between 1200 and 1800 images, while the rest had between 40 and
500. Furthermore, while some participants felt the mechanism was stronger than
passwords, others were not convinced.
Pering et al. also state that another concern is the fact that attacker does not
need to identify a target image to compromise the system. The attacker simply
needs to identify the images that do not belong to a user. Pering et al. argue the
mechanism could tackle this concern by using the target images of other users.
However, Pering et al. concede they are not sure how this would scale to a large
group of users.
Tiles
Nicholson et al. propose Tiles, an authentication approach that requires users to
simply memorise a single image [189]. The image is segmented into nine equal
tiles. The mechanism then presents a single segment or tile from the image in a
grid, alongside eight others that have been randomly selected from decoy images.
The user needs to complete four of these challenges grids to access a system.
Nicholson et al. argue that relying on a single image, instead of four, reduces
the burden placed on the user. However, they do emphasise that being dependent
on a single image may make the mechanism more vulnerable to (a) sharing and
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(b) observation. Therefore, they evaluated these two specific attacks with two
user, or attacker, studies.
The mechanism was exposed to 60 students, acting as attackers. The partic-
ipants were presented nine different challenge grids, all using a different target
image. The participants were asked to identify the segment belonging to the tar-
get image in each grid. The decoy images used are categorised as either similar,
medium or dissimilar to the target image. The target images were not presented
to participants. The participants were either presented (a) a description of the
target image or (b) a segment of it.
Nicholson et al. reported that decoy images, similar to the target, proved the
most resilient to both attacks. Furthermore, they state that specific target images
appeared more resilient than others. Therefore, Nicholson et al. suggest careful
consideration of the target image could strengthen the mechanism against both of
these attacks. However, while Nicholson et al. emphasise the focus is on the ability
of attackers to compromise the system, they do not perform any assessment of the
performance of the mechanism with any actual users. Therefore, while certain
images be more resilient to attackers they may also prove more difficult for users.
That may result in users adopting unknown coping strategies.
2.4.4 Comparison of Approaches
Section 2.2 outlined and classified various graphical authentication mechanisms
as either recall, cued-recall or recognition memory tasks. The alphanumeric au-
thentication approach can be considered a recall task, as the user is required to
enter a password from memory. An alternative authentication approach, such
as DAS, is also classified as a recall task, as the user is presented a canvas and
required to draw an authentication secret from memory.
An alternative authentication approach, such as Story, is classified as a recog-
nition task, as the user is presented with images of objects and is required to
indicate if they recognise them or not. The interesting aspect of these authen-
tication approaches is whether or not framing an authentication approach as a
recall or recognition memory task improves authentication. The intention is to
craft an authentication approach that is convenient and painless for the user. If a
specific memory task is classed as more convenient or less intensive than another,
then it should form the foundation of an alternative authentication approach.
Recall memory tasks provide few, if any, prompts to aid memory retrieval,
while recognition memory tasks present actual elements to prompt retrieval. Tul-
ving and Watkins states that retrieval cues interact with memorised information
[275]. The combination of the cue and stored information allows an individual
to extract memorised information. However, a cue may not be particularly well
suited or carefully crafted for retrieval. Furthermore, cues themselves may be
processed and encoded differently to the information sought. An example would
be using smell to retrieve a drawing. Consequently, Tulving and Watkins state
recognition is essentially an easier memory task, than recall, as the retrieval cues
are more pertinent. The element being sought is essentially the element presented.
Therefore, the decision was taken to frame the alternative authentication
mechanism as a recognition task. The expectation was an recognition-based ap-
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proach would ease retrieval of an authentication secret. Consequently, the next
step was to determine an appropriate image-type for use in authentication.
2.5 Taxonomy of Image-types for Recognition-
based Authentication
Standing argues that recognition potential for images, when considered under
certain conditions, is almost limitless [257]. Similarly, Nickerson states that hu-
mans have strong recognition abilities for complex images [190, 191]. Nickerson
investigated the recognition performance of images, exposing individuals to 600
images. The participants were initially presented 200 images, immediately fol-
lowed by another set of 400. The second set was a mixture of the previous set
and 200 unseen images. The participants were asked to determine if an image
in the second set was new or old, i.e. unseen or seen. Nickerson reports strong
recognition performance at 95% accuracy. The lowest performing participants
still exhibited above 80% accuracy.
Nevertheless, while individuals may exhibit strong recognition performance for
images, not all images necessarily elicit the same performance [125]. Furthermore,
not all images that an individual can recognise are necessary suitable or realistic
for use in an authentication mechanism. Consequently, the image-type selected
for use in a recognition-based graphical authentication mechanism must represent
a balance between usability and security.
There is not necessarily a single image-type, researchers and designers have
taken several different directions in designing alternative authentication mecha-
nisms. Section 2.4.3 outlined and discussed several recognition-based graphical
authentication mechanisms. The image-types used in each of these mechanisms
are:
• Scenes
Tiles [189] and Photographic Authentication [203] both rely on images of
scenes. The image can comprise of objects, individuals and/or landscapes.
• Objects
Story [62] relies on images of objects of general items as well as faces.
• Faces
Passfaces [266] relies on images of faces.
The aforementioned image-types are not the only options for recognition-based
graphical authentication mechanisms, another potential image-type is:
• Caricatures
Faces with emphasises on distinctive facial features, e.g. exaggerated chin
or nose.
However, there are other images, such as “random art” images [68], graphical
icons [293] and mikons [223]. Nevertheless, “random art”, graphical icons and
mikons are essentially synthetic images that are favoured as they offer practical
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and technical advantages. The synthetic images are not selected as they represent
a usability and security balance. The primary advantage of “random art” images
is that they can be systematically generated, affording a wide password space
and avoiding complex copyright issues. Similarly, graphical icons without legal
constraints are numerous and relatively easily sourced. Nevertheless, the usability
advantages of either approach is not particularly clear.
Graphical icons were not designed to be used in recognition-based graphical
authentication but instead serve to afford users the ability navigate operating
systems effectively and effectively. Furthermore, graphical icons may simply not
be distinctive enough for an individual to recognise rapidly among a see of others
[293]. Similarly, the unusual and novel shapes, colours and composition of “ran-
dom art” may not be particularly memorable or distinctive for users to rapidly
process in an authentication approach.
However, while the aforementioned image-types of scenes, objects and faces
represent a potentially better balance, they are not without concerns. The images
of all have their advantage and disadvantages in terms of use in an authentication
approach, these outlined in the ensuing sections.
2.5.1 Scenes
Oliva states that individuals can capture the gist of a scene with a single glance
[196]. Oliva points to ‘channel-surfing’ as an example of such sophistication, i.e.
an individual progresses through television channels, sparing seconds on scenes,
seeking content they want to watch. An individual does not linger for long in
their quest for entertainment.
The speed and sophistication of individuals in processing scenes suggests such
images may be acceptable for use in authentication. An individual is not merely
processing colours and compositions. Biederman states comprehension of scenes
is equally important, objects and faces do not appear in a vacuum [30]. The ele-
ments within a scene are connected and when processing the scene, an individual
is assessing the semantics of it.
Consequently, the contents and composition of a scene may impact on the
memorability of it. Parikh et al. states that scenes that comprise of an enclosed
environments and faces are more memorable than picturesque landscapes [200].
Furthermore, Parikh et al. states novel or visually pleasant scenes are not more
memorable, despite common assumptions [200] .
Furthermore, Xiao et al. argues that scenes have an intrinsic memorability
value that is consistent across individuals, regardless of experience and knowledge
[297]. Therefore, the speed and sophistication of the human visual system in
processing and storing scenes suggests such images are suitable for use in an
authentication mechanism.
Nevertheless, the aspects of scenes that contribute to the memorability of an
image could be harnessed by a system to classify and assess scenes. Xiao et al.
demonstrates such a system that is able to rapidly process and assess the content
of a scene and the potential memorability of it. Therefore, given an individual
may favour memorable images, users may make predictable choices that another
system could easily determine. However, Parikh et al. argues while some scenes
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are more memorable than others, users are not necessarily good at determining
such scenes [200].
Unfortunately, while this may address the problem of predictable choices,
in terms of memory, it raises concerns about the memorability of scenes that
users may select for use in authentication. However, users could merely be issued
scenes than select them or users could be presented vetted scenes, that already are
deemed to have high memorability. Consequently, the design of the authentication
mechanism is crucial in extracting the maximum value from images of scenes.
However, given the complexity of scenes and space required to display them,
there are concerns on how scenes could be presented to users. If users were
presented target scenes alongside distractors, arguably considerable space would
be needed. Furthermore, it is not clear such space would be available on many
devices. Moreover, even with increased screen spaces, users may need to have
a short viewing distance, as well as a high-quality screen, to process small and
specific details of a scene. Nevertheless, the design of the authentication approach
could arguably tackle such problems. Tiles, outlined and discussed in §2.4.3,
tackled the problem of scene scale by segmenting scenes into small sections. Users
are presented a single target segment alongside several distractor segments, over
several stages [189].
Nonetheless, Nicholson et al. did not assess the approach with actual users,
consequently, it is difficult to determine if the approach is practical. Furthermore,
arguably segmenting scenes into sections is little different from using a single
object or face from a scene. Therefore, objects and faces could also be potential
images-types for use in authentication.
2.5.2 Objects
Individuals exhibit speed and skill in observing and processing objects, unsurpris-
ing as they encounter them everyday. Therefore, images of objects may represent
a strong image-type for an authentication mechanism. Jolicoeur et al. states that
recognition of objects represents the intersection of perception and memory [137].
Individuals do not simply observe an object they attempt to comprehend it, its
reasons for existence, its purpose.
Consequently, Jolicoeur et al. argues the way an individual processes an object
could be dependent on the level of knowledge and experience an individual has
of the object [137]. Furthermore, Konkle et al. state that memorability of an
object is very much associated with experience, in that objects will have increased
memorability, if an individual has some prior knowledge or experience with it,
upon encountering it [156]. Moreover, individuals can potentially be trained
and taught to process and distinguish even subtle changes between objects [31].
Therefore, images of familiar objects, even particularly unusual or esoteric objects
could form the basis of an authentication mechanism.
However, Biederman et al. states that while individuals display prowess for
object recognition, it is not without expense [32]. Biederman et al. evaluated
the cost of object recognition by presenting individuals an increasing number
of objects in a clock-face composition [32]. Biederman et al. states that there
was notable decrease in detectability as more objects were presented, suggesting
70
object recognition is an “attention-demanding” process [32]. Therefore, there
are constraints on the design of the authentication mechanism as to ensure the
mechanism is not too demanding of users, in terms of the number of objects.
Furthermore, there are concerns that users may make predictable image choices
and exhibit patterns in their object selection. The patterns could be exploited
by an attacker and result in the compromise of the authentication mechanism.
Spain and Perona argue that objects are indeed not all equal, individuals assign
different levels of importance to objects [254]. Consequently, there are real con-
cerns that users may make predictable choices based on such importance levels
when selecting images for use in authentication and an attacker could utilise such
patterns.
However, Davis et al. states that users of the Story scheme, outlined and dis-
cussed in §2.4.3, do not appear to make such predictable choices [62]. Therefore,
images of objects may still be a suitable image-type for use in an authentication
mechanism. Nevertheless, there are still concerns surrounding the sourcing of
object images. The images would need to assessed and primed to ensure they are
distinct enough so users can rapidly detect and select target images. However,
users may fair better with a single prototype object that varies between images,
such as faces.
2.5.3 Faces
The human vision system is able to perceive and process faces almost instanta-
neously [273] with recognition for faces superior to other objects [103]. The speed
and accuracy of the system, as with many others, depends on a number of factors
[303]. The majority of neuroscience and psychophsyic research agrees individuals
have a penchant for people and are incredibly efficient at processing faces. An
ability that could form the strong foundation of an alternative authentication
mechanism.
Ellis states that face processing is a dedicate process [79] as recognition of a
face is affected by inversion [301] and prosopagnosia suffers are able to recognise
other objects [36] as well as the preference of newborns for “face-like” patterns
[105]. These discoveries may indeed be indicative of a dedicated process. However,
many researchers argue that conclusions drawn from such discoveries are not
necessarily the only explanation.
Valentine states that while inversion certainly does effect the processing of
faces so does short presentation time [279]. Valentine argues neither are par-
ticularly indicative of a dedicated process. Furthermore, Diamond and Carey
demonstrate the same ‘inversion-effect’ in canine specialists’ recognition of dogs
[70], suggesting such a transformation is not exclusive to face processing. Further-
more, there are also counter arguments and explanations for the face processing
abilities of prosopagnosia patients and newborns.
The reality is that prosopagnosia patients do not exhibit the same symptoms.
Malone et al. demonstrated the ability of one prosopagnosia to match some fa-
mous faces but not unfamiliar faces, while another prosopagnosia patient was
able to match unfamiliar faces but few famous faces [178]. Moreover, Bruyer ar-
gues the “information processing system” of a prosopagnosia suffer may recognise
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and process a face while the patient does not [43]. Consequently, prosopagnosia
suffers may not be indicative of a dedicated face process.
Therefore, the preference of newborns for face-like patterns may be the only
aspect that points to a dedicated process. However, while Johnson et al. was able
to confirm the preference for newborns, the preference itself declined after a few
months [136]. Consequently, while neonates do exhibit a preference for faces, it
does not persist, further questioning the existence of a dedicated process.
Nevertheless, other evidence could suggest the possibility of a dedicated pro-
cess for face processing. Perrett et al. identifies face specific neurones in rhesus
monkeys, arguing the existence of such cells as evidence of specialised areas for
faces [205]. Nevertheless, such specialised areas may not be exclusive to faces
[206]. Similarly, Kanwisher et al. outlines the fusiform face area, an expert region
that is more responsive to faces than other objects [149]. However, yet again,
such specific and specialised processing and encoding may not be exclusive to
faces [95]. Nonetheless, Tanaka suggest faces are processed differently and ar-
gues the entry point for face recognition is different from object recognition [261].
Tanaka argues that object recognition entry point is at a basic level, e.g. ‘a hu-
man being’ while the entry point for faces is at a subordinate level, e.g. ‘Barack
Obama’. Consequently, there is still much debate about exactly how faces are
special.
However, there appears consensus or general agreement that the brain reacts
to some object differently and can be optimised for certain objects. Therefore,
while some individuals may be experts on specific objects and visually process
them efficiently, all individuals are face experts without training. Furthermore,
individuals exhibit strong retention for faces as well.
Bahrick et al. assessed retention of classmate faces for 392 participants, who
had graduated, between 2 weeks and 57 years, from high-school. The participants
were asked to complete a picture recognition task. The task consisted of ten
stages, each stage involved the presentation of a row of five faces on a single card,
one face was the target while the other four were distractors. The recognition
performance was 90% for those who recently graduated and appears to remain
consistent for approximately 35 years before deteriorating.
Furthermore, distinct and attractive faces appear to improve memorability
and recognition. Cross et al. report that in every case where individuals deemed
a face as attractive or beautiful, it was subsequently recognised [61]. Similarly,
Fleishman et al. found that individuals recognised faces that were initially deemed
as either very attractive or least attractive than neutral faces [84]. Moreover, even
the expression on a face can impact on an individuals recognition performance
[91]. Consequently, distinctive features on a face likely ensure future recognition.
However, such aspects of face processing could prove problematic for use in
an authentication mechanism. Davis et al. discovered that individuals make pre-
dictable choices when they are required to select images for use in graphical
authentication [62]. The following aspects of faces may influence user choices:
• Attraction
The purpose of attraction is propagate desirable genes [268, 267]. The level
of attraction associated with face may decrease but remains similar overtime
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[264]. Furthermore, no specific feature is responsible, instead perception of
attraction is based on symmetry, averageness and secondary sexual traits
[81]. Lastly, an attractive face is a memorable face [61]. Consequently, an
authentication secret comprising of attractive faces is a memorable authen-
tication secret.
• Race
The reality is that race does impact on the recognition with faces [280,
46, 265] with individuals exhibiting superior memorability for own-race
faces, than other-race faces [179, 230]. However, Cross et al. found that
African Americans exhibited similar recognition performance for own-race
and other-race faces [61]. Cross states performance may stem from the fact
that participants had ‘experience’ of white faces from television programmes
and films.
• Familiarity
Goldstein and Chance state faces exhibit superior recognition performance
to inkblots and snowflakes [103]. Goldstein and Chance argue familiarity
with a class may not only aid in assimilation of new members but also
strengthen resilience to decay [103]. Furthermore, Ida Gobbini et al. state
familiar faces, belonging to friends and family, exhibit a stronger response
than famous or unfamiliar faces. Ida Gobbini et al. state that familiar
faces induce neural activity in areas traditionally associated with social
knowledge. Moreover, Ida Gobbini et al. argue unfamiliar faces induce
activity in areas, hypothesised as a ‘social brake’, when assessing potential
threats [121].
Unfrotunately, these general aspects appear to impact on the use of face images in
authentication mechanism. Davis et al. demonstrates that when creating authen-
tication secrets based on images of faces, users tend to select own-race faces [62].
They state that 50% of authentication secrets generated by Asian females dis-
play an own-race bias, as do 90% of authentication secrets generated by African
Americans. However, image-sets could be vetted and configured to tackle such
problems.
Nevertheless, aspects such as attraction could still present a problem. Lan-
glois et al. argues maxims, such as beauty is in the eye of the beholder, are myths
and there is agreement on attraction within and across cultures [166]. There-
fore, individuals could exhibit patterns that an attacker or system could exploit.
Eisenthal et al. states that the beauty of a face is a ‘universal concept’, learn-
able by a computer [78]. Consequently, any system attempting to introduce faces
would need to address these concerns in their design [62].
However, the design of an authentication mechanism can also potentially en-
hance the use of faces. Dukes and Bevan states retention of faces are improved
if observed in multiple poses [73]. Similarly, recognition is improved when in-
dividuals encounter distinctive familiar faces [281]. Therefore, the design of an
authentication mechanism could display multiple poses of the same face or rely
on an image-set of familiar faces, for example. Consequently, the design of an
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alternative authentication mechanism is incredibly important as it has the po-
tential to reduce the concerns of using specific image-types as well as enhancing
their use.
However, while face images may be suitable for use in authentication, an
alternative direction could be caricatures. The caricature image-type may afford
many of the benefits of face images but avoid complications such as attraction
and race.
2.5.4 Caricatures
Tversky and Baratz argue that caricatures, rather than face images, closely re-
semble the schematic representation of them in memory, as they they maintain
stable features and emphasis distinct features [276]. Benson and Perrett argues
that memory may process and encode faces in terms of deviations from a proto-
type [25]. Consequently, caricatures may harness and stimulate such representa-
tions. However, Rhodes et al. argues while line drawing caricatures may have an
advantage, photographic caricatures do not [229]. Furthermore, caricatures of fa-
miliar faces are identified faster than veridical line drawings and anti-caricatures
[228]. Moreover, Rhodes suggests that the preference or accuracy of a caricature
depends on the familiarity of the face to the viewer [226].
Therefore, traditional hand-drawn caricatures may be a suitable image-type
for an alternative authentication mechanism. Nevertheless, Rhodes and Wooding
states that while caricatures may be closer to the mental representation of faces,
traditional photographs are recognised faster [227]. Moreover, Lewis argues ad-
vantages in using caricatures may apply to any distorted face not simply carica-
tures [168]. Consequently, there is possibly no real advantage in using traditional
caricatures over distorted faces in an authentication mechanism.
Furthermore, caricatures do not necessarily address many of the problems
of using face images. Byatt and Rhodes states that there is an own-race bias
when recognising caricatures [45]. Therefore, users may make predictable choices
in creating an authentication secret that an attacker or system could exploit.
Gao et al. demonstrates machine recognition of emotions from caricature faces
[94]. Consequently, a system could be potentially devised to process and exploit
patterns within caricature-based authentication secrets.
However, arguably the authentication mechanism could be designed to curb
the impact of such concerns. Nevertheless, the immediate benefit of caricatures
over face images is not clear. Furthermore, sourcing caricatures could be more
complex than face images, as there is no readily available source of them when
compared to other image types. Nonetheless, while caricatures may have con-
cerns and problems they still represent a suitable image-type for an alternative
authentication mechanism.
2.5.5 Comparison of Image-types
The human vision system exhibits speed and prowess in processing, encoding,
storing and retrieving images. Moreover, images are more memorable than the
words that name them [188]. Therefore, images appear a strong foundation for
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a recognition-based graphical authentication mechanism. Nevertheless, not all
images are necessarily equal and some image-types may be more superior than
others for the purposes of authentication.
The previous section, §2.5, outlined and discussed four images types, namely:
scenes, objects, faces and caricatures. The use of scenes of images appears ad-
vantageous as individuals can capture the gist of a scene with a single glance
[196]. However, constructing an authentication mechanism around images of
scenes may be difficult due to limitations on screen space and screen quality.
Biederman states comprehension of a scene is key, as individuals do not process
scene elements in a vacuum [30]. Consequently, there must be enough space and
detail for an individual to comprehend a scene. An aspect that may be difficult
to perform on small screens or large low-quality screens.
However, such concerns are becoming irrelevant as screens become increasingly
sophisticated and readily available. Nevertheless, even beyond screen quality
there are still limitations on screen real estate and how many scene images can
be practically presented to users at any one time. Moreover, even if scene images
are segmented, comprehension is potentially impacted as individuals do not have
access to the entire scene. Consequently, scene images appear awkward, in terms
of use for authentication. Nonetheless, scene elements such as objects and faces
could be better images-types for use in authentication.
An authentication mechanism based on objects seems possible as users pro-
cess and encounter them everyday. Nonetheless, object recognition and pro-
cessing is an attention-demanding process [32]. Furthermore, while individuals
encounter objects regularly, there are still concerns surrounding the practicality
of them forming the basis of an authentication mechanism. An individual’s prior
knowledge of an object impacts on the processing and memorability of the object
[137, 156]. Consequently, constructing an object image-set could be problematic,
unless it comprises of common objects. Furthermore, object would need to be
vetted to sufficiently distinct to ensure users do not confuse objects. Moreover, as
users assign different levels of importance to objects, they may create predictable
authentication secrets.
However, users do not appear to exhibit such patterns when creating authen-
tication secrets comprising of object images [62]. Nonetheless, there are still
concerns about sourcing and filtering object images for use in an consumer-level
authentication approach. There is no guarantee that users may be familiar with
all images or that they can rapidly differentiate between objects. Moreover, any
algorithms or pre-processing to vet an image-set may simply introduce complexity
that an attacker could exploit to comprise systems. Nevertheless, an authentica-
tion approach could be tailored to specific and services to harness the potential of
object images. A fan-based canine website, for example, could utilise a graphical
authentication approach. The approach itself, could utilise an image-set of par-
ticular breed of dog. A fan or expert in dogs would be able to rapidly recognise
and process such images as they have experience with them.
Therefore, while there is undeniable potential for object images it is arguably
restricted to specific systems and services. Nevertheless, all users have knowledge
and experience with certain objects, namely faces. The reality is that almost
all individuals are face experts and a graphical authentication approach based
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on faces arguably has many advantages. Users are able to retain and recognise
faces for decades [13]. The improved recognition ability may be an indication of a
dedicated process for faces within the brains of individuals [79]. However, it may
simply be indicative of an expert area of the brain, that individuals can harness
to efficiently process specific objects [95].
Nevertheless, there are concerns surrounding use of face images in authentica-
tion. The primary concern is users making predictable choices based on attraction
and race, as such patterns could be exploited by attackers. Moreover, there are
lesser concerns such as actually sourcing suitable face images. Consequently,
caricatures rather than faces images are often considered as a potential alterna-
tive. The assumption is that caricatures retain the advantages of face images but
address disadvantages such as predictable users patterns.
Unfortunately, race does impact on the processing of caricatures [45]. More-
over, sourcing is potentially far more complex, although one potential solution is
for users to create their own caricatures. However, such a requirement would only
balloon the cost of the authentication approach in terms of time and would expect
users to have skill and inclination to create such caricatures. Furthermore, tra-
ditional photographs are recognised faster than caricatures [227]. Consequently,
caricatures do not appear to present any real advantages over face images, in
terms of use in authentication.
Therefore, after considering the four specific image-types, the following con-
clusions can be drawn:
• Scene images have potential but require considerably screen real estate to
display to users, limiting the number that can be presented at one time.
• Object images have potential but image-sets would need to be tailored to
ensure users have familiarity with images. The concern is that users may
struggle with unfamiliar objects.
• Caricatures have potential but there are concerns about sourcing and they
arguably offer no benefits over face images.
• Face images can be recognised rapidly and retained for decades but there
are concerns users may exhibit predictable patterns when creating authen-
tication secrets.
Therefore, the decision was taken to focus on face images and use them in the al-
ternative authentication mechanism. Nevertheless, while face images may be ad-
vantageous for use in authentication, another aspect had to be addressed, namely
obfuscation of the authentication secret. The primary concern of using images
as part of a recognition-based authentication approach is that onlookers could
potentially observe entry of the authentication secret. Therefore, an obfusca-
tion method had to be determine to ensure entry of the authentication secret is
shielded from onlookers.
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2.6 Taxonomy of Observation-types for Graph-
ical Authentication
The observation of authentication entry by onlookers is a major concern for al-
most all knowledge-based authentication approaches. Password entry is routinely
obfuscated so that other individuals are unable to easily observe what is be-
ing typed, which reassures end-users. Unfortunately, Tari et al. discovered that
when users type long and obscure passwords, entry is more easily observed by
shoulder-surfers than when typing simple and familiar words [263]. Unfortu-
nately, alphanumeric authentication secrets generated by users to protect bank
accounts and tax records are likely to exhibit exactly these characteristics, so
efforts spent by a user to be “secure” actually backfire. Even so, most users are
fairly confident that observers cannot guess their password with any degree of
accuracy [288], even though such confidence is probably misplaced [263].
Researchers have proposed a number of different ways of alleviating these
problems. Therefore, there are many different strategies for shielding authenti-
cation secrets within a shared space. Tan et al. propose a spy-resistant on-screen
keyboard specifically designed for kiosks. Unfortunately, users are somewhat
uncomfortable using the keyboard [260]. Nevertheless, Tan et al. proposed ap-
proach is only one of several and researchers have proposed several solutions that
are designed to shield authentication entry from onlookers. The solutions can be
primarily divided into the following two categories:
• Hardware
The authentication approach is complimented with dedicated hardware to
obfuscate entry of the authentication secret.
• Software
The authentication approach is designed in software to obfuscate entry of
the authentication secret.
There have been several hardware and software approaches proposed by re-
searchers, these outlined and discussed over the ensuing sections.
2.6.1 Hardware
There are various hardware solutions to obfuscation of authentication. The pro-
posed solutions vary from utilising existing hardware within devices to designing
and constructing bespoke hardware solutions. There are many possible solutions
but two prominent directions are:
• Tactile
Orozco et al. outline a graphical authentication approach that relies on al-
most imperceptible tactile interactions, such as pressure and velocity, during
authentication [197]. Similarly, Sasamoto et al. proposes an an approach
that relies on tactile interaction that is concealed and shielded from onlook-
ers [237]. Nevertheless, drawbacks for both include the need for specialised
hardware and relatively complex user interaction. Consequently, De Luca
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et al. propose an approach that relies vibration, as several consumer de-
vices already support such tactile interaction [64]. Similarly, Bianchi et al.
outline approach that relies on vibration and audio cues [28]. Nonetheless,
both approaches are still relatively complex and this is reflected in lengthier
authentication times.
• Gaze
Hoanca and Mock propose the use of eye-tracking systems to determine the
direction of the user’s gaze [118]. Similarly, Kumar et al. propose gaze-based
entry of passwords as a method of concealing authentication interaction
from onlookers [162]. The approach requires an individual to essentially
gaze at an object, such as a button, and then either dwell on the object
or push a trigger to indicate selection. Furthermore, the same interaction
could be applied beyond alphanumerics to graphical authentication. Dun-
phy et al. proposes a variant of PassFaces, original outlined and discussed in
§2.4.3, reliant on gaze rather than mouse clicks [75]. Similarly, Forget et al.
proposes a gaze-based variant of Cued Click Points [87], original outlined
and discussed in §2.4.2. Nevertheless, all such approaches require fairly
laboured and complex interaction that results in lengthier authentication
times, e.g. Forget et al. contrasts performance of 53.5 seconds with 7.5
seconds mean authentications times for Cued Gaze Points and Cued Click
Points, respectively. Furthermore, such interaction still requires arguably
sophisticated and dedicated hardware that many consumer electronics de-
vices may not support.
The aforementioned design directions are interesting and represent some of the
most prominent solutions for tackling observation of authentication. Nevertheless,
while interesting and novel, hardware is expensive and limited while software is
arguablly inexpensive and versatile. Consequently, several researchers have also
proposed software-based solutions for obfuscation of authentication.
2.6.2 Software
There are several advantages to using software to shield the entry of authen-
tication secret. The primary advantage is that the solution can potentially be
deployed on several different systems or retroactively added to shipped devices.
Moreover, a software solution can be far less expensive to deploy than a bespoke
hardware alternative. These advantages have motivated researchers to deploy
software-based solutions to shield authentication from onlookers. There are sev-
eral design directions for software solution but two prominent choices are:
• Trapdoors
Roth et al. argues an authentication mechanism can be presented as game
that contains a cognitive trapdoor [233]. Roth et al. outlines a game-like
PIN approach, illustrated in Figure 2.8, where the cognitive trapdoor is
the PIN itself. The user authenticates by entering the correct sequence
of colours, users will struggle if they do not have knowledge of the PIN.
Similarly, Hayashi et al. propose a visual trapdoor approach that relies
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on knowledge of a pristine image to navigate a series of degrade images
[113]. Similarly, Wiedenbeck et al. proposes use of a cognitive trapdoor
in graphical authentication by expecting users to create a convex hull us-
ing knowledge of secret graphical icons [293]. Moreover, Weinshall outlines
an approach that presents a board of images that users navigate using
knowledge of secret images [286]. Nevertheless, while interesting, both au-
thentication approaches require training and relatively complex interaction.
Figure 2.8: An example of an individual entering ‘3’ in the cognitive trapdoor
game [233, p. 238]
• Indirect interaction
De Luca et al. argues indirect entry as method of shielding authentication
secrets from onlookers during authentication [65]. De Luca et al. outlines
a variation on the PIN that requires an individual to associate a colour
with each digit. The user is then presented a keypad with coloured char-
acters underneath each digit. The user enters the coloured character that
corresponds to the digit and colour combinations of their authentication
secret. Similarly, Gao et al. proposes an variant of Story, original outlined
and discussed in §2.4.3, that relies on indirect entry [93]. The approach
still requires an individual to select images of faces and object the user
enters them by drawing over them in sequence. The user can indirectly
enter the authentication secret by drawing over as many distractors as pos-
sible, as long as the user draws over the target images in sequence they can
authenticate. Nonetheless, while users are able to use the authentication
approaches, they still exhibit lengthy authentication times.
• Searchmetric
Searchmetric mechanisms are another alternative [225]. Limited disclosure
searchmetric mechanisms foil shoulder surfing and key-logging software,
since they rely on the use of arrow keys or a mouse to manipulate sets
of pictures. Most limited disclosure searchmetric mechanisms have some
redundancy so that the observer is not able to deduce the key from casual
observation but has either to observe a number of authentications or carry
out an error-prone deduction of the key based on a few observations. The
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v.Crypt system from Bharosa1, illustrated in Figure 2.9, requires the user to
use arrow keys to line up a shape on the bottom row with an alphanumeric
key on the top row or to rotate a dial to line up letters in the same way as a
combination lock is operated. This is done for as many letters and numbers
as there are in the key.
Figure 2.9: Searchmetric graphical authentication approach.
The aforementioned approaches have several advantages, namely they can argue
extend beyond a single device and are inexpensive to implement. Nevertheless,
elaborate software obfuscation solutions typically result in lengthy authentication
times and elaborate user interaction.
2.6.3 Comparison of Observation-types
There are advantages and disadvantages to both hardware and software obfus-
cation of authentication entry. Table 2.7 compares and contrasts some of the
various obfuscation solutions, outlined and discussed in §2.6.1 and §2.6.2. The
Approach Authentication Accuracy Application Evaluation
Times
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Undercover 32s 74% ATM
Lab
Phone lock 28s 90% Smartphone
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VibraPass 4s 97% ATM
TAS 35s 85% Web
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Eye-password 11s 85% Web
GPF 20s 60% ATM
GCP 54s 54% —
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PIN Game 23s 91% ATM
CHC 72s 90% Web
Query 180s — —
V
is
. UYI 12s 100% ATM
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ColorPIN 14s 77% ATM
CDS 14s 97% PDA
Table 2.7: Comparison of observation resilient authentication mechanisms
1http://www.bharosa.com
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aforementioned authentication solutions with observation resilience are almost
exclusively designed for use on ATMs or mobile phones. Furthermore, authenti-
cation times appear to be comparatively lengthy when contrasted with those for
passwords and PINs.
However, the evaluation of each of the observation resilient authentication
mechanisms is controlled and performed in the laboratory, i.e. under optimal
and ideal conditions. Consequently, the ecological validity of such assessments
is questionable and performance is not necessarily representative of actual per-
formance. Nevertheless, obfuscation clearly adds complexity that results in in-
creased authentication times. The complexity costs appears both in hardware
and software solutions.
Hardware approaches essentially focus on providing entry methods that others
are unable to observe, as well as providing feedback that does not reveal entry of
the authentication secret. The ideal hardware solution would be a one where the
user simply thinks of the authentication secret as there would be no observable
interactions [272]. Unfortunately, such a solution has yet to be developed and de-
ployed. Nevertheless, there are other obfuscation strategies that monitor almost
imperceptible actions, such as gaze. However, while such approaches are inno-
vative there are still several questions surrounding eye-tracking. The widespread
deployment of dedicated eye-tracking hardware is one limitation as is the concern
of detecting a specific gaze in a room full of eyes. Beyond eye-tracking, other
obfuscation strategies rely on pressure and vibration.
These strategies are potentially better suited to a remote control, as pressure
can be monitored on button presses and vibration easily incorporated. Unfortu-
nately, pressure values exhibited by an individual may not be particularly dis-
tinct or repeatable [197]. Furthermore, users appear uncomfortable in changing
behaviour to utilise the power of pressure. Vibration, although easier to deploy,
is undermined by the noise of the vibration motor [64].
Therefore, hardware-based obfuscation strategies appear unfinished and un-
practical. The alternative is software. Software-based obfuscation strategies in-
clude indirect entry, visual trapdoors and cognitive trapdoors. Indirect entry is
an interesting obfuscation approach being comparatively lightweight to imple-
ment. However, it is not clear how indirect entry would function within specific
contexts, such as the living room. There is a limited number of buttons, so rely-
ing on a keyboard is not an option. Moreover, while indirect entry of characters
with characters is doable [65] it may not be optimal with images. A graphical
authentication approach would either need to offer mixed images that may inter-
fere with each other, or use a combination of image and text that may not afford
optimal performance.
Nevertheless, there are software obfuscation solutions, such as searchmetrics,
that can potentially shield entry of purely graphical authentication secrets. There
are numerous advantages to searchmetrics in that it not only provides observation
resilience to onlookers but also has resistance to attacks such as key-logging.
Moreover, an advantage searchmetrics possess over similar alternatives is the
potential extensibility of the approach beyond specific scenarios and contexts.
There is potential to develop a searchmetric approach that can be deployed across
numerous devices, such as televisions and tablets, without dramatic redesign.
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Furthermore, couple such advantages with the inherent benefits using software
and searchmetric approach seems one the strongest obfuscation design directions.
The primary benefit in using software-based approach is that the solution can be
added to almost any device, past and present. Moreover, software solutions can be
iterated and improved in place without having to request a user to purchase a new
accessory or entirely new device. Consequently, a software-based searchmetric
solution was selected as the basis of the alternative authentication mechanism,
for the following reasons:
• Software-based searchmetric solutions can extend beyond a single device to
others without dramatic redesign.
• Software-based searchmetric solutions can be added to existing devices
without major expense.
• Software-based searchmetric can be iterated and improved upon in-place.
Therefore, the decision was taken to focus on a software-based searchmetric so-
lution for obfuscation and develop a purely software-based authentication mech-
anism with observation-resilience.
2.7 Summary
The aforementioned sections, §2.3 to §2.6, outlined and discussed various aspects
of several authentication mechanisms. The aim was to form the foundation of
an alternative authentication mechanism that would act as alternative to the
password in some key contexts.
2.7.1 Proposed Solution
The foundation of the alternative authentication mechanism can be formed from
the conclusions of the aforementioned sections as outlined below:
1. The authentication solution is knowledge-based rather than token or
biometric-based. Section 2.2 outlined and discussed the various options
and concluded that knowledge-based solutions are relatively inexpensive
and ensures users are actively involved in authentication.
2. The authentication solution is graphical rather than alphanumeric or re-
lying on other senses, such as sound and touch. Section 2.3 outlined and
discussed various options and concluded that images are more memorable
than the words that name them and that modern consumer electronics are
well positioned to support graphics.
3. The authentication solution is recognition-based rather than recall or
cued-recall. Section 2.4 outlined and discussion various options and con-
cluded that s solution based on recognition potentially minuses the use of
coping strategies as the authentication secret is actually presented to the
user.
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4. The authentication solution relies on face images. Section 2.5 outlined and
discussed various options and concluded that individuals readily retain and
recognise face for long periods of time.
5. The authentication solution relies on software observation resilience
to shield authentication entry. Section 2.6 outlined and discussed various
options and concludes that software-based solutions can be deployed to
devices past and present and iterated upon in-place.
Nevertheless, while the foundation of the alternative authentication solution was
formed, the mechanism itself had to be designed and prototyped. The next
chapter details the actualisation of the alternative authentication mechanism.
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Chapter 3
Tetrad: An Alternative
Authentication Mechanism
Graphical authentication secrets have the potential to replace passwords in some
key contexts. The primary reason is that pictures are more memorable than the
words that name them [188]. Furthermore, graphical authentication mechanisms
can be designed in such a way that an individual merely has to recognise images
to authenticate, rather than recall them [266]. Moreover, specific images, such as
faces, can be retained and recognised for decades [13].
Consequently, the following chapter outlines the design and evaluation of a
graphical authentication mechanism that relies on face images. The ensuing sec-
tion, §3.1, details the design of the graphical authentication solution, focusing
on aspects such as the authentication secret and presentation of images. The
outlined aspects are used to actualise the graphical authentication solution, §3.2.
Consequently, a prototype is produced and evaluated, §3.3 , with results reported,
§3.4, then discussed, §3.5. Lastly, conclusions are drawn, §3.6, then future steps
outlined.
3.1 Design
The previous chapter outlined and discussed various aspects of the alternative
authentication mechanism, that essentially formed the foundation of the solution.
The following aspects still had to be determined:
• Authentication Secret
The actual authentication secret the mechanism will expect users to mem-
orise.
• Context
The envisioned context for prototype.
• Presentation
The presentation or layout of the authentication solution.
The ensuing sections, §3.1.1 to §3.1.3, outline the aforementioned aspects of the
alternative authentication solution.
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3.1.1 Authentication secret
Section 2.7 detailed that the authentication mechanism relied on face images.
Consequently, the authentication secret compromised of a series of face images.
The next design decision was to determine the exact number of face images.
The assumption is there is a limit to the number of faces an individual can
successfully memorise. Miller argues individuals do have finite resources and the
capacity of working memory is seven, plus or minus 2, objects or chunks [182].
The argument is that an individual can process a number of objects but as they
increase, performance decreases.
Therefore, the limits of individuals had to be considered in the design of the
authentication secret. The design had to ensure users could process and encode
the authentication secret. John Shepherd-Barron respected such limitations when
designing PINs for use in ATMs [21]. Shepherd-Barron originally favoured a six-
digit authentication secret, as it equated the same length of his army number,
that he could easily recall. However, when outlining the design with his spouse,
they favoured a four-digit design. Consequently, Shepherd-Barron revised the
design and created the popular four-digit PIN code. Interestingly, Cowan argues
a similar figure for the capacity of working memory [57]. Cowan states that four
objects or chunks is the capacity of working memory. Nevertheless, regardless of
a specific figure on the capacity of working memory, the important aspect is that
an individual has limited resources. Consequently, an authentication solution can
not expect an individual to memorise an outlandishly large authentication secret.
Therefore, the design decision was taken to limit the authentication secret to
four face images. The motivation was that individuals have limited resources
[182, 57] and millions of them have exhibited their ability to memorise four-digit
PIN codes.
3.1.2 Context
Authentication is most often achieved by means of a shared secret. By defini-
tion any disclosed secret is no longer secret and thus can no longer serve as an
authenticator. Hence authentication context — the task, actors and physical
environment within which the user is authenticating — must be taken into con-
sideration when designing the authentication mechanism. There are essentially
two environments that need to be considered:
• Shared Space
We are not alone, and we are aware that individuals or devices could be
potential threats. Tan et al. point out that large displays have a serious
impact on privacy and argue that a solution to this should be sought [260].
• Secluded Space
We are alone and do not need to be concerned that others are observing
our actions. Most authentication mechanisms in use today implicitly assume
this context by requiring the user to provide their entire secret. The only
concession to possible observation is obfuscation of the entered text, and
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even that has been abandoned on many consumer electronic devices, e.g.
iOS briefly displays the entered text so as to enhance usability for the user.
The aforementioned contexts are not necessarily mutually exclusive and users will
behave differently in each, no matter how unaware they are of security issues.
Customers in the United Kingdom have to enter a PIN when using their credit
cards to purchase goods in a card-present transaction. After a number of fraud
cases banks are now advising customers routinely to shield their PIN entry. The
fact that the banks had officially to issue such advice confirms that many people
simply do not understand the security threats they are vulnerable to [288].
However, even the least privacy conscious user will not want private or sen-
sitive information displayed on a large screen for everyone to see in a shared
space. Unfortunately, many modern consumer electronics, such as Nintendo Wii
and AppleTV, expect users to enter alphanumeric authentication secrets on large
displays to play games and watch movies. The task of watching a movie on con-
sumer electronics is unusual when considered. The task is an intensely shared
experience only made possible through personal sacrifice. An individual needs to
enter a password to confirm purchase of the latest movie or game.
Therefore, there is a need to accommodate the many people who want to be
able to share movies, music and photos with others but do not want to give away
their authentication secrets in the process. What is needed is a way for people
to prove knowledge of a secret without revealing the secret to an active observer.
The large display is not that of monitor but a television. Users relax with a
remote control not a mouse.
Consequently, the decision was taken to outline a working context for the
graphical authentication mechanism prototype. The envisioned context is a
consumer, purchasing a movie through a television display, among friends and
family.
3.1.3 Presentation
The last design decision before construction of the prototype was the layout or
presentation of the authentication mechanism. Section 2.7 as well as §3.1.1 outline
the fundamentals of the alternative authentication mechanism, namely:
1. Recognition-based memory task
The authentication mechanism will be framed as a recognition memory
task. The user will be presented elements of the authentication secret and
requested to indicate if they recognise the elements.
2. Face images
The authentication mechanism will rely on face images.
3. Fixed-length for authentication secret
The authentication mechanism will use fixed-length authentication secret,
limited to 4 elements.
The aforementioned aspects essentially produce a cognometric system [63], e.g.
PassFaces. The PassFaces authentication approach is discussed in §2.4.3. Cogno-
metric systems present a collection of images with a single stage, each collection
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contain a single target image while the rest are distractor images. The user is
required to specify the target image. The user continues completing stages until
they have identified each element of the authentication secret.
Figure 3.1: Cognometric graphical authentication approach displayed on a tradi-
tional computer monitor with an aspect ratio of 4:3 and modern television screen
with aspect ratio of 16:9.
Unfortunately, PassFaces and other such cognometric authentication approaches
are unsuitable for consumer devices in a shared space context. The approach is
not suitable for the living-room, for the following reasons:
• Limited resilience to observation
The user needs to indicate the target face, an interaction that could be
observed by onlookers. The user can wield a keyboard to shield entry of
the authentication secret. However, physical keyboards are not common in
living-rooms, remote-controls are far more prevalent. Nevertheless, directly
selecting an authentication element would reveal the target image to others.
• Poor user experience
The authentication mechanism does not translate well from a monitor screen
to a television screen. The aspect ratio, resolution, quality and interaction
differences between traditional personal computers and televisions are dra-
matic. Figure 3.1 illustrates the differences between the two screens. The
personal computer has excess chrome and additional on-screen controls,
while the entire canvas is available on the television screen.
The initial concern can be addressed by redesigning the approach to provide
resilience to observation. Section 2.6 outlined the various strategies to obfus-
cate entry of authentication secrets and concluded the alternative authentication
mechanism should be designed as a searchmetric. Consequently, designed as a
searchmetric, the alternative authentication solution would be resilient against
observation.
Therefore, the next item to address was poor user experience. PassFaces was
developed at the turn of the century for displays with a 4:3 aspect ratio. However,
modern consumer displays and television screens have widely adopted the 16:9
aspect ratio, as consumers strongly prefer it [209]. Nevertheless, there is no real
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evidence or psychological explanation that any aspect ratio is preferable or su-
perior to another [244]. Nonetheless, consumer devices are increasingly adopting
widescreen ratios. Consequently, the decision was taken to target such displays.
The layout or presentation of the authentication mechanism would be designed as
(1) a searchmetric and (2) target widescreen displays. Therefore, a single screen
strategy was adopted for presentation, rather than presenting several screens as
is the case with some cogonometrics, e.g. PassFaces. Consequently, users do not
shift through five screens of nine image, instead they interact with a single screen
containing all 45 images. The 45 images are randomly positioned in grid format.
Contained within the set are the user’s target images, i.e. those images which
constitute the image-based authentication secret.
A successful authentication attempt requires the user to re-position columns
and rows of images within the grid. The user does not move or select individual
images; he or she re-positions subsets of the images, i.e. rows and columns. The
goal is to align the target images either horizontally, vertically or diagonally.
Because the user is moving rows or columns at a time, it is hard for an observer
to see exactly which pictures are the focus of the movement. The introduction of
an element of redundancy provides the obfuscation which protects the user.
Therefore, given the foundation and layout of the alternative authentication
mechanism was determined the next step was to actualise the solution. Conse-
quently, the next step was to construct prototypes of the alternative authentica-
tion solution.
3.2 Tetrad
An initial prototype of Tetrad was design for execution through a web browser,
discussed in §3.2.1. A subsequent iteration was designed for a shared-space,
discussed in §3.2.2.
3.2.1 Web Prototype
The initial Tetrad prototype was built for execution on a web browser, using
Javascript to accomplish interaction. Buttons or ‘arrow-keys’ were positioned at
each column and row edge, i.e. to the right of a row would be a ‘right arrow-key’.
The user would click the arrow-key which would, in turn, execute a Javascript
to re-position images. Each click represents one movement in that direction,
e.g. click a right arrow-key and all images within the respective row moves one
position right within the grid with the rightmost image wrapping around to the
left.
Informal testing revealed mixed reactions to the mechanism. This is not
unexpected as experimental authentication mechanisms often evoke connotations
of unusable and cryptic methods in the mind of a user.
Unfortunately, the early prototype only reinforced this perception.
There were almost as many ‘arrow-keys’ as there were images, resulting in
a cluttered and confusing mess. The interaction was not intuitive, although a
‘right arrow-key’ may logically communicate the concept of re-positioning images
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to the right, it failed visually to communicate this interaction. The re-positioning
of images was not animated: they simply appeared in their new grid position,
in the blink of an eye. Individuals would frequently click ‘arrow-keys’ to extract
meaning, citing they only did so because they were the only objects on-screen
that were not generic images.
Indeed, many individuals clicked target images directly, expecting a response
from the system. This not only undermined the main purpose of Tetrad, i.e.
resilience to casual observation, but highlighted the interaction flaws.
The interaction initially seemed simple and could scale to a range of shared
space devices. However, the initial implementation had 28 ‘arrow-keys’. This vast
number of buttons is difficult to navigate using the remote-control of a large-scale
display.
Figure 3.2: The design of an early prototype constructed for execution within a
web-browser.
Figure 3.2 illustrates an iteration of the prototype exploring the use of 14 buttons
that support circular movement in one direction only, deeming this acceptable
since users often simply clicked the same ‘arrow-key’ to achieve movement, than
both. However, 14 buttons is still excessive, and did not resolve any of the afore-
mentioned concerns. Lastly, the generic images themselves also failed adequately
to facilitate lightweight recognition [219].
3.2.2 Shared Space Prototype
In developing the shared space prototype a fresh perspective was taken: create
a somewhat generic approach that could not only scale between shared space
devices but also address the concerns of our earlier web prototype.
Furthermore, although images of faces had been determined as the authen-
tication secret, the specific type of such images was not selected. Therefore, a
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specific type of face images need to be selected that would facilitate lightweight
recognition.
Design & Implementation
The shared space prototype was implemented using Objective-C for use with
Apple’s OS X. The operating system is utilised across their entire range of Apple
devices, in one variant or another, i.e. iMac, MacBook, Apple TV, iPod touch,
iPhone and iPad. Therefore, there was scope to explore future prototypes on
different devices.
Three main concerns to be addressed in our shared space prototype were:
1. Visual communication of image movement
2. Interaction required to re-position images
3. Exposure of target images
The first concern was addressed by exploring how others had dealt with visually
communicating re-positioning of content. Minimising a window is such an exam-
ple. Historically, windows would simply disappear when minimised and appear in
another location, e.g. the task bar. This was potentially confusing to new users
as it was unclear where the window had disappeared to, and how to retrieve it.
Apple’s solution was to animate the window, shrinking it from its current location
to its new location, i.e. the ‘genie effect’.
Animation, often seen as a frill, serves the purpose in this case of visually
communicating to the user the location of the now minimised window. A user
consequently knows exactly where the window now resides.
The shared space prototype made extensive use of Apple’s Core Animation
development framework. The images are animated, moving rather than disap-
pearing and reappearing. The intention behind the decision is to reduce the
number of ‘exploratory’ button pushes by the user, often used to discover how
the images moved within the grid.
The next concern was the interaction required to re-position images. Even
14 buttons was still unrealistic. Television manufacturers had tackled the prob-
lem of navigating complex programming guides for hundreds of channels without
using so many buttons. The solution in almost all cases was a directional-pad
complimented with a ‘Select’ or ‘OK’ button on the television remote control.
Tetrad’s interaction was revisited and efforts were made to map the function
of 14 buttons to just five. Our solution was a horizontal and vertical ‘selection
bar’. Users navigate the grid of images using these bars, rather than a free
flowing cursor. The horizontal bar would map to the ‘up’ and ‘down’ buttons
of the directional-pad while the vertical bar would map to the ‘left’ and ‘right’.
Obviously, both bars cannot be on-screen at the same time, so they fade-in and
-out in response to directional-pad movements, e.g. while the horizontal bar
is on-screen the user can move it up and down — if a user presses ‘right’ the
horizontal bar fades out and the vertical bar fades in. Naturally, the navigation
bars remember their position when fading-in and -out, aiding entry.
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Once an individual has navigated to the column or row they wish to manipu-
late, they press the selection button. If a row is highlighted, and the select button
is pressed, a circular movement to the right occurs, e.g. all images move right one
space, with the last image becoming the first. Similarly, if a column is selected
and the selection button is pressed, a circular movement downwards occurs, each
image moving down one position, with the last image moving to the top of the
column.
The approach also addressed the remaining concern: exposure of target im-
ages, as users control only the two selection bars. This means they are able to
highlight individual rows and columns but not individual images — preventing
inadvertent disclosure.
Figure 3.3: Interaction within the shared space prototype
Figure 3.3 illustrates interaction within the shared space prototype. Let us as-
sume that the highlighted square represents an image the user wants to reposition,
its intended location being one column along and one row down. The following
steps are required:
(a) Select column - Using the ‘right’ navigation button, the user moves the
vertical selection bar to highlight the second column.
(b) Move image downwards - Using the selection button, the user activates the
highlighted column, moving all images within the column downwards, with
the last image becoming the first.
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(c) Select row - Using the ‘down’ navigation button, the user moves the hori-
zontal selection bar downwards. The vertical selection bar fades out.
(d) Move image right - Using the selection button, the user activates the high-
lighted row, moving all images within the row to the right, with the last
image becoming the first.
(e) Submission - Using the submission button, i.e. ‘Menu’ on the Apple remote,
the user can submit their efforts for assessment.
i. Success - if successful, a ‘smile’ is displayed on-screen indicating that
access has been granted to the service or system.
ii. Failure - otherwise, a ‘frown’ is displayed on-screen indicating that
access has been denied and that another attempt can be made.
These simplified facial gestures are generated and animated using the im-
ages within Tetrad. The images are repositioned and filled blue for a suc-
cessful entry, red if otherwise. This approach extends the accessibility and
simplicity of feedback while avoiding language.
The sequence of steps represents merely one way of repositioning an image; several
other paths could be utilised.
Indeed, such redundancy has the potential to offer flexibility to the user,
who, if feeling under threat, could take less obvious routes to reposition images.
Furthermore, individuals could perform ‘trick-moves’, repositioning images not
required for authentication to confuse onlookers.
Image Type
The experiment was not intended to test memorability of different kinds of images.
Therefore, the most memorable image type was selected so that any observed
effects would be easier to attribute to the nature of the mechanism than to the
efficacy of the image type used.
Furthermore, sourcing a selection of images can be difficult due to lighting,
quality and copyright reasons [76]. Therefore, a collection of celebrity images
were generated for use with the prototype mechanism. Figure 3.4 illustrates the
shared space prototype with celebrity images.
3.3 Evaluation
The evaluation of Tetrad need to test two aspects: how easy Tetrad was to use,
and how easy it was for observers to identify the secret images if they watched
someone else authenticating using Tetrad. The first aspect assesses the usability
and the second the security of the mechanism. Therefore, participants were asked
to engage in three tasks, using a within-subject design.
The three tasks are outlined below:
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Figure 3.4: Shared space prototype.
1. Authenticating with Tetrad.
Although participants were familiar with alphanumeric authentication mech-
anisms and their mechanics and processes, it’s unlikely they would be fa-
miliar with image-based authentication. Therefore, the first task asked
participants to authenticate using Tetrad. This task assessed the usability
of the mechanism and also prepared participants for the second task. The
cognitive workload of the authentication task was also estimated.
2. Observing Authentication
This task asked the participant to determine the secret key being entered by
another user. The participant viewed two videos, of equal length, one show-
ing an unknown individual making an alphanumeric authentication attempt
with an on-screen keyboard and the other showing the same individual au-
thenticating using Tetrad. The independent variable is the authentication
mechanism while the dependent variable is the success or failure of the par-
ticipant determining the password entered. The experimental hypothesis is
that Tetrad will be more resistant to casual observation than alphanumeric
authentication.
3. Questionnaire
The last task asked participants to provide additional information based
on participants’ thoughts and concerns regarding authentication in shared
spaces.
3.3.1 Subjects
Eleven participants were recruited: 6 females and 5 males. Their ages ranged
from 20 to 70 and included various backgrounds and professions, e.g. student,
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retired, professional etc. The diversity as well as the low number of participants
may appear less than ideal but the assumption was that the participant group
would be enough to uncover any major usability concerns.
3.3.2 Apparatus & Materials
The system used was an Apple MacBook, Model: MB062LL/A, with 2GB RAM.
The MacBook’s accompanying Apple Remote was used for interaction.
Figure 3.5: Early Apple Remote
Tetrad required two image sets, one for the first task, and one for the second
task. A total of 90 face images, 45 for each set, were extracted from the University
of Massachusetts LFW database1.
The videos used in Task 2 were captured using Screenium 1.0 in advanced
using our MacBook. The first video required the Nintendo Wii to be connected
to our MacBook using Elegato EyeTV Hybrid. The output from the Nintendo Wii
was viewed using Elegato EyeTV 3. The captured videos were played full-screen
during the trial using QuickTime 7 Pro.
Finally, participants were provided with pens and a handout to complete
which included instructions for each task, questions regarding the experiment,
cognitive workload assessments and a brief one-page questionnaire.
3.3.3 Procedure
Participants were requested first to read the cover-page of our handout, which
outlined the nature of the trial, estimated time to complete, three tasks that par-
ticipants were expected to complete and our contact details should they have any
queries. Lastly, participants indicated consent by signature before the experiment
commenced.
Task 1 introduced our image-based authentication mechanism, Tetrad, to the
participants and explained the concepts necessary to make a successful authenti-
cation attempt. Four images, which represented an image-based password, were
printed as part of the instructions. Participants were advised there was no time-
limit and that they did not need to memorise any of the images.
1http://vis-www.cs.umass.edu/lfw/
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Upon completion of an authentication attempt, participants were requested
to complete two evaluation procedures which examined cognitive workload. The
NASA-Task Load Index or NASA-TLX was used to determine the perceived
cognitive workload. The NASA-TLX is an evaluation tool developed at NASA’s
Ames Research centre and is used to assess the performance of individuals and
systems. The process determines perceived cognitive workload using six sub-
scales, namely:
• Mental Demand (MD)
The perceived level of mental processing required to perform the task,
i.e. users may perceive task as mentally demanding or relatively straight-
forward.
• Physical Demand (PD)
The perceived level of physical activity required to perform the task, i.e.
users may perceive task as physically demanding or requiring little exertion.
• Temporal Demand (TD)
The perceived pace required to perform the task, i.e. users may perceive
the pace as overly rapid or slow.
• Effort (E)
The overall level of mental and physical activity to perform the task.
• Performance (P)
The overall assessment of personal performance on the task.
• Frustration (F)
The overall level of stress, anxiety and irritation experienced during the
task.
Individuals are expected to produce ratings across the aforementioned scales.
Consequently, participants in the evaluation first completed weighting and mag-
nitude ratings for each sub-scale.
Task 2 instructed participants to watch two videos, of equal length. The
purpose of viewing the videos was to extract the password entered by an unknown
individual. In the case of alphanumeric authentication individuals wrote down
the characters in their recalled position, e.g. if the password entered was ‘east’,
a response of ‘seat’ would result in all characters being correctly identified but
only one with the correct position, ‘t’. Similarly, for the image-based password,
participants were requested to select four images from the image-set printed in
the handout, as well as identifying that image’s position within the password. In
both cases, participants were asked to rate their confidence on a scale of 0 to 100,
i.e. how confident they felt about their estimations.
The second video had an additional question, which was for the participant
to guess the alignment and position of the secret set of images within the image
set when the person had completed moving all images around to authenticate.
Participants indicated this on a generic template of Tetrad’s layout and rated
their confidence in their estimation.
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Upon completion of Task 2, participants were requested to complete two eval-
uation procedures which examined cognitive workload for extracting the image-
based password. NASA-TLX was used, thus participants first completed weight-
ing then magnitude ratings for each sub-scale.
Lastly, participants were invited to complete a short questionnaire, i.e. Task
3.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Task 1
Task 1 was completed by all 11 participants, with every attempt being successful.
Although time and memorability were not a consideration during this experiment,
anecdotal evidence suggests that faces were memorable. Furthermore, it took
time to authenticate varied between participants. The evaluation procedure for
the first task was completed by all 11 participants, which generated a cognitive
workload score. Table 5.4.1 shows the mean, median, minimum and maximum
weighted ratings for Task 1.
Workload Score
Mean 61
Median 60
Min 15
Max 91
Table 3.1: Workload Score for Task 1
The mean weighted rating or workload score for Task 1 is 61. The factors
and their respective weights which contribute to the workload score can be seen
in Figure 3.6. The factor contributing the most to the workload score is Effort
with an approximate mean weight of 4. The median, minimum and maximum
for Effort is 4, 2 and 5 respectively. While the factor contributing the least to the
workload score is Physical Demand with an approximate mean weight of 1. The
median, minimum and maximum for Physical Demand is 1, 0 and 4 respectively.
The factor with the highest rating is Temporal Demand at approximately
65. The median, minimum and maximum for Temporal Demand is 70, 20 and
100 respectively. The lowest rating is Physical Demand at approximately 15.
The median, minimum and maximum for Physical Demand is 10, 0 and 50,
respectively.
3.4.2 Task 2
All 11 participants attempted Task 2. After watching the first video all partic-
ipants successfully extracted the characters within the alphanumeric password
and their positions. The mean confidence rating was 95 out of 100, with 75 being
the minimum and 100 the maximum confidence rating.
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Figure 3.6: Mean Weighted Ratings for Contributing Factors for Task 1
However, after watching the second video, all participants failed to extract any
of the images contained within the image-based password. Furthermore, 45% of
participants identified at least 4 incorrect images, the mean being 2 images, with
27% of participants not identifying any images. If these participants are removed,
the mean increases to approximately 3 images.
Participants did identify similar images, with two images in particular being
identified by 45% and 27% of participants, respectively. If those individuals who
made no attempt to identify any images, are removed, these values increases to
62.5% and 37.5% respectively.
The mean confidence rating from participants, regarding their identification of
images, was approximately 27 out of 100. One of the participants identified only
one image (incorrectly) but their confidence rating was 100, confident that above
all else the single image they had identified was part of the image-based password.
If this outlier is removed, the mean confidence rating drops to approximately 16
out of 100.
Participants were asked an additional question for the second video, which
was the alignment of the image-based password. The alignment used within the
video was diagonal but none of the participants identified this alignment, 27.2%
could not identify the alignment, 27.2% identified horizontal as the alignment
while the majority of participants, 45.4%, identified vertical as the alignment.
Participants were asked to rate their confidence in the alignment they had
identified, on a scale of 0 to 100, the mean confidence rating was approximately
28.
The participants were asked to complete an evaluation procedure, which as-
sessed workload, for the second video. Table 3.2 shows the mean, median, mini-
mum and maximum weighted rating for the second video.
The mean weighted rating or workload score for identifying the password is
74. The factors and their respective weights which contribute to the workload
score can be seen in Figure 3.7. The factors contributing the most to the workload
score are Mental Demand and Effort, with an approximate mean weight of 4.
The factor contributing the least to the workload score is Physical Demand,
with an approximate mean weight of 0.
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Workload Score
Mean 74
Median 76
Min 23
Max 98
Table 3.2: Workload Score for Task 2, Video 2
Figure 3.7: Mean Weighted Ratings for Contributing Factors for Task 2
The factor with the highest rating is Frustration at approximately 80. The
median, minimum and maximum for Frustration is 90, 10 and 100 respectively.
The factor with the lowest rating is Physical Demand at approximately 10. The
median, minimum and maximum for Physical Demand is 5, 0 and 45 respectively.
3.4.3 Task 3
Lastly, the answers to the questionnaire reveal that 54.5% of participants have
purchased on-demand content through their television using their remote control.
When asked if they would authenticate when not alone, 90.9% of participants said
they would authenticate in front of others, with 70% ranking family as the least
threatening and strangers the most.
3.5 Discussion
The evaluation was designed to assess the usability and security of the shared
space prototype. The first task assessed the usability of the mechanism. The
participants clearly put some effort into authenticating with Tetrad, but at least
did not find it physically demanding. Fewer than half indicated that it was men-
tally demanding. This suggests that the workload score is less than than optimal,
and could be improved. However, all participants managed to authenticate suc-
cessfully in what was their first use of Tetrad, which is encouraging.
Task 2 assessed the observability of Tetrad. The participants were asked to
attempt to record the authentication secret after watching someone enter either
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their alphanumeric password or their image-based password. It was no suprise
that they all correctly observed the alphanumeric password. However, we did not
expect that no one would be able to pick out at least one of the images involved
in the secret images used in the image-based password. In terms of vulnerability
to observation it would appear that Tetrad is as strong as we had hoped.
However, when considering that several individuals mistakenly identified the
same faces, it could be that an individuals choice was influenced by attractiveness
or race [62]. Thus, Tetrad’s interaction redundancy, assumed to increase security,
could itself prove redundant due to image-type and/or secret-creation. This could
be tackled in numerous ways. Whether any such approaches could curb the
inherent problems in using faces for authentication is another question.
It is interesting to note that the workload score for users attempting to uncover
the image-based password was higher than that of the workload score for Task
1, indicating that authenticating with Tetrad requires less effort than observing
someone else authenticating with Tetrad with a view to extracting an authentica-
tion secret. However, further investigation will be required to determine strength
outside the realm of shared space.
Furthermore, the extra effort perceived by our participants needs to be ad-
dressed if the authentication mechanism is to succeed. Even though people com-
plain about passwords, the undeniable fact is that they are very convenient when
authentication is required [183] and people will always minimise their cognitive
effort if at all possible [82, 194].
In strengthening the appeal and credibility of Tetrad, it needs to be compared
and contrasted to competing graphical authentication mechanisms. This will
require the finalisation of the prototype, carefully considering and outlining the
procedures for authentication secret-creation and identification. Moreover, the
services and systems suitable to Tetrad need to be contemplated and defined as
Tetrad is not a one-size-fits-all authentication solution. The resulting product
can be evaluated using traditional metrics, such as login-time and memorability
using longitudinal usability assessments.
It is well established that people are the weak link when it comes to security
[1, 238] They make clear judgements about costs and benefits. If the cost of
authenticating securely is balanced against their risk perception, even if it is
inaccurately low, and they might well prefer not to use a mechanism such as
Tetrad but rather to accept the risk of traditional mechanisms [288].
However, the idea of buying online content, using a device such as a Wii,
iPhone or Apple TV, is relatively novel. Perhaps, as people start using these
devices in shared spaces, the issues envisaged will come to the fore and companies
will start looking for mechanisms akin to Tetrad to mitigate the threats of shared
space authentication.
Tetrad’s first evaluation was promising but it is a first step in the journey to-
wards creating an acceptable, secure authentication mechanism for shared spaces,
which will be as convenient as possible.
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3.6 Conclusion
The chapter introduced an alternative authentication mechanism called Tetrad.
The authentication solution was designed to allow consumers to authenticate
among others in a shared space. Nevertheless, while the initial prototype of
Tetrad showed promise, the evaluation had weak ecological validity.
• The evaluation had weak ecological validity. Tetrad was assessed in a vac-
uum and was not assessed as part of task or deployed to actual users.
• An envisioned context was outlined for the design and evaluation of Tetrad,
i.e. the living room. However, tasks cross context, meaning an authenti-
cation mechanism may need to cross contexts as well. An individual may
complete a task one day in the living room using a television, but the next
on a train using a tablet. Consequently,
The authentication solution was assessed in a vacuum. Tetrad was not part of
a task, it did not have an actual registration process. Furthermore, it was not clear
how the process would be positioned and deployed alongside other authentication
solutions. The reality is that a task is not restricted to a single context but can
occur in many. An individual may complete a task one day in the living room
using a television, but the next on a train using a tablet. The scenario is different,
so too is the device individuals use to perform the task.
Consequently, an authentication mechanism may be expected to cross contexts
as a task cross contexts. Therefore, the next step was to determine the correct
task for Tetrad. The task not only had to be a realistic use of Tetrad, as to ensure
strong ecological validity, but also had to be a task that could be realistically
deployed to individuals. A task involving precious and private medical data
coupled with an experimental authentication solution would be unacceptable, for
obvious reasons.
Therefore, the next chapter outlines and details several potential tasks before
determining one for use in evaluations. Furthermore, the next chapter also out-
lines the research questions that will be explored in future evaluations, using the
selected task.
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Chapter 4
Evaluation Task
Tetrad is a graphical authentication mechanism that has the potential to replace
passwords in the living room [224]. Nevertheless, while Tetrad showed promise,
the evaluation, outlined and discussed in §3.3 to §3.5, clearly had weak ecolog-
ical validity. A situation that is not unusual for experimental authentication
mechanisms. Table 2.7 illustrates the reality that few alternative authentica-
tion mechanisms are evaluated beyond the laboratory, under realistic conditions.
Brunswik emphasised the need to focus on tasks and scenarios to ensure evalua-
tions and experiments were applicable to the world around us [42, 54]. Similarly,
Sasse argues systems employing security mechanisms, such as an authentication,
should be perceived as socio-technical systems [238].
Consequently, the following chapter outlines the design of an evaluation task
for Tetrad that has strong ecological validity. The ensuing section details the
requirements of the envisioned task, §4.1, as well detailing the basic structure of
it, §4.2. The conclusion is that any task involving authentication comprises of
a primary task and secondary authentication task. Therefore, several potential
primary tasks are considered, §4.2.1, before outlining the fundamental aspects of
the secondary authentication task, §4.2.2. The potential tasks are then assessed
for risk, §4.4, before selecting one. Lastly, an application is proposed and research
questions outlined for subsequent evaluations of Tetrad, §4.5.
4.1 Requirements
An evaluation with ecological validity required Tetrad to be incorporated into an
actual task. The task could be anything, ranging from something simple such
as browsing articles in an RSS reader to adding an authentication secret to a
password manager. There were two requirements for the task, as follows:
1. The task had to represent a realistic use of Tetrad
The task had to illustrate a real-world use of Tetrad, authentication as a
secondary task rather than the primary one. If the authentication mecha-
nism was bundled with an unrealistic application, one never envisioned for
use with Tetrad, then any insights extracted would have little validity.
2. The task had to be suitable for evaluation purposes.
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Individuals using the application should not be placed in jeopardy. The
application or experimental mechanism could fail at any minute. Therefore,
failure should not result in the user being put at risk.
These aims were set to ensure the resulting package was a realistic implementa-
tion of Tetrad. There was no merit in coupling Tetrad with an application that
either did not normally use an authentication mechanism or would never use a
graphical one. Furthermore, although the application had to be realistic, we had
to be mindful that it was still experimental. The application or mechanism could
contain any number of flaws or errors. Therefore, users of the application could
not be placed at risk, if failure occurred. These were the only two requirements
in the design of the application.
4.2 Structure
The inclusion of an authentication mechanism within a task must be carefully
considered. The task created at the end of the process would be actualised as
an application. Consequently, if Tetrad was added without proper consideration
of the impact on the workflow, it could cause friction. A conflict that will re-
sult in users either abandoning the application or bypassing the authentication
mechanism [24].
The importance of such a conflict is often not considered in the evaluations
of experimental authentication mechanisms. The reality is that many evalua-
tions often frame an experimental authentication mechanism as the primary task
rather than a secondary task [23, 239]. Authentication is not a primary task,
authentication is always a secondary task. The user has a specific workflow or
goal and an authentication mechanism is one step in completing that workflow
or achieving that goal. Users may act calm and collected in a sterile lab when
nothing is at stake and are rewarded with money or course credit. However,
when users are distracted, stressed and frustrated, when they are attempting to
access important course work, an experimental authentication mechanism may
elicit different reactions.
Consequently, a task involving authentication, comprises essentially of two
tasks: namely a primary task and a secondary authentication task.
4.2.1 Primary Task
There are several tasks that incorporate authentication, e.g. purchasing a film,
reading email etc. The primary task is the focus or goal of the user. The authen-
tication step within a task essentially represents a secondary authentication task,
i.e. individuals are required to authenticate in order to purchase a film.
Consequently, Tetrad could not simply be used with any task. The evalua-
tion task had to require an authentication step otherwise it would undermine the
ecological validity of any assessment, as the task would be unrealistic. Moreover,
the authentication step had to be realistically fulfilled by a graphical authentica-
tion solution. The latter point is salient as there are several potential tasks that
may require authentication but are not best served by a graphical authentication
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solution. Consider the scenario where an individual needs to purchase additional
mapping information while driving around a foreign city. The task may require
authentication but graphical authentication would not be optimal in such a con-
text. An individual have to stop the vehicle as well as view and select images. An
optimal solution would be an audio or voice password, an authentication solution
that an individual could perform hands-free.
Therefore, context aspects of a task need to be considered when coupling an
authentication mechanism with it. There are several aspects to context but three
important aspects are:
• User
The actors within a task include the user and any individuals supporting
them, such as an operator or technician. While there is no single type of
computer user, they can be broadly divided into two groups: professionals
and consumers. The distinction serves to emphasis the support that sur-
rounds the user, rather than any technical expertise they may posses. A
professional will receive training and access to real-time technical support.
This is not typically true of consumers, who are more self-supporting.
• Device
Tasks may or may not be tailored for specific devices or platforms. A task
be more optimal on a dedicated portable device such as smartphone or it
may be better suited to a device with a very large screen, such as desktop
or laptop computer.
• Environment
The environment the task is performed in is another important consider-
ation. If the environment is heavily populated then any information used
within the task may be observed by others. Furthermore, a bustling envi-
ronment may make it difficult for an individual to focus all concentration
on the task at hand.
The aforementioned aspects of task context closely mirror many of the aspects of
authentication context, outlined in Table 2.4. Consequently, if both contexts do
not align along these aspects, it would suggest the authentication mechanism is
not optimal for the specific task.
Nevertheless, even if the contexts of both the task and authentication mecha-
nism do align, the authentication solution must still be integrated into the task.
Therefore, aspects of the secondary authentication mechanism must also be con-
sidered to ensure an authentication mechanism is optimal.
4.2.2 Secondary Authentication Task
Section 2.1.2 outlines the two main purposes for including an authentication step
within a task: access control and accountability [26]. However, while these may
be valid reasons for including an authentication mechanism within a task, there
will also be specific motives for considering the use of authentication in the first
instance. Understanding the motives for including authentication, affords insight
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into specific characteristics an authentication mechanism should exhibit to fulfil
the requirements of the authentication step.
Furthermore, asides for the motivates for including an secondary authentica-
tion task there is also the consideration of different contexts. The reality is that
many tasks cross contexts, individuals no longer perform all computer tasks on a
single device. An individual, for example, may purchase a film on their laptop,
phone and television. Consequently, as tasks cross contexts so does authenti-
cation. However, an authentication mechanism may not easily cross context.
The use of passwords on televisions in one such example. Apple has been used
to selling individual content on computers but when transitioning the task to a
television, passwords persist — despite the obvious concerns of other observing
password entry.
Therefore, when determining the optimal evaluation task to couple with Tetrad,
the following aspects had to be considered, namely:
• Motivation
The reasons for including an authentication mechanism within the task.
• Cross Context
The strategy used to transition the authentication mechanism across con-
texts.
The aforementioned aspects of the secondary authentication mechanism had to
be considered to ensure Tetrad was properly evaluated.
Motivation
There are various different motives for including an authentication mechanism
within a task. If the motivation is to comply with laws of the land, an au-
thentication may need to have an extensive deployment history, experimental
authentication mechanisms are rarely deployed, making them unsuitable for such
motivations. Nevertheless, there are many motivations for including an authen-
tication mechanism within a task, three potential motivations are:
• Rules and Regulations
Designed to benefit most people within a region, rules and regulations en-
sure individuals and organisations do not put citizens at risk. The United
Kingdom, for example, proposes the use of authentication in regulations
regarding the management of personal information [122] and the protection
of minors from adult certified content [193].
• Content Control
Rampant piracy of digital music, early in the century revealed the mar-
ket potential for digital content [17]. Consequently, content creators made
digital content available to retailers, under the condition they can control
the flow and use of it [111]. There are several organisations that rely on
authentication, among other tools, to secure and control the flow of digital
content.
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• Regulating Access
There are several scenarios where authentication can be used to regulate ac-
cess. An authentication mechanism can regulate access to sensitive personal
information on a device, e.g. smartphone lock, or within an application, e.g.
location tracker. Moreover, an authentication solution, especially alphanu-
meric authentication, is a cheap and effective way to manage users, even if
authentication is not necessary for any specific security reason.
The aformentioned motives are among some the most common reasons for includ-
ing authentication within a task. The motivation of including an authentication
mechanism within a task must be considered to ensure the optimal solution is
selected.
Crossing Contexts
The reality is that tasks cross contexts, meaning any included authentication step
must also cross contexts. Consequently, there are several strategies to expanding
an authentication mechanism across contexts, they are:
1. Distinct authentication mechanism for each device.
The user may use an alphanumeric authentication approach when purchas-
ing a movie on a personal computer and use Tetrad when purchasing a
movie on a television. However, while such a strategy may be acceptable
for a select few authentication tasks it seems unrealistic for most tasks. The
user would be required to manage several authentication secrets for a few
simple tasks.
2. Distinct interaction for each device.
The task could employ the same authentication secret for all devices but
require individuals to perform a different authentication process for each
device. Therefore, while an individual may be required to perform a cog-
nitive trapdoor process on the television, see §2.6, they may be required
to simply enter the authentication secret on a mobile phone. Banks are
yet another example of an organisation using such a strategy. The bank
may require an individual to enter elements on an authentication secret
on touch-type phone but enter the entire authentication secret to enter a
desktop application.
3. Same Mechanism and Interaction for all devices.
The remaining strategy is to utilise the same authentication mechanism
and authentication secret across all devices. This is the strategy adopted
for most consumer applications. Apple has used the alphanumeric authen-
tication secret used on the desktop version of iTunes and pushed across all
versions of iTunes on the television, tablets and smartphones.
The last strategy is the one adopted by industry when constructing consumer
applications. However, while an authentication may need to cross contexts it
does not need to reach for the lowest common denominator or fit every task. The
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authentication mechanism should compliment the optimal context and be func-
tional in a range of others. Otherwise an experimental authentication mechanism
will not be adopted.
The optimal experience for watching a film is on a large screen, with friends
and family, in the living-room. The authentication mechanism should address the
key concerns in that context. Users wanting to purchase movies on a smartphone
or tablet can expect the same authentication mechanism to be functional but not
necessarily optimal. The assumption is that users will be authenticating more on
the optimal device and rarely on suboptimal devices.
Consequently, when considering candidate tasks the optimal device had to be
identified as it would inform the optimal authentication solution.
4.3 Candidate Tasks
There was a total of seven potential primary tasks considered as the foundation
of an application. The primary tasks considered were:
1. Edit personal information.
An individual accesses an application and updates personal information
associated with them. The optimal device for such a task would be one
centred around a good display and keyboard, namely a desktop or laptop.
2. Access content from a digital store.
An individual accesses an application containing a library of digital content
and selects items for download. The optimal device for such a task would
depend on the content itself, e.g. accessing a movie on a television.
3. Make a phone-call.
An individual accesses an application to make a voice call to another indi-
vidual. The optimal device for such a task would be a device able to place
calls, namely a smartphone.
4. View a friend’s location.
An individual accesses an application or service to view an associate’s last
known location. The optimal device for a such task would be one with a
good display, meaning a range of devices.
5. Read an article.
An individual accesses an application or service to peruse articles they have
collated from various sources. The optimal device for such a task would be
one with a very high-quality display with enough space to display pages of
text, such as a tablet.
6. Personalise a service.
An individual accesses a service that has been personalised to their taste
based on information collected about them. The optimal device would
depend on the service and could be practically any device.
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7. Access a password manager.
An individual access an application that contains all of their passwords,
when they need to access another proceed system or service. The optimal
device would be one to hand, most likely a smartwatch or smartphone.
The next step in selecting a task was determining the risk associated with each
task. Therefore, a risk evaluation was performed on each task.
4.4 Risk Evaluation
The candidate tasks, discussed and outlined in §4.3, all carry risk when deployed
to an actual user-base. However, the risk posed by each workflow is not necessarily
the same. The workflow deployed to the user-base must be realistic but not place
users at risk. Therefore, the risk-level of each task is considered. The risk level
associated with each workflow will be a deciding factor in what workflow to use.
Consequently, a risk evaluation was performed for each of the potential workflows.
4.4.1 Risk Evaluation Process
The level of risk associated with each workflow is determined using steps outlined
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [259]. NIST states
risk evaluation is part of the Systems Development Life Cycle (SLDC). The risk
evaluation process used seven of the steps recommended by NIST, they are as
follows:
1. System Characterisation
Outline the nature of the system, i.e. hardware and software, as well as the
interconnected systems.
2. Threat Identification
Determine the threats associated with the system, i.e. natural, human and
environmental.
3. Vulnerability Identification
Determine any potential vulnerabilities associated with the system, e.g.
known software exploits.
4. Control Analysis
The measures in place to reduce any potential threats, as well as the mea-
sures in place if any vulnerabilities are exploited.
5. Likelihood Determination
Generate an overall likelihood rating of vulnerabilities being exploited, con-
sidering control measures in place.
6. Impact Analysis
The overall impact from vulnerabilities being exploited, along three dimen-
sions: integrity, availability and confidentiality.
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7. Risk Determination
Determine risk level through consideration of impact analysis, likelihood
determination and control analysis.
Likelihood Impact magnitude
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic
Certain Medium High High Extreme Extreme
Likely Low Medium High High Extreme
Possible Low Low Medium High High
Unlikely Negligible Low Low Medium High
Rare Negligible Negligible Low Low Medium
Table 4.1: Josang et al. NIST-based Risk Matrix [141, p.271]
The risk associated with each workflow will be the outcome of step seven. The
risk level will be determined using the likelihood against the impact. Table 4.1
will be used to determine the risk level. The outcomes for the first three steps
for each workflow are the same. They are, as follows:
1. System Characterisation
The system characterisations for each authentication task are the same.
The task will need to operate across an ecosystem of devices but will be
optimal on at least one. The envisioned ecosystem comprises of a desktop,
laptop, tablet, television and smartphone.
2. Threat Identification
The primary threat is an individual, who is not the user, is able to complete
the authentication task.
3. Vulnerability Identification
Flechais et al. [83] argues there two types of vulnerabilities, technical vul-
nerabilities and social vulnerabilities. The primary vulnerability in all the
authentication tasks is a technical one, i.e. the experimental authentica-
tion mechanism. The mechanism is a vulnerability as it could contain any
number of unknown usability errors and flaws, that could be exploited.
The remaining steps will be evaluated for each of the potential workflows. The
potential workflows and risk evaluation are detailed as follows.
4.4.2 Risk Evaluation of Potential Tasks
Edit personal information
The primary task is editing personal information. The secondary authentication
task will positioned before an individual is able to edit information. The motiva-
tion for including a secondary authentication task is rules and regulations. The
steps 4 to 7 of the risk evaluation are detailed, as follows:
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4. Control Analysis
A technical control method can be put in place to ensure the application
can be remotely deactivated if a breach occurs. This would rely on users
informing us of a data breach. Therefore, a nontechnical control method
will also be used where any changes to personal information will result in a
confirmation email. The email will be sent to the user’s previously specified
email address and current email address. The email will instruct users to
contact us, if they have not authorised any changes to personal information.
5. Likelihood Determination
Personal information is valuable, therefore attackers are well incentivised
to compromise the system to gain access to it. Furthermore, there is no
real method of detecting when an unauthorised individual actually views
information but does not edit it. The information can still be captured and
used. The attacker is well incensed and is unlikely to be detected. Therefore,
it is deemed likely that attackers may try and comprise the system to gain
access to personal information.
6. Impact Analysis
If an attacker was able to compromise the system there is a loss of integrity
and loss of confidentiality. The loss of integrity occurs when an attacker
is able to edit personal information. The attacker could potentially poi-
son data with gibberish and nonsense. This could be counterbalanced be
retaining previous versions of data. However, this would require storage
of information users may not wish to be kept. If users delete their phone
number, for example, they may be unhappy to learn the number is retained
for precautionary reasons.
The loss of confidentiality occurs because once an attacker compromises the
system they are able to view an individual’s personal information, even if
they choose not to edit it. The loss of confidentiality has serious implications
as it puts users at risk. If a user’s home address was captured, for example,
there is little the user could do, other than move house. Therefore, the
impact magnitude is catastrophic.
7. Risk Determination
Therefore, with a likelihood rating of likely and impact magnitude of catas-
trophic. The risk level of the authentication task, according to Table 4.1, is
extreme.
Purchase content from a digital store.
The primary task is purchasing digital from a store. The secondary authentication
task is to confirm purchase. The purpose for including a secondary authentication
task is accountability, while the motivation is content control. The steps 4 to 7
of the risk evaluation are detailed, as follows:
4. Control Analysis
A technical control method can be put in place to ensure the application can
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be remotely deactivated if a breach occurs. Furthermore, purchased digital
content can be restricted to the application itself. Therefore, if an individual
is able to purchase digital content and subsequently download it, it would
reside with the application. If the application is remotely deactivate, an
attacker will not be able to consume content.
5. Likelihood Determination
The motivation would depend on the content available from the digital
store. If the store offered premium digital content, e.g. Hollywood pro-
ductions, attackers would be sufficiently motivated. The attackers could
transfer the content on to other mediums and sell it at a much lower cost,
as they have bore no real cost in obtaining it. However, if the digital content
is not premium then there may be little motivation to attack the system.
The digital content our mechanism would be protecting would obviously not
be Hollywood productions. However, at the same time the content would
be above free-distribution. Therefore, there would be some motivation to
compromise the system. Nevertheless, if digital content remains within the
application, access to the content can be controlled by deactivating the ap-
plication itself. Therefore, it is deemed possible that the system will be
compromised.
6. Impact Analysis
There is no real concern if an attacker is able to purchase digital content.
The user is not placed at risk, it is only the content supplier that is placed
at risk. The content supplier can make the decision if the risk is worth
access to the user-base. Furthermore, if content is exposed, the application
can be remotely deactivated and an attacker would no longer be able to
consume it. Therefore, the impact magnitude is moderate.
7. Risk Determination
Therefore, with a likelihood rating of possible and impact magnitude of
moderate. The risk level of the authentication task, according to Table 4.1,
is medium.
Make a phone-call
The primary task is making a telephone call. The secondary authentication task
is to ensure only authorised individuals are able to access the phone. The pur-
pose for including a secondary authentication task is regulate access, while the
motivation is piece of mind. The steps 4 to 7 of the risk evaluation are detailed,
as follows:
4. Control Analysis
A technical control method can be put in place to ensure the application
can be remotely deactivated if a breach occurs.
5. Likelihood Determination
The motivation would depend if an attacker wanted to make a call to a spe-
cific person or gain access to a user’s phone. An individual’s personal mobile
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phone can potentially hold a lot of information about a user, including con-
versations with other individuals, precious photographs as well logs of call
made to others. There is little that can be done if an attacker is able to
make a phone-call or compromise a user’s phone. The only option would be
to remotely deactivate the application or phone, a potentially great incon-
venience to the user. Therefore, given a user’s phone presents a respectable
treasure to an attacker and that little be can down to thwart them, once
compromise. It is deemed likely that the system will be compromised.
6. Impact Analysis
The impact on the user is disastrous if an attacker is able to access their
mobile phone to make a phone call. A user can recover from the incident, in
terms of explaining to others there any calls where not from them and the
phone can be restored from a back-up. However, information on the phone
or call made by an attacker have the potential to not only harm users but
others as well. The other individuals affected in a potential breach are not
using the experimental application or even partaking in it. However, this
arguably depends if the final implementation of the mechanism is an appli-
cation that makes voice-calls between users or is a screen-lock for a mobile
phone. Nevertheless, the impact would be great on the user. Therefore, the
impact magnitude is major.
7. Risk Determination
Therefore, with a likelihood rating of likely and impact magnitude of major.
The risk level of the authentication task, according to Table 4.1, is high.
View a friend’s location.
The primary task is viewing a friend’s location. The secondary authentication
task is to ensure only an authorised individual is able to access the application.
The purpose for including a secondary authentication task is to regulate access,
while the motivation is user management. The steps 4 to 7 of the risk evaluation
are detailed, as follows:
4. Control Analysis
A technical control method can be put in place to ensure the application
can be remotely deactivated if a breach occurs. Furthermore, all individuals
using the application can be contacted via email or text message, informing
them of the breach and to destroy the application.
5. Likelihood Determination
The motivation of the attacker would depend if they wanted to see the lo-
cation of a specific individual or collection of individuals. The location of
an individual is very sensitive information as it can reveal personal appoint-
ments and habits. If an individual was located in a clinic, bank or a local
fast-food chain, for example. An individual may want to share with a friend
but not attacker. The information extracted could be used to blackmail or
compromise another. An attacker could contact a specific bank and detail
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that they conducted a transaction at a branch, at such a time. Further-
more, if the location of another individual is compromised there is little
action that can be taken, other than informing the individual immediately
to move location. Nonetheless, the location could be an individual’s home
or workplace. Therefore, given the sensitivity of the information and value
to an attacker, it is deemed likely that the system will be compromised.
6. Impact Analysis
The impact on users is cataclysmic if an attacker is able to compromise
the location information. An attacker could potentially access location
information several times before the breach was recognised. Furthermore,
the breach of the system puts potentially many users at risk, not just a
single user of the system. Therefore, given the grave risk users are placed
in and the fact little can be done once the information is leaked, the impact
magnitude is catastrophic.
7. Risk Determination
Therefore, with a likelihood rating of likely and impact magnitude of catas-
trophic. The risk level of the authentication task, according to Table 4.1, is
extreme.
Read an article
The primary task is reading an article from a reading list. The secondary authen-
tication task is to ensure only an authorised individual can access the application.
The purpose for including a secondary authentication task is to regulate access,
while the motivation is user management. The steps 4 to 7 of the risk evaluation
are detailed, as follows:
4. Control Analysis
A technical control method can be put in place to ensure the application
can be remotely deactivated if a breach occurs. Furthermore, all individuals
using the application can be contacted via email or text message, informing
them of the breach. Moreover, all articles could be stored for a specific pe-
riod before being actually deleted from the service. Therefore, if an attacker
does compromise the system and delete articles, the application could be
‘rolled-back’ to an agreed state.
5. Likelihood Determination
The motivation of an attacker would be very low, as there seems to be
few if any discernible reasons as to why an attacker would compromise a
reading-list application using an experimental authentication mechanism.
Therefore, given the lack of motivation, it is deemed rare that the system
would be compromised.
6. Impact Analysis
The impact on the user from an attacker compromising the system would
relatively minor. The attacker could delete the articles collected by an indi-
vidual but this concern can be overcome with technical control mechanism.
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Therefore, given the fact users would not be dramatically inconvenienced,
the impact magnitude is minor.
7. Risk Determination
Therefore, with a likelihood rating of rare and impact magnitude of mi-
nor. The risk level of the authentication task, according to Table 4.1, is
negligible.
Personalise a service
The primary task is personalising a service. The secondary authentication task is
to ensure only an authorised individual can access the personalised service. The
purpose for including a secondary authentication task is to regulate access, while
the motivation is user management. The steps 4 to 7 of the risk evaluation are
detailed, as follows:
4. Control Analysis
A technical control method can be put in place to ensure the application
can be remotely deactivated if a breach occurs. Furthermore, all individuals
using the application can be contacted via email or text message, informing
them of the breach. Moreover, all data used to personalise the service would
be purged.
5. Likelihood Determination
The motivation of an attacker would be relatively low, as there is little ben-
efit for an attacker to compromise a personalised service. An attacker would
only be able to receive tailored responses to specific requests or searches.
This suggests an attacker would have no real motivation to compromise the
system. Therefore, given the lack of motive, it is deemed unlikely that the
system would be compromised.
6. Impact Analysis
The impact on the user from an attacker accessing a personalised service
appears negligible. The tailored responses sent to attacker would not have
any real any impact on the user. Therefore, given the fact they stand to
experience no real impact, the impact magnitude is insignificant.
7. Risk Determination
Therefore, with a likelihood rating of unlikely and impact magnitude of
insignificant. The risk level of the authentication task, according to Table
4.1, is negligible.
Add something to password manager
The primary task is adding an authentication secret to a password manager.
The secondary authentication task is to ensure only an authorised individual
can access the password manager. The purpose and motivation for including a
secondary authentication task is to regulate access. The steps 4 to 7 of the risk
evaluation are detailed, as follows:
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4. Control Analysis
The manager will store various objects, not just passwords. Therefore, the
application can not be remotely deactivated as this would inconvenience
the user. A technical control method can be put in place where users are
contacted by email to inform them of breach.
5. Likelihood Determination
An attacker will be highly motivated to compromise a password manager as
it contains secrets for a range of application and services. Users may choose
to save credit card and debit card information, as well as information access
online services. Furthermore, given the fact an experimental mechanism is
being used, attackers may feel they could easily find design flaws and bugs.
Therefore, given the motivation, it is deemed certain that the system would
be compromised.
6. Impact Analysis
The impact on the user would be dramatic if not catastrophic. If an attacker
is able to access a user’s personal password manager they may be able to ac-
cess any number of services. An attacker could conduct simple to nefarious
attacks. These attacks could range from changing passwords to initiating
remote wipes on personal devices. If an attacker changes the passwords to
services, then users will be unable to access the service. If an attacker is
able to remotely wipe devices by accessing such services through the web,
the could lose precious data, e.g. photographs. Therefore, given the fact
stand to experience no real impact, the impact magnitude is catastrophic.
7. Risk Determination
Therefore, with a likelihood rating of certain and impact magnitude of
catastrophic. The risk level of the authentication task, according to Table
4.1, is extreme.
Summary
Table 4.2 outlines a summary of the various potential tasks. The tasks with
a risk level of Extreme or High are probably best avoided for use in the field
investigations. Table 4.3 outlines some of the concerns surrounding the potential
tasks. There are various concerns with the tasks. However, the second task
appears to have few concerns as a client or distributor is exposed not the user.
These aspects will influence the proposed workflow.
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4.5 Proposed Solution
4.5.1 Task
The candidate tasks, outlined and discussed in §4.3, were considered and assessed
for risk, in §4.4. The second task was selected as the evaluation task, namely:
• Access content from a digital store.
An individual accesses an application containing a library of digital content
and selects items for download.
The primary task context was similar to that of the envisioned context of Tetrad,
aspects outlined and discussed in §4.2.1, namely:
• User
The envisioned users of both the task and Tetrad are consumers, not pro-
fessionals.
• Device
The envisioned optimal device for both task and Tetrad is the television.
The assumption is that the television is the biggest and best display for
most consumers. Moreover, it likely possess the most sophisticated sound
system for most consumers. Consequently, it will represent the best device
to access several different types of digital content, such as music, films,
television programmes and games.
• Environment
The envisioned environment for both the task and Tetrad is a shared space
or the living room.
Furthermore, Tetrad was deemed to meet the requirements of the secondary au-
thentication task, aspects outlined and discussed in §4.2.2, namely:
• Motivation
The motivation for including an authentication step within the task is to en-
sure only authorised individuals are able to access content. The motivation
aligns well with Tetrad as users are not exposed to harm, if the mechanism
fails. The only element under threat in such a situation is the content itself.
• Cross Context
The task is expected to cross into different context and be used on dif-
ferent devices, specifically smartphones and tablets. Consequently, it was
determined that Tetrad would cross contexts unchanged to these devices.
Lastly, the aforementioned task was determined to have a medium risk level,
detailed in §4.4. The user is not exposed is Tetrad does not function properly.
The next step was actualise the task in the form of an application.
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4.5.2 Application
The initial incarnation of Tetrad was designed and developed for large screen dis-
plays, such as those found in televisions. The assumption was that Tetrad would
form part of a task, performed on televisions. Nevertheless, the reality is that
as tasks cross contexts onto other devices, so does an authentication mechanism.
Therefore, the initial assumption was that the application, containing Tetrad,
would be initially evaluated on televisions, before expanding onto smartphones
and tablets. Nevertheless, a television platform that would allow for the distri-
bution of an application containing an experimental authentication mechanism
could not be identified. Consequently, the application was designed, developed
and evaluated for smartphones and tablets, as (1) acceptable distribution plat-
forms could be identified for both and (2) the authentication mechanism had to
be explored in other contexts.
The first step was sourcing a content distributor for the candidate task. This
lead to conversations with School of Psychology at the University of Glasgow.
The School of Psychology wanted students to be able to download and access
lecture recordings on their mobile devices. Furthermore, they wanted access to
the lecture recordings regulated by an authentication approach, ensuring only
enrolled students were able to access the lecture recordings.
Therefore, an agreement was reached where we would provide such an appli-
cation protected with our alternative authentication mechanism. The School of
Psychology acknowledged the approach was experimental and could have flaws
that may expose their content. They agreed this was acceptable as long as flaws
could be tackled swiftly and if not the content was to be removed. Furthermore,
the School of Psychology required designs to be approved and discussed with
themselves before any applications would be deployed to students. Lastly, the
School of Psychology made it clear that application was to be of an acceptable
quality as they would not deploy a low quality application to students.
Therefore, we agreed to deliver an application that would allow students to
download and listen to lecture recordings. The application would require users to
authenticate to access it. There was three iterations of the application created,
codenamed ‘Tom’, ‘Dick’ and ‘Harry’. The labels are inspired by the tunnel names
mentioned in the 1963 film ‘The Great Escape’. The assumption in the film is that
not all tunnels would necessarily be successful. Similarly, the assumption when
creating the applications was that not all would not necessarily be successful.
The design, implementation and evaluation of the initial application, ‘Tom’ is
outlined in the next chapter, followed by similar chapters for ‘Dick’ and ‘Harry’,
respectively. The application itself would be used to evaluate Tetrad within an
actual task. Therefore, a number of research questions were outlined to explore
in subsequent evaluations.
4.5.3 Research Questions
There are two keywords in the thesis statement, outlined in §1.2, namely viability
and wild. A number of research questions were used to determine the viability of
the authentication mechanism. These questions are detailed after the steps taken
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to ensure the mechanism was evaluated in the wild, below:
1. The first step was to create the foundation for a recognition-based graphical
authentication mechanism, as outlined in the thesis statement. The existing
research and literature was reviewed. The decision was taken to create
a novel graphical authentication mechanism that focused on observation-
resistant entry rather than resurrect an existing approach. The approach
relied on images of faces and entry of the authentication secret was resilient
to observation from onlookers.
2. The recognition-based graphical authentication mechanism had to be eval-
uated in the field, as outlined in the thesis statement. However, before
committing to expensive and complex field investigations, the decision was
taken to assess the authentication mechanism in a controlled evaluation.
Consequently, a prototype was designed, implemented and evaluated to de-
termine if users could cope with the novel authentication approach. The
research was presented at BCS HCI 2009 [224]. The controlled evaluation,
as well as the discussions at the conference, concluded that the authentica-
tion mechanism showed promise and did address an actual authentication
concern.
3. The next step was to develop and extend the authentication mechanism for
deployment in the field. The approach was to assess it in the wild as out-
lined in the thesis statement. Consequently, the authentication mechanism
had to be primed for use in a specific authentication context. Therefore, a
suitable task that required authentication had to be designed and evaluated
for risk. Furthermore, a client and user base had to be sourced to use the
application. Once these steps were completed all the elements involved in
authentication had to be designed and implemented, namely the application
and the registration process. These elements had to be throughly consid-
ered as they were being deployed, as outlined in the thesis statement, in the
wild, i.e. a field investigation with strong ecological validity. Therefore, the
elements had to withstand use from individuals that were self-supporting.
Lastly, to strengthen ecological validity and ensure the mechanism was fac-
ing realistic conditions, as is the case with other applications reliant on
authentication, the application was put against competition. Therefore, al-
ternative access to the same resources was made available to individuals to
ensure if they did not want to use the application and by extension the au-
thentication mechanism they could abandon it. All these steps were taken
to ensure the authentication was being exposed in the wild as outlined in
the thesis statement.
4. The initial field investigation revealed that the image set was not suitable.
Furthermore, the design of the registration process impacted on user perfor-
mance during subsequent authentication attempts. Consequently, a second
iteration of the application was designed, implemented and evaluated using
a personal image collection sourced from a popular social network.
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5. The second field investigation revealed that the revised registration process
was suboptimal. The sourcing of images was part of the reason why the
registration process was bloated. Consequently, the third iteration of the
authentication approach attempted to improve the sourcing of images and
to reduce the complexity of the registration process.
The aforementioned steps were taken to ensure the authentication mechanism was
evaluated in the wild, as outlined the thesis statement. The following research
questions were used to determine the viability of the authentication mechanism.
The viability of the authentication can be expanded in terms of:
• Convenience
The authentication mechanism should not be too expensive in terms of time
and effort. The assumption is that time may initially be lengthy due to nov-
elty of the authentication mechanism, it will improve with use and practice.
Furthermore, the observation-resilience does not impede performance.
• Memorability
The authentication mechanism relies on images and recognition. Conse-
quently, the images must be memorable to ensure the authentication mech-
anism can be used practically. Furthermore, efforts made to make the
authentication secret more memorable and improve observation-resilience
must not impede performance.
Therefore, these areas are tackled in the following research questions. The first
research question is:
Is there a difference in the time taken to complete an authentication
attempt based on the number of attempts?
Research Question 1
The time taken to complete an authentication attempt is an important measure of
viability and more importantly convenience. While an alternative authentication
approach may have lengthy initial authentication times, it is assumed these will
improve over time. The second research question is:
Is there an association between the memorability of an authentication
secret and the time taken to create it?
Research Question 2
The memorability of an authentication secret is an important consideration has
it is important factor in determining the value of an authentication secret. More-
over, the memorability is important in determining the viability for the given
authentication context. The third research question is:
Is there a difference in the time taken to complete a successful and
unsuccessful authentication attempt?
Research Question 3
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There should ideally be no real difference in the time taken to complete an au-
thentication attempt as the process is essentially the same only the conclusion
is different. Consequently, a difference would indicate there are factors that in-
fluence the success or failure of an authentication attempt. The fourth research
question is:
Is there a difference in the time taken to complete an authentication
attempt if users have selected distractors as well as targets?
Research Question 4
The image set is an important factor for a graphical authentication mechanism.
The image set used in the second iteration of the application required users to
select distractors and target images. There is concern that users may struggle to
locate target among distractors. The fifth research question:
Is there a difference in the time taken to complete an authentication
attempt if target and distractor images oscillate?
Research Question 5
The image set is an important factor for a graphical authentication mechanism.
The image set used in the third iteration of the application required users to
select distractors and target images and those images oscillated, if possible. The
motivation was to improve resilience to observation and improve retention of
the authentication secret. However, there is concern that such changes would
be difficult for users to discern and impact on time taken. The final research
question is:
Is there a difference in the time taken to complete an authentication
attempt if images are reduced in quality?
Research Question 6
The last question focuses on the concern of completing the registration process
over a WiFi connection or cellular connection. A cellular connection is susceptible
to traffic-shaping that may result in lower quality images.
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Chapter 5
Tom
The process of authentication is always part of a bigger picture, a larger task.
Tetrad appeared promising when initially assessed, but the evaluation admittedly
had weak ecological validity. The evaluation, like many others, framed the alter-
native authentication mechanism as a primary task rather than a secondary one
[23, 239]. The real test of an authentication mechanism is how it performs as
part of the big picture. The reality is that if Tetrad proves difficult, unusable or
awkward as part of a larger task, users will simply abandon the entire application
or bypass the mechanism itself [24].
Furthermore, another uncomfortable reality for authentication designers is
that tasks are no longer restricted to a single device. Tasks involving an authen-
tication mechanism now extend to range of devices. Users may predominantly
purchase and watch movies on their television, as it is the optimal device to do
so, but they will also expect to do the same task on their smartphone when stuck
in an airport lounge. The scenario may be rare but the authentication solu-
tion must support several contexts. Therefore, while Tetrad is optimised for the
shared-space of the living room and television, it must also function in other con-
texts. The user can not be expected to manage different authentication secrets
and/or solutions for the same task across different devices.
Consequently, the following chapter outlines (1) the actualisation of an au-
thentication task that relies on Tetrad as an authentication mechanism and (2)
evaluates the package with actual smartphone users. The ensuing section, §5.1,
details the design of the application, focusing on important aspects of Tetrad,
such as the registration process. The outlined aspects are used to actualise the
application, §5.2. Consequently, a prototype application is produced and evalu-
ated, §5.3, with results reported, §5.4, then discussed, §5.5. Lastly, conclusions
are drawn, §5.6, with future steps outlined.
5.1 Design
The application payload is downloading and annotating a lecture recording on a
smartphone. The student must be authorised to access the lecture recording, as
required by the client, the School of Psychology.
The functionality is achieved with a smartphone application. Authentication
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observation resistance is achieved with the proposed authentication mechanism,
Tetrad. The design of the shared space prototype of the authentication mech-
anism was outlined previously. However, the initial design targeted the large
display of a television, not the small screen of a smartphone. Therefore, the ini-
tial step in designing Tom was to translate the big screen design to the small
screen.
AUTHENTICATION
PROCESS
USER
IDENTIFICATION
APPLICATION
AUTHENTICATION
IMAGES
REGISTRATION
PROCESS
RECOVERY
PROCESS
AUTHENTICATION
INTERACTION
Figure 5.1: The many unspecified elements that had not been considered in the
shared space prototype.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the many aspects of authentication that the initial shared
space prototype did not consider. The shared space prototype lacks many im-
portant elements. There is more to authentication than the process itself [143].
The mundane elements of authentication need to be throughly considered and
thoughtfully designed, otherwise it could hamper the entire experience and un-
dermine use of the authentication mechanism or the application itself. A regis-
tration process, as well as a recovery process, had to be designed. Therefore, the
following elements needed to be designed to ensure an implementation that had
ecological validity, as follows:
• Authentication Interaction
The design of the proposed authentication mechanism, specifically inter-
action, had to be translated to smaller smartphone screens. Section 5.1.1
outlines and discusses the design of the authentication mechanism for a
smartphone.
• Authentication Images
The original shared space images relied on an ad-hoc collection of celebrity
images. A set of images had to be identified that were suitable for use by
Tom. Section 5.1.2 outlines and discusses the image collection used in the
design.
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• Registration Process
The original shared space prototype lacked a registration process, used to
issue or create an authentication secret. Moreover, the registration process
determines who is eligible to use the application. Section 5.1.4 outlines and
discusses the design of the registration process.
• User Identification
The original shared space prototype lacks a user identification stage. Sys-
tems must identify a user to compare an entered authentication secret with
one on record. Section 5.1.5 outlines and discusses the design for the user
identification stage.
• Recovery Process
The original shared space prototype lacks a recovery process. Users need
to be able to recover from failure to remember an authentication secret.
Section 5.1.6 outlines and discusses the design of the recovery approach.
• Application
The original shared prototype was not coupled with an application or work-
flow. Authentication is always a secondary task in reality, not a primary
task. Therefore, a suitable application was required to ensure the evalua-
tion had ecological validity. Section 5.1.7 outlines and discusses the design
of the application.
The thorough consideration of the aforementioned elements produced a proposed
solution, outlined and discussed in §5.1.8, that was used to produce an imple-
mentation for use in a ecologically valid evaluation.
5.1.1 Authentication Interaction
The original proposed shared space prototype was designed for a big screen.
The initial plan was simply to make the original interface, intact, accessible on
the iPhone. Gutwin and Fedak propose panning, zooming or fisheye views for
navigating big screen interfaces on small screens [108]. Unfortunately, interacting
in such ways is slow and could inadvertently reveal target images, as users linger
on specific images of interest.
Therefore, instead of interacting with a big screen interface on the small
screen, the decision was taken directly to translate the proposed authentication
to the smartphone. However, interaction had to tailored to the iPhone as it re-
lied on touch and not a physical six-button remote control. Three interaction
approaches for using Tetrad on a smartphone were considered, as follows:
• Touch Gestures
The user manipulates images using touch gestures, e.g. swiping and tapping
the screen of the smartphone.
• On-screen controls
The user manipulates images using on-screen controls, e.g. on-screen direc-
tion pad mimicking a physical one.
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• Accelerometer Gestures
The user manipulates images using motion gestures, e.g. pitching and yaw-
ing the smartphone.
These approaches are all viable for interacting with applications on smartphones.
However, not all approaches are necessarily optimal for use with Tetrad. Getting
the optimal interaction approach for a smartphone is crucial as the users need
to authenticate without help and support. No technician or evaluator will be
peering over the shoulder of the user. No one will be around to guide and support
the user. They need to be able to authenticate on their own, in a range of
environments. Therefore, the advantages and disadvantages of each interaction
must be considered.
Touch Gestures
The initial strategy was to take the existing interaction model and simply trans-
late it for a touch-based smartphone. The primary advantage is that a user could
transfer knowledge of interaction from the television screen to the smartphone
screen. The user is not required to manage multiple interaction approaches for
a single authentication mechanism. Figure 5.2 illustrates the interaction mech-
anism on a touch-based smartphone. The selection bar still persists from the
original shared space prototype, except that instead of pressing physical buttons,
the interface relies on touch gestures. The user performs a vertical swipe to move
the selection bar between rows and a horizontal swipe to move the selection bar
between columns. The user performs a single tap to reposition images within the
selection bar and a double-tap to submit an authentication attempt.
The approach is simple but not without disadvantages. The primary one being
that the necessary gestures are not immediately obvious to the user when first
encountering the authentication mechanism. Moreover, the interaction model
may not be optimal. The user is not directly interacting with images, instead
they are manipulating the selection bar. Authentication times could be reduced if
the touch gestures directly manipulated the images. However, the use of gestures
that are not immediately obvious to a user is still a concern.
Nevertheless, touch gestures could be communicated to the user in advance
using video or text instructions. Apple and Microsoft have used both techniques
to communicate touch gestures to users [163, 284]. Therefore, touch gestures
could not only be used to interact with the authentication mechanism but also
to remove a layer of abstraction between the user and the interface. However,
the action of the touch gesture must be clear to the user. Pirhonen et al. states
that touch gestures must be coupled with feedback and simple single tap gestures
should be avoided, as they are easily performed accidentally [208].
Figure 5.2 (d) illustrates an alternative touch gesture interaction approach.
There is no selection bar, indeed there are no discernible interface elements. The
user is simply presented with images in a grid. The grid comprises manipulatable
columns and rows. The user is able to reposition images by directly manipulating
a column or row of images within the grid. If users want to move an image to
another row, say one beneath, they simply swipe down on the column contain-
ing the image. When users are content within their manipulations and ready to
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submit an authentication attempt, they simply double-tap. The double-tap inter-
action gesture is used to avoid accidental submissions from single-taps. The user
interface is minimal and focuses attention on the authentication images. Nev-
ertheless, the interface is simplistic and while interactions are not immediately
obvious, they can be communicated via text instructions.
On-screen controls
An alternative strategy is to use on-screen controls. A primary concern of using
touch gestures is that discrete or non-obvious gestures need to be discovered by
users. Therefore, buttons from the Apple remote control, used by the shared
space prototype, can be replicated on-screen, much the same way as others have
replicated keyboards on-screen. Figure 5.2 (c) illustrates a shrunken authentica-
tion canvas with visible dedicated controls. The advantage is the user can see
all images. A disadvantage is the images will need to be smaller, making them
harder to discern.
Kamba et al. states interface designs for small screens needs to reach a com-
promise between a physical and functional screen [148]. Interface controls can
be displayed on-screen but consume valuable screen space that would otherwise
be used to present content. Kamba et al. propose use of opaque on-screen con-
trols [148]. The approach has been deployed in several smartphone applications.
Sega have adopted it to port interaction schemes originally designed for physi-
cal gamepads to touch-based smartphones. Figure 5.2 (b) illustrates transparent
controls overlaying the authentication canvas. The primary advantage of the lay-
out is that the images used in authentication do not need to shrink in size to
accommodate the controls. However, a disadvantage is that users may search
for images that are underneath their fingertips. If the user lifts fingers from the
screen to inspect images underneath, it may be an indicator of target images to
onlookers.
Accelerometer Gestures
The use of on-screen controls is desirable as users do not need to interact with
images directly. The user does not need to tap anywhere near them or reveal
target images. However, shrinking images to use on-screen controls makes them
harder to discern and lifting fingers to spot images lurking underneath controls
could reveal targets. Therefore, another strategy is to avoid on-screen interaction
altogether and use other sensors, such as accelerometers.
Accelerometers determine acceleration in a specific direction: many smart-
phones use these sensors automatically to rotate the interface between portrait
and landscape. Rekimoto states accelerometers can be used to interact with small
screen interfaces without sacrificing screen space [218]. Kallio et al. evaluated ac-
celerometer gestures with seven users and reports that none struggle with the
interaction approach [147] He et al. states that accelerometer gestures are suit-
able and practical for many popular smartphone applications [114]. Indeed, the
interaction approach has been deployed in popular smartphone applications, such
as Instapaper [8]. Therefore, another alternative strategy is to manipulate images
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using accelerometers.
Figure 5.2 (a) illustrates the interaction mechanism on a modern smartphone.
The selection bar is present but instead of the user tapping an on-screen control or
gesture they simply paw and yawn the smartphone to reposition the selection bar.
The user single-taps to manipulate images within the selection bar and double-
taps to submit an authentication attempt. The advantage of the approach is
that the user rarely interacts with the screen and images do not need to be made
smaller to accommodate controls. However, a disadvantage is that unintuitive
accelerometers gestures may not be immediately obvious to users.
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Summary
There are clearly advantages in using any of the aforementioned interaction ap-
proaches with Tetrad. However, there are also disadvantages with each approach.
Furthermore, it is difficult to assess user experience without developing and ex-
ploring prototypes.
Therefore, prototypes were developed and explored before committing to a
final implementation choice.
5.1.2 Authentication Images
The alternative authentication mechanism essentially relies on an image set of
staff profile pictures, essentially local celebrities. The assumption is that these
images will be memorable and recognisable by the user base. All users are pre-
sented the same image set during registration and authentication. The image set
comprises the following images:
• Target images
The images that comprise the authentication secret.
• Distractor images
The images used to distract attackers away from the important target im-
ages.
The user is required to select four images to be their authentication secret: these
become the user’s target images. The remaining images become distractor im-
ages. The image selection process is important as users have to present the same
sequence of images to authenticate.
5.1.3 Authentication Process
All users are presented the same image set within a grid. The user is expected to
locate the target images they identified during registration among the distractor
images. The user manipulates the grid by rearranging columns and rows of images
so that the target images align either horizontally, vertically or diagonally. The
images must align in the originally selected sequence.
5.1.4 Registration Process
There was no registration process in the shared space prototype. The authentica-
tion mechanism was not deployed to an actual user-base. Consequently, there was
no need for a registration process that users could complete without guidance.
However, when deploying the authentication mechanism to an actual user-base,
a registration process is required, enabling users to create authentication secrets
without intimate and immediate support.
Registration processes are rarely researched outside the realm of the World
Wide Web. Naturally, the ideal solution would be to bypass the registration
process entirely [96]. Unfortunately, users typically endure a registration process
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before they are able to authenticate. Users should, ideally, only encounter and
endure a registration process, once. Nevertheless, the design of the registration
process is interesting as it is not itself necessarily bound by the same constraints
as an authentication mechanism.
The purpose of the registration process is to associate a user with a system.
The registration process determines if the user is eligible to register and then as-
sociates an authentication secret with the user, either a user-generated or system
allocated one. However, the remaining elements of context — platform, person
and place — are dictated by the process itself.
Nevertheless, the registration process is typically the first element of an ap-
plication users encounter. Therefore, the registration process needs to be treated
as a learning stage, that can train and teach interaction approaches to users.
Therefore, there are three elements that need to be considered when designing a
registration process are:
• Context control
The registration process dictates the context, e.g. users need to complete
the process in a secluded space.
• Collection of personal information
The registration process can be used to determine who can register as well
as elicit personal information for other purposes.
• Learning stage
The registration process is often the first element users encounter of an
application. Therefore, the process itself is an opportunity to train and
teach users.
The aforementioned elements all had to be thoroughly considered before outlining
a potential design for the registration process.
Context Control
The design does not need to complement the current context the user is operating
within: rather the design can dictate the context to the user. The accompany-
ing authentication mechanism is designed to offer resilience to observation. The
registration process does not need to offer resilience. There are several reasons ob-
servation resilience is not essential, if not potentially damaging, for a registration
process. They are, as follows:
• Potential confusion surrounding the authentication secret
The authentication secret could become ambiguous in the mind of the user
in a registration process designed to be resilient to observation. The regis-
tration process would likely rely on redundancy or indirect entry to achieve
observation resilience. The concern is that a user may believe they have cre-
ated an authentication secret, using specific image elements, when in actual
fact they have created an authentication secret comprising of different im-
age elements. The user would not be aware of the error until authentication
fails. Even then they may assume they have forgotten the authentication
secret, rather than misinterpreted the registration process.
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• Interference effect on authentication
The interaction adopted in the registration process to create an authentica-
tion secret may impact on entry of the authentication secret. The interac-
tion used in the registration process to achieve observation resilience may
result in confusion during authentication. Individuals may perform inter-
actions used during registration during authentication, resulting in failure.
The user may not even be sure of the error that occurred, they may assume
they entered the wrong authentication secret rather than that they entered
the correct authentication secret incorrectly.
• Difficult to design using software alone
The design of a registration process, contained entirely within software,
resilient to observation, is difficult to envision. The primary problem is
how to communicate with the user in secret. The registration process,
for example, could present the user with a grid of images and ask them
to reposition images to specific target cells. Images located within target
cells would become the authentication secret. The only problem is how to
communicate the target cells to the user, without others observing. The
target cells could be fixed but then any other user who has registered with
the system previously, would know the location of the target cells. The
target cells could be communicated via another channel but there is no
guarantee others would not observe such communication. Furthermore,
this assumes the user has a secondary channel in the first instance.
The registration process should perhaps rather instruct users to complete the
process in a quiet, secluded environment, free from distractions and onlookers.
Personal Information Collection
The registration process is primarily about generating an authentication secret.
A registration process should be designed [97] to ensure that it is:
• Rapid
The registration process can be completed efficiently and effectively by the
majority of users.
• Shallow
The registration process should not probe for personal information that is
not necessary for authentication, i.e. privacy preserving.
However, the registration process could offer the opportunity to collect personal
information. Such information is potentially valuable to an organisation in cus-
tomising a user’s experience and targeting advertisements. Nevertheless, users
may feel uncomfortable in providing such personal information to a system or
service, especially an experimental one. However, the reality is that most users
view personal information as worthless [131] and are willing to sell it for as little
as 25 cents [107].
Therefore, users may indeed provide personal information, as long as the
process is not particularly time consuming. However, merely because they deem
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certain personal information worthless, this does not mean they will answer all
questions accurately. There are three aspects to consider when probing personal
information [177], as follows:
1. Not all information is disclosed readily
Users may readily surrender certain personal information but are less likely
to disclose more sensitive information.
2. Savvy users are less likely to respond
Users who strongly value personal privacy are far less likely to respond to
probes for personal information.
3. Explanations do not improve response rate
Furnishing users with explanations or reasons for probing for particular
personal information does not improve response rates.
There are also concerns beyond collection of personal information, namely stor-
age. The primary concern in collecting personal information is that users may be
put at risk if the experimental system is compromised or collapses.
Presentation
Users were presented four panes that they could vertically swipe through. Figure
5.3 illustrates the layout or presentation of the registration process. The purpose
of each pane is:
(a) Information Screen
The information screen greets the user and provides instructions as well as
an overview of the registration process.
(b) Image Pool
The user can horizontally swipe through the image pool and double-tap
images to add them to the authentication secret.
(c) Authentication Secret
The user can view the authentication secret. They can reposition images
within the authentication secret by dragging individual images. Moreover,
the user can remove an image from the authentication secret by double-
tapping it.
(d) Confirmation
The user is presented a confirmation button. The user is required to press
the button to confirm the creation of the authentication secret.
Users can vertically swipe between panes at any stage, in case they want to consult
a particular pane before progressing to another, e.g. consulting the information
screen before confirming the authentication secret.
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(b)
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Figure 5.3: The presentation of the registration process.
Summary
The registration process does not collect any personal information, aside from
the unique identifier of the device initiating the registration process. The user is
not required to provide any personal information or create a username.
5.1.5 User Identification
Just states authentication is not just a single process but comprises of many
procedures, user identification being an important one [143]. User identification in
most knowledge-based authentication schemes typically relies on usernames, i.e.
strings of characters. A username generally acts as an index, used by the system
to locate a specific user record. Records can contain a variety of information but
at a very minimum will contain an authentication secret for the user.
Therefore, the user is typically required to submit a username and an au-
thentication secret during authentication. There are many different strategies for
managing such credentials [142]. Nevertheless, many organisations opt to manage
user credentials themselves so as to retain control over valuable user information.
Applications need to ensure each username is unique, if they are to be used
to retrieve records. Usernames are generally generated or chosen during the
registration process. There are variety approaches to creating usernames, three
potential approaches are:
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1. System-generated username
Usernames are generated automatically by the system and issued to users.
The advantage of the approach is that a username can be created and
issued rapidly, streamlining registration. Moreover, using system-generated
usernames, makes it far more awkward for attackers and others to track an
individuals movements and actions across systems and services. However,
a disadvantage of the approach is that users may find it difficult to recall
the username when required, especially if they have to manage several such
usernames. The solution, at least in modern web browsers, is to allow the
web browser to manage credentials or store the username in a small text
file on a user’s device, i.e. a cookie. Nevertheless, the user may encounter
problems if they attempt to authenticate on other web-browsers or devices.
2. User-generated username
The username is generated by the user. The advantages of allowing indi-
viduals to create usernames is they should be easier to remember and the
user does not need to sacrifice any personal information, such as an email
address. However, registration may take longer to complete as users spend
time creating a username that is unique. Moreover, users may opt to reuse
a username, inadvertently allowing other organisations and individuals to
track movements across various systems and services [9, 204].
3. Email-address as username
The username is an individual’s email address. Using an individual’s email
address as a username represents a middle ground between system-generated
and user-generated approaches. An email address is assuredly unique, en-
suring the registration process will not be lengthy because of username
generation. An individual does not need to waste time trying to craft a
username, that no other user has registered. An email address is ensuring
users will not struggle to recall it [9]. However, using an email address allows
other entities and attackers potentially to track and aggregate user move-
ments between systems and services. Moreover, using an email address may
be used for purposes other than authentication, such as marketing [9, 204].
The last approach, an email address as username, is likely the best compromise.
An email address should be memorable to most users and will not slow down
the registration process. Nevertheless, there are still concerns surrounding the
collection and storage of email addresses.
However, there is always the option of not using usernames at all, at least
not usernames perceptible to users. There are many consumer scenarios where
an individual authenticates without entering a username. An example would
be paying for shopping at a local supermarket, using Chip and PIN. The user
would insert a bank card and enter the relevant PIN. The user is unaware of any
identification stage. The bank card itself contains enough information to identify
the user.
The user may be accessing the authentication mechanism from a television,
desktop or mobile phone. The user may even be accessing the authentication from
a public machine, such as a desktop computer in a local library. The device itself
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is discounted when constructing a web application. However, if the authentication
mechanism is part of an application, the device itself may provide the information
necessary to identify the individual without needing to burden the user with
providing a username.
• Recall vs Recognition
The user identification stage could require an individual to recall a username
or recognise it.
• Interaction
The user identification stage could rely on hardware that is not present on
a device, e.g. televisions do not typically come equipped with keyboards.
• Refacing
Usernames are used to tell a system about a user. However, they could be
refaced or redirected towards a user. The ‘username’ could tell a user how
much a system knows about them.
The aforementioned elements all need to be considered when designing a regis-
tration process, suitable for use with the proposed authentication mechanism,
Tetrad.
Recall vs Recognition
While an authentication mechanism may incorporate an identification stage, it
is not clear what form that stage will take. The stage would have typically
relied on usernames, i.e. strings of characters. However, authentication typically
takes the form of passwords, i.e. strings of characters. The identification and
authentication stages are similar: both rely on string of characters. Furthermore,
they are both framed as recall memory tasks. The user is required to recall and
type-in an alphanumeric username and an alphanumeric authentication secret.
The same is not true of the proposed graphical authentication mechanism.
The proposed authentication approach is reliant on recognition. Therefore, using
usernames would result in the coupling of a recall memory task with a recognition
memory task. There is nothing inherently improper in creating such a coupling
but such a design appears awkward.
Interaction
The proposed graphical authentication approach is not reliant on a keyboard, a
great advantage on devices that lack keyboards, such as televisions. The user
does not need to struggle with an on-screen keyboard and a four-direction button
to enter a lengthy authentication secret. However, expecting users to struggle
with an on-screen keyboard to enter a lengthy username seems to negate any
such advantage. The authentication approach has not then actually spared the
user the inconvenience of using an on-screen keyboard. Moreover, if the user is
able to enter an alphanumeric username, they may well be content to enter a
password, rather than learn yet another interaction process.
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Summary
The user will not be expected to create a username and instead the unique iden-
tifier of the device will be used to identify the user.
5.1.6 Recovery Process
There are several possible designs for the recovery approach. Deciding on a
recovery approach for an alternative authentication mechanism could take many
different directions. The decision was taken to not offer an explicit recovery
process since this was outwit the scope of the research. The user will be expected
to complete the registration process again to use the application.
5.1.7 Application
The workflow is downloading a lecture recording for listening and annotating on
a smartphone. Therefore, the application is an audio player with accompany
digital store.
The School of Psychology record all lectures, for all years. The lecture record-
ings are compressed and distributed through an online resource centre, referred to
internally as the ‘portal’. The portal is managed by dedicated technicians in the
School of Psychology. The portal is accessible to all enrolled students through a
typical web browser. The portal is designed and targeted at laptop and desktop
computers. Students enter a username and password before they can access it.
The lecture recordings are compressed using the MP3 encoding scheme and are
not wrapped with any digital rights management. Therefore, students have the
option to download lecture recordings from the portal and essentially transfer
them to any device that decodes MP3 files, e.g. a digital audio player.
However, the workflow of downloading and transferring a lecture recording to
a smartphone is awkward and cumbersome. Other educational institutions have
addressed the problem by adopting podcasting. Using podcasts simplifies the
process greatly. The user simply subscribes to a podcast using specialised soft-
ware, available on several devices. When an institution releases a new recording,
a user’s device is notified and proceeds to download it. Moreover, devices can
synchronise to ensure the latest recording is available across device, e.g. a lecture
recording is automatically transferred from a personal computer to a digital audio
player. A user is almost unaware of the entire process, ensuring the focus is on
the lecture recording itself.
The School of Psychology simply sidestepped podcasting, due to concerns of
unauthorised access. Nevertheless, the School of Psychology acknowledge that
the solution was non-optimal for mobile devices and were interested in a be-
spoke mobile application that offered authorised access. The primary aims of the
application are, as follows:
• Authorised Access
Users need to authenticate to access the application. The student should
be able to access any part of the application without authentication.
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• Lecture Store
The user is able to peruse a list of lecture recordings and select specific
recordings for download.
• Audio player
The majority of audio player applications are design to play music that is 3
minutes in length. A typical lecture is 50-60 minutes in length. Therefore,
the audio player needs to be designed to reflect such length.
The initial aim would be addressed by using the proposed authentication mech-
anism. The second and third aim would be addressed by designing and imple-
menting a store and audio player, respectively.
However, another aspect, from an evaluation perspective, is that the applica-
tion should incentive users to return to it, promoting recurring use. The incentives
must be considered, as inappropriate or unsustainable incentives would dilute the
ecological validity of the evaluation. The application should attract users back
to it, generating authentication attempts but not in a way that is unrealistic.
Furthermore, incentives could not be offered that would undermine or damage
the reputation of the School of Psychology. Therefore, after thorough consid-
eration and discussion, the following incentives were agreed with the School of
Psychology. They are, as follows:
• Chapters
The smartphone application would allow students to chapter lecture record-
ings. Therefore, a user could pinpoint specific parts of the lecture recording
for later revision. The same way that students use a highlighter to highlight
passages of a text.
• Annotations
The mobile application would allow students to attach an image and notes
to a chapter. Therefore, a user could attach a specific diagram or image to
a specific part of the lecture recording.
• News
The mobile application would provide a news feature that would keep stu-
dents up-to-date with the latest course information and scheduling.
The design of the authentication mechanism was considered in §5.1.1 and §5.1.2.
However, the remaining aforementioned elements need to be considered to deter-
mine the design of the application.
Lecture Store
The design of the lecture store was modelled around the several successful digital
stores operated by Apple. The digital stores operated by Apple are amongst
the most successful distribution platforms in the world [207]. Apple and Google
stores have both served other 25 billion downloads to customers [7, 245]. There
are many reasons for such successes but the design of such digital stores is likely
a major contributor.
137
Apple launched the iTunes Store on the 28th April 2003 with a catalogue of
over 200,000 songs [6]. The iTunes Store now has a music catalogue of more than
28 million songs [247]. The initial catalogue size may seem small in comparison
until you consider a larger ASDA supermarket carries 40,000 items on its shelves
[12]. Therefore, the digital stores are designed to enable users to navigate vast,
complicated collections of content.
The digital stores are standalone smartphone applications. The user peruses
the digital store, selects an item to purchase. The content is then downloaded
and delivered to another application on the system. An example would be a song
purchased from the iTunes Store would be downloaded and delivered to the Music
smartphone application.
The solution clearly works well for millions of users. However, the School
of Psychology requires that only authorised users can access lecture recordings.
There is no reason to make the user authenticate to access the lecture store
and then authenticate to access the audio player. Moreover, the lecture store
would only need space to navigate a few hundred lecture recordings, not the
thousands or millions handled by the iTunes Store. Therefore, the lecture store
would be incorporated into the main application and not offered as a standalone
application.
Furthermore, the audio player is designed for lecture recordings, not general
audio files. There is no way to download lecture recording without using the
lecture store. Therefore, the audio player and the lecture store have a symbiotic
relationship. Lecture recordings downloaded from the store are only playable on
the audio player. The audio player is only able to play lecture recordings from the
lecture store. Therefore, they should form a single application rather than two
distinct applications that are dependent on each other. Furthermore, the user is
able to access the audio player, listening and annotating other lecture recordings,
while others download.
Audio Player
Most modern smartphones are preloaded with a music application. The music
application can be used to listen to a range of audio recordings, encoded in many
different schemes. However, music applications on most modern smartphones are
designed to showcase content purchased from digital music stores.
Therefore, the music application on the iPhone is designed for the majority
of music sold on the iTunes Store, i.e. commercial pop songs. Consequently, the
preloaded music application is designed for a 3 to 5 minute listening experience.
Figure 5.4 illustrates the audio player preloaded on the iPhone. Four distinct
elements are highlighted: (a) toolbar outlining information about the recording,
(b) an overlay with audio controls for the current song, (c) a large view of album
art and (d) audio controls for all songs.
There are several interesting aspects to the overlay with audio controls for
the current song. The overlay for one can easily be dismissed by the user and
will not reappear unless summoned, unlike other elements in the audio player.
The assumption is that the controls are not necessarily important or crucial,
suggesting designers at Apple do not envisage many users scrubbing through
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(a)
(b)
(d)
(c)
Figure 5.4: Apple ‘Music’ application interface.
such short audio files. Therefore, the design focuses on users navigating between
songs, rather than within a single song. Moreover, the scrubber interaction object
is not particularly informative of the differing lengths between audio files. The
interface object almost implicitly assumes most audio files are of a similar length,
as abnormal, longer lengths are difficult to observe and navigate.
Therefore, the scrubber interface object is not optimal for recordings longer
than 5 minutes. There is arguably a need for an audio player designed for lengthier
lecture recordings. A design that elegantly communicates a 60 minute length but
is itself not confusing to many users. The School of Psychology was adamant
that students’ focus must be on learning content and not on learning confusing
or complicated novel interfaces.
Therefore, the foundation of the interface is a familiar design for representing
60 minutes, recognised by many individuals instantly: a clock face. The clock face
is a well established metaphor that enables viewers to observe and understand
time quickly. The majority of the interface is allocated to the new scrubber. The
appearance of the scrubber is a large circle with a button in the middle. The
user navigates the scrubber by touching and gliding a finger along the face of the
circle or by tapping a specific point within the circle. The circle represents 60
minutes of audio. The user can tap at the 3rd hand, for example, to jump 15
minutes into the lecture recording, the 6th hand for 30 minutes etc.
The proposed interface has no software-based volume control; instead the user
is expected to use the hardware buttons on the device. The bottom section of
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the canvas is allocated to navigation while the top is allocated to a toolbar. The
toolbar comprises three elements, from left to right, a button to return to a list
of lecture recordings, a label outlining the title of the current lecture recording
and lastly, a button to access a list of chapters.
Chapters
A chapter is a common and well understood concept in books and text. How-
ever, they are rarely seen in digital video and audio. Digital video discs (DVDs)
prompted the idea of navigating lengthy video recordings using chapters. The
film or television show is segmented, much like a book, into a series of chapters
that an individual can use to jump to a specific part of a video recording, avoiding
the hassle and time of scrubbing through various scenes.
Chapters in digital audio have rarely been used as digital audio is often rel-
atively short. However, Apple prompted the use of chapters in ‘enhanced pod-
casts’. Apple provide tools to developers and content creators to create chapters
for lengthy audio recordings. The required encoding and format was only widely
used by Apple iTunes. Therefore, only iTunes users have access to chapters. Nev-
ertheless, the concept is useful to navigate lengthy audio recordings as it allows
users immediately jump to specific topics and ideas without needing to scrub
through the entire audio track.
However, in both cases the activity of chaptering is restricted to content cre-
ators. Users are unable to create chapters and they are unable to segment or
emphasise parts of audio. Research and investigation into chaptering of lectur-
ing recordings by lectures or learners is relatively rare to non-existent. However,
the activity in many ways can be likened to highlighting text within written and
printed notes.
Fowler and Barker state that highlighted text improves retention of infor-
mation [89]. However, readers need to have confidence. The user has to have
confidence that the highlighter is able to discern between relevant and irrelevant
content. While a lecturer would likely be loath to class any content within a
lecture as irrelevant, clearly students would deem certain aspects more important
than others. Moreover, students are likely to have high confidence that a lecturer
is able to discern between relevant and irrelevant content in a lecture recording.
Therefore, an initial consideration was to have the digital audio player present
chapters from lectures. However, the School of Psychology was concerned that
the inferred importance of chapters by students may be that highlighted content
signalled examination or assessment topics. Furthermore, the tools themselves
would be exclusive to the application. The School of Psychology would not pro-
vide any content that required users to own an iPhone or required them to use
the application. Moreover, the School of Psychology was not convinced that all
lecturers would provide the necessary content. Therefore, the decision was taken
not to offer chapters provided by the lecturer.
Instead the application would focus on students chaptering lecture recordings
themselves. Lindner et al. argues any advantage in highlighting text is reaped by
the highlighter during review [171]. Therefore, the motivation is that students will
listen and chapter audio throughout the session rather than before the traditional
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revision period. Consequently, the digital audio player supported chaptering,
allowing the user to highlight segments of the lecture recording.
An arbitrary limit was placed on the number of chapters a user could create for
a specific lecture recording. Students were limited to 12 chapters. The motivation
for the design decision was driven by a number of reasons. However, the primary
one was the concern that the function may become a procrastination tool for
many users. Students may create a vast number of chapters making it difficult to
navigate and discern key segments at a glance, negating the purpose of chaptering
in the first instance. The limit would require users to consider the placement and
length of a chapter, sparingly placing them, rather than simply creating a chapter
every few minutes. The limit of 12 chapters was deemed enough, as it represents
essentially 6 minutes of audio in a 60 minute lecture. Moreover, the limit could
always be increased if the School of Psychology felt the content they supplied
would benefit from the ability to create more chapters.
The chapter button is located in the centre of the digital audio player. The
user creates a chapter by pressing the button. Each chapter is automatically
associated with one of twelve colours, progressing sequentially through them until
all chapters are used. A chapter is represented as a coloured segment on the
circular scrubber, ranging from the point it was created until the start of the
next chapter or end of the recording. The interface looks similar to Goethe’s
symmetric colour wheel when covered in chapters [101].
The user can view list of chapters by tapping the ‘chapter list’ button in the
top-right corner of the digital audio player interface. The list contains all the
chapters associated with a lecture recording; students can add annotations to
each chapter.
Annotations
Students can often be seen annotating lecture slides or writing notes in lectures.
Hartley and Davies state there are two reasons for students creating notes [112],
as follows:
• Process
Students feel the process of producing written notes is conducive to reten-
tion of information.
• Product
The faithful reproduction of a lecture will provide a solid foundation for
revision.
Similarly, Di Vesta and Gray argue there are two primary purposes for creating
notes [69], as follows:
• External Storage
Generate a faithful reproduction of everything communicated as the basis
for subsequent revision.
• Encoding
Strengthen knowledge and understanding of lecture material through con-
nection with previously encountered ideas and concepts.
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The process of creating notes is advantageous, as is the reviewing thereof [152].
Peper and Mayer suggest the process of creating notes is valuable as it encourages
integration of information [201].
Therefore, annotating lectures is a common and beneficial activity. Unfortu-
nately, few students have access to tools that allow them easily to annotate lecture
recordings without advanced technical knowledge and experience. Consequently,
the feature was added to the application in the hope that it would promote in-
creased use of the application. The ability to add notes was not part of the
portal but students could easily create and manage handwritten or typed notes.
Therefore, students were not put at a disadvantage for not using the smartphone
application or not owning an iPhone.
The application allows students to annotate each chapter with an image, head-
ing and notes. Figure 5.5 illustrates the annotation user interface for adding text
notes to each chapter. The user reads and edits text notes by accessing the chap-
Figure 5.5: Annotation User Interface
ter list. Each chapter element in the list has a note icon on the right: the icon is
transparent when there are no notes and yellow if a note has been attached. The
user views the notes by tapping the icon. Furthermore, each chapter element in
the list has a colour block on the left. The user taps the colour block to attach
an image. The image replaces the colour block and acts as the background for
the chapter segment on the scrubber in the audio player interface as well.
Therefore, the user can easily see, at a glance, the chapters they have created.
The annotations themselves reside on the device and there is no way to export
them.
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News
Campus and course news is important to students [71]. The School of Psychol-
ogy portal keeps students up-to-date with the latest course information, such as
deadline changes and scheduling information.
Incorporating news into the application not only keeps all students up-to-date
with the latest information, it is also the case that an easily accessible news source
may promote further use. Consequently, a news carousel was positioned in the
lecture store. The carousel presented five news banners. Users tapped on the
banners to view a news story. Upon tapping a webpage with the story slides up
from the button covering the lecture store. The user simply taps a small ‘close’
button in the corner to dismiss the webpage.
5.1.8 Proposed Solution
The proposed solution is an application that allows individuals to download and
annotate lecture recordings. The user will be expected to authenticate to access
the application. The implementation of the application is discussed in the next
section.
5.2 Implementation
The ‘Tom’ prototype was implemented for iOS 4.0 devices, specifically Apple
iPhone and iPod touch. The implementation of each component is detailed, as
follows:
5.2.1 Authentication Images
The image set used was staff profile pictures. The expectation was that the
image set would be memorable and familiar to the user base, minimising need for
recovery.
5.2.2 Authentication Interaction
There were a number of possibilities for authentication interaction on mobile
devices. The possible interaction solutions for implementation were discussed
in §5.1.1. The aim was to provide an interaction approach that was elegant
and efficient but did not waste precious screen space, an important factor for
mobile devices. There were essentially three interaction approaches to consider,
specifically accelerometers, touch-gestures and on-screen controls.
The use of on-screen controls was quickly discounted as they were inelegant
and inefficient. The proposed designs either wasted or consumed too much screen-
space. The user experience of the remaining interaction approaches, i.e. ac-
celerometers and touch-gestures, was difficult to gauge without actual use. There-
fore, preliminarily prototypes of both interaction approaches with the authenti-
cation mechanism were created, so as to determine the best suited design.
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The interaction approaches were implemented on an Apple iPhone. The im-
plementation, for each case, presented the authentication mechanism in landscape
orientation. Accelerometers were initially favoured as a minimum of screen space
would be spent on interface objects associated with interaction. The implemen-
tation presented a selection bar on-screen that a user positioned left and right as
well as up and down by pitching and rolling, respectively. An on-screen tap was
required to reposition images within the selection bar.
Unfortunately, the accelerometer approach was far from elegant and was dif-
ficult to use. The primary problem with the prototype was that the entire device
had to be positioned to move the selection bar. Consequently, the screen was
often positioned away from the direct line of sight. Moreover, the screen would
often reflect light, increasing the difficulty of viewing the screen. The problem was
addressed in part by attuning the approach to be more sensitive to movement,
reducing the need to manipulate the device dramatically.
However, such sensitivity was impractical, as the device would respond fre-
quently to movements that were essentially indirect interactions. Furthermore,
there was no guarantee that all users would interact with devices in the same
way, certain users may make bigger movements. Therefore, the accelerometer
approach was discarded. The approach would either not move the selection bar
when expected or it would move the selection bar too much when not expected.
The remaining interaction approach was touch gestures. The initial imple-
mentation of the touch gesture approach presented the authentication mechanism
with a selection bar. The user was expected to swipe up, down, left and right
to move the selection bar and single-tap to manipulate images. An advantage of
the implementation was that it was essentially the same as the Tetrad approach.
Therefore, there is a more consistent approach to interaction across devices. How-
ever, consistent interaction is not necessarily an advantage if one device suffers
with inefficient interaction.
Unfortunately, the initial implementation of touch gestures felt slow and awk-
ward. The process felt cumbersome as interaction essentially consisted of manip-
ulating a selection bar rather than images. Users wanting to manipulate a column
of images needed to swipe the screen several times to position the selection bar
over the desired column. Once the selection bar was positioned, a single tap was
required to manipulate the images. Therefore, there was the possibility that users
would have to perform several touch gestures to make small manipulations. The
design of the interaction, although consistent with other prototypes, simply felt
slow and awkward.
Therefore, a second implementation of touch gestures focused on manipulat-
ing images directly. The interaction was a break with early prototypes, as the
selection bar was abandoned. The implementation presented the authentication
mechanism and expected direct swipes on the columns and rows of images them-
selves. The second implementation relied on five gestures: swipe-up, swipe-down,
swipe-left, swipe-right and double-tap. Therefore, if an individual wanted to ma-
nipulate images within a specific column, they simply swiped up or down on that
column. Similarly, if an individual wanted to manipulate images within a spe-
cific row, they simply swiped left or right on that row. Lastly, an authentication
attempt was submitted with a double-tap. A single-tap was avoided, in case the
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user made an accidental tap. The approach was simple and clear.
The implementation relied on an internal iOS framework that essentially de-
termined when one of the gestures had occurred. The specific details of the ges-
ture, such as on-screen position, was used to determine what action should occur.
Therefore, if a right swipe occurred, for example, the coordinates associated with
the gesture was used to determine the row to manipulate.
The user experience was far superior, in terms of effort, than the original
touch-gesture implementation, as users did not need to make several gestures to
make a single manipulation. Moreover, no screen-space was wasted on additional
interface objects. The entire screen of the smartphone was dedicated to grid
display. Therefore, the second implementation of touch gestures was selected for
use in the Tom prototype.
5.2.3 Registration Process
The implementation of the registration process comprised two screens or parts.
The first screen was registration code entry and the second supported the creation
of the graphical authentication secret.
The first screen was presented when the application was initiated for the
first time. The view comprised a text field and a block of text. The block of text
explained that a registration code was required to use the application and could be
obtained from the School of Psychology. The text field was for entry of the actual
registration code. When the user entered a registration code the client device
confirmed the registration code was valid with the server. Therefore, the user had
to have an active data connection to begin the registration process. If the code
was invalid, the user was informed and asked to ensure it was entered correctly.
If the registration code was valid then the registration code was deactivated on
the server and the second screen presented.
The second screen focused on the creation of the graphical authentication
secret. The user was presented with a vertical scroll view containing four pages,
that they navigated with a vertical swipe. The user was expected to create a
sequence of four images from an image set of 45. Each of the 45 images had an
associated text label. The image labels combined to represent the user-generated
image sequence as a string. An example would be if the user had selected images
with labels: ‘A’, ‘K’, ‘X’ and ‘B’, in that order, then the resulting string would be
AKXB. The string was then used to generate a hash value. The hash value was
stored on the device for subsequent use in the authentication process. The user
was expected to recreate the sequence of four images, generated in the registration
process, during authentication.
5.2.4 Authentication Process
Three attempts to recreate the sequence were allowed, otherwise the account
would be deactivated and the user would be required to re-register.
Tom presented the authentication mechanism directly after the registration
process. The user was given instructions on how to use the mechanism; users
tapped instructions to dismiss them. The instructions were only presented on the
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first encounter and were not presented again, once dismissed. The user submitted
an authentication attempt with a double-tap.
Upon entry of an authentication attempt, the system determined the coor-
dinates of the first image in the image sequence. The system then determined
a horizontal, vertical and diagonal image sequence using the first image as the
start point. The system generated a string, using the labels associated with each
image, for each image sequence. The strings were then used to generate a hash
value. The hash value was compared with the one generated at registration. If the
values matched, the user was authenticated and the authentication mechanism
was dismissed. Otherwise the user could make another authentication attempt.
Therefore, the authentication process itself did not include a server-side com-
ponent. The implementation was designed to allow the authentication mecha-
nism to function without an active data connection. The design was intended
to complement the portability of a smartphone in contrast to a desktop personal
computer permanently connected to the Internet. Students may need to authen-
ticate in environments where there is no connection to the Internet. Furthermore,
students may encounter the situation where they are unable to afford to pay for
an active data connection. An individual may have a pre-pay handset rather than
post-pay; as funds dwindle students may prioritise and not pay for expensive data
connections. Moreover, students may not be using an Apple iPhone but rather
an Apple iPod touch. Consequently, while students may have connectivity in a
coffee shop or on campus, they will not as they walk to the bus stop.
However, the details associated with the authentication attempt, such as the
time taken were logged on the server side. The client device logged the informa-
tion on the server after the user completed an authentication attempt. Therefore,
an active data connection was required during authentication to log details of the
attempt itself. Consequently, users were required to have an active data con-
nection to use the authentication mechanism, otherwise a message was displayed
that instructed users to check their Internet connection.
Unfortunately, there was still the concern that users may not always have
a data connection. Therefore, the decision was taken to afford eight hours of
use between authentication attempts. Therefore, once a user had successfully
authenticated and the application was active, they would not be required to
authenticate again for another eight hours.
5.2.5 User Identification
An alphanumeric string was used for user identification. The Universal Device
Identifier (UDID) of the user’s iOS device acted essentially as an individual’s
username.
5.2.6 Recovery Process
The authentication mechanism will not have a dedicated recovery process. The
user will instead be expected to delete the application and subsequently install it
again.
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5.2.7 Application
Figure 5.6 illustrates an open lecture document within the application. The main
elements of the interface are detailed below:
1. Lecture Document Browser
The user taps the button to return to a view of the downloaded lecture
recordings from the store. If audio is playing it will stop.
2. Chapter List
The user taps the button to view the chapters associated with the currently
opened lecture recording.
3. Action Button
The user taps the button to perform an action. If the lecture recording is
playing then a chapter is created at the specific time point. If the lecture
audio is not playing, it will play the audio.
4. Chapter
These coloured segments represent chapters. The user can change the colour
to an image by attaching a specific image to the chapter, in the chapter list.
5. Lecture Document View
The user can tap the tab to view the currently opened lecture document or
a list of documents if none are open.
6. Lecture Store View
The user can tap the tab to view a list of available lecture recordings for
download. The user can view and download lectures will listening to a
lecture.
The application was made available for distribution to students in the evaluation.
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5.3 Evaluation
The details of the evaluations are outlined over the following sections.
5.3.1 Subjects
The participants were enrolled students at the School of Psychology at the Uni-
versity of Glasgow. The application was distributed for free and any enrolled
student was allowed to use it. The application itself did not collect any personal
information. Therefore, it is difficult to characterise the user-base. However,
estimations can be made about the cohort, based on the results of the survey.
5.3.2 Apparatus & Materials
Three technical elements were required for the application to function, namely:
(1) a device to execute the application, (2) a server providing content and storing
usage logs and (3) a data connection between the two.
Students were responsible for providing two of these elements, specifically a
device to execute the application and a data connection. The application binary
was designed for execution on iOS 4.0 devices, specifically Apple iPhone and
iPod touch. The application could also execute on other iOS 4.0 devices, such
an Apple iPad. Students were expected to own or have access to such devices.
The application binary itself was distributed for free via the Apple App Store.
The Apple App Store was available on all iOS 4.0 devices, as it is packaged
with the operating system. Consequently, students were expected to download
the application from the Apple App Store, requiring them to have a registered
iTunes account.
Furthermore, students were required to have an active data connection to not
only download the application but to use it. Moreover, users were completely
responsible for managing all costs associated with data connections. Therefore,
students choosing expensive cellular connections over inexpensive alternatives,
such as on-campus wireless connections, did so at their own discretion. Students
could not claim expenses for costs associated with the data connection. The data
connection was necessary as the primarily link between the application and the
server.
The server solution for the application was a mixture of Amazon Web Services.
Amazon Simple Database was used to store usage information collected from the
user’s device. While Amazon Simple Storage Service was used to store and serve
lecture recordings, as well as a listing of available lecture recordings. The listing
was an XML file containing specific details about the lecture recordings, e.g.
lecture title and lecturer.
The listing file was updated and uploaded to the server solution using a tra-
ditional personal computer. Lecture recordings were generated by the School of
Psychology and delivered for upload. The School of Psychology provided high-
quality audio recordings, MP3 encoded. The audio recordings were transcoded
into Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) format before upload, using Apple iTunes
on a traditional personal computer.
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5.3.3 Procedure
The School of Psychology sent an email to all enrolled students, advising them
about the immediate availability of the application. The main features of the
application were communicated, namely users could download lecture recordings
direct to their portable device as well as chapter and annotate them. Students
were advised the application targeted iOS 4.0 devices, specifically Apple iPhone
and iPod touch. Lastly, students were advised that a registration code was nec-
essary to use the application.
Students were automatically issued registration codes via email. Students
seeking a registration code either had the option of completing the survey or
requesting a code using a web-based form. The student was expected to enter
the registration code when the application requested it.
The application requested the registration code, upon first launch. The ap-
plication binary was distributed, for free, via the Apple App Store. The email
sent to students contained a hyperlink to the application binary in the store.
The application could be downloaded by any registered iTunes user in the United
Kingdom. However, without a registration code users could not actually use the
application.
Users were presented the registration process, once they entered a valid reg-
istration code. Each registration code was limited to one-time use. The user was
requested to complete the registration process to generate a graphical authenti-
cation secret. Once students had completed the registration process, they were
requested to authenticate.
The graphical authentication mechanism was then presented. Moreover, an
information panel overlaid the graphical authentication mechanism, detailing how
to use it. The panel of information was presented to user the first time they used
the authentication mechanism and not subsequently. Users dismissed the infor-
mation panel with a single tap. Once users authenticated they could access the
application for eight hours. Therefore, if they authenticated one day and accessed
the application the following day they would be asked to enter their graphical
authentication secret. Users were allowed three attempts to authenticate.
There was no reset or recovery procedure. If users were unable to authenticate,
then they were required to delete the application and request another registration
code. There was no limit on the number of times a user could register.
5.4 Results
The results are discussed in terms of registration process and the authentication
process.
5.4.1 Registration
There were 63 registrations, over 168 days. The majority of these (76%) occurred
in the first 30 days and few registrations (13%) occurred after 60 days.
The application did not collect personal information, such as an email address,
or request individuals to create a username. The application instead relied on the
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device UDID as the individual’s username. The device UDID was associated with
each registration. Consequently, the number of unique users can be estimated
from the number of distinct UDIDs. The total number of distinct devices that
executed the registration process was 45. Therefore, 45 individuals registered and
generated an authentication secret.
However, because there was no recovery process, users unable to authenticate
were expected to delete the application, download it and conduct the registration
process again. Therefore, some users completed the registration several times.
The majority of users though (64%) completed the registration process only once.
Nevertheless, several users completed the registration process twice (31%) and
some (5%) completed it three times. The registration process was not completed
more than three times by any user.
The majority of registrations (60%) were initiated between midday and six
o’clock in the evening. Indeed most registrations (68%) were initiated between
midday and midnight. Nevertheless, some registrations (16%) occurred during
the night between midnight and six o’clock in the morning. The remaining regis-
trations (16%) occurred between six o’clock in the morning and midday. Further-
more, the majority of registrations (30%) were initiated on a Thursday. Indeed
most registrations (90%) occurred on a weekday rather than at the weekend.
Image Selection
Students were expected to select four distinct images during registration, duplica-
tions were not allowed. Therefore, an individual could not select the same image
twice in a single registration. The mean number of selections for each image was
approximately six, over all registration attempts, with a median of 2 and mode
of 1. However, the range in image selections was 35 with a minimum of 0 selec-
tions and maximum of 35 selections per image. The standard deviation for image
selections, over all registration attempts was 9.16.
However, specific registration attempts were re-registrations, i.e. users con-
ducted the registration process a second and third time as they were unable to
complete authentication. Excluding subsequent registrations by the same device,
the mean number of selections per image was 4 with a median and mode of 1.
However, the range in image selections was 24 with minimum of 0 selections and
maximum of 24 selections per image. The standard deviation for image selections,
for initial registration attempts was 6.65.
Therefore, there was variance between images in terms of selections. Figure 5.7
illustrates the frequency distribution of image selections made during registration.
Figure 5.7 depicts image selections from all registration attempts contrasted with
image selections from initial registration attempts. A total of 8 images were
never selected over all registration attempts, 10 when considering only initial
registration attempts.
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Rank # Staff Title
Times Selected Position
Overall Initial
Overall Initial
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 21
Senior
35 24 12 6 6 11 8 3 5 8University
Teacher
2 15
Teaching
32 23 10 10 4 8 8 5 4 6Assistant
3 34
Head of
28 21 9 4 7 8 8 3 5 5Department &
Professor
4 35
Reader
28 20 7 10 7 4 6 8 3 3
5 44
University
22 18 5 6 6 5 4 5 4 5Teacher
Table 5.1: Five most popular image selections made during registration.
Time
The average time taken to complete the registration process overall was 312 sec-
onds. However, there was wide variation in the time taken to complete registra-
tion (minimum = 25.17, maximum = 5041.94, range = 5016.78). The majority of
users (93%) completed the registration process in less than 1000 seconds. The av-
erage time taken to complete the registration process for those below 1000 seconds
was 163.23 seconds. However, there was still wide variation in the time taken to
complete the registration process (minimum = 25.17, maximum = 763.62, range
= 738.45). It is important consider that the registration process would be novel
to most users and take time for some to adjust to the process.
The time taken to create an authentication secret is incredibly important as
it represents a component of the overall cost of an authentication. The time
spent on registration needs to be coupled with the time spent on authentication
attempts to give a real reflection of the time associated with an authentication
secret. If an individual spends 100 seconds on registration and then makes only
two authentication attempts, then each authentication attempt is weighed down
with an additional 50 seconds. The majority of laboratory investigations do not
discuss registration cost; even if such costs are discussed it is hard to couple
them with authentication attempts. The reason is that laboratory investigations
typically rely on a controlled number of attempts at fixed intervals. The user
is not given room to authenticate as much, and as often, as desired. Therefore,
laboratory investigations can sidestep the actual cost of registration and ignore
the fact that this cost has to be added to each authentication attempt.
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A key concern is that users should be able to complete registration swiftly.
Moreover, it is expected users may take time with novel registration. The ex-
pectation is that users can become better at registration and reduce the overall
time taken to complete registration, as they become more familiar with the pro-
cess. Consequently, a key research question is whether there is any difference in
the time it takes a user to complete registration, specifically between the initial
encounter and subsequent encounters with the registration process.
Therefore, a paired-samples t-test was used to determine if a statistically
significant difference in mean time existed between participants re-registrations
and initial registrations. The data exhibited no outliers, as determined using a
box plot. The data was normally distributed for both re-registrations and initial
assessments, as determined by a Shapiro-Wilks test (p=.741). The reality is
that participants completed re-registrations (M = 116.95, SD = 44.32) quicker
than initial registrations (M = 153.83, SD = 62.48). The mean difference was a
statistically significant (p < .05) decrease in time of 36.87s, 95% CI [-70.9417,-
2.8127], t(13)= -2.339, p=0.036, d= -0.63.
5.4.2 Authentication
Users made a total of 387 authentication attempts over a period of 339 days.
The majority of authentication attempts (58%) ended in success. The remaining
(42%) were unsuccessful.
A total of 46 users made at least one authentication attempt. The average
number of authentication attempts was 8.41 (SD = 6.235). However, many users
made far fewer authentication attempts (mode = 3). The number of authenti-
cation attempts generated by users was mixed (minimum = 1, maximum = 30,
range = 29), suggesting that the distribution of authentication attempts among
users was more varied than indicated by the mean. Figure 5.8 illustrates users
grouped by the number of attempts they generated. The majority of users (33%)
made between 1 and 3 authentication attempts.
Furthermore, although all users made at least one authentication attempt
(N = 46), not all attempts were successful. The average number of successful
authentication attempts was 4.91 (SD = 5.349). However, the mean may not
be indicative of actual performance for most users (mode = 0). There was a
large span in the number of successful authentication attempts (minimum = 0,
maximum = 22, range = 22). Figure 5.9 illustrates the number of successful and
unsuccessful authentication attempts made by individuals. Figure 5.9 serves to
emphasise that several users (20%) did not make a single successful authentication
attempt.
The average number of unsuccessful authentication attempts was 3.50 (SD =
2.438). The mean may be indicative of overall performance (median = 3, mode
= 3) as comparatively there was not wide variation in the number of unsuccessful
attempts for most users (minimum = 0, maximum = 10, range = 10). However,
a small number of users (11%) made no unsuccessful authentication attempts.
Nevertheless, the majority of such users (80%) only made a single authentication
attempt. The reality is that most users (89%) made at least a single unsuccessful
authentication attempt. Moreover, the vast majority of users (74%) made 3 or
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Figure 5.8: Users grouped by the number of attempts they generated.
more unsuccessful authentication attempts.
Users were constrained in that each registration or account was limited to 3 se-
quential unsuccessful authentication attempts. The account was deactivated once
the limit was reached. Users had to re-register to use the application. Figure 5.10
illustrates authentication attempts in terms of registrations. Users completed a
total of 63 registrations (N = 45), all individuals were accounted for in authen-
tication attempts, asides one. Therefore, authentication attempts are associated
with an individual that is not accounted for in registration logs. There are sev-
eral possible explanations for the situation, although the most likely is that the
registration information was simply not logged on the server. The individual
generated 4 authentication attempts. Consequently, a total of 383 authentication
attempts were generated across all registrations.
The average number of authentication attempts for each registration or ac-
count was 6.06 (SD = 5.217). However, many accounts generated far fewer au-
thentication attempts (mode = 3). The average number of successful authentica-
tion attempts for each registration or account was 3.52 (SD = 5.060). Similarly,
many accounts generated far fewer successful authentication attempts (mode =
0). The average number of unsuccessful authentication attempts for each account
or registration was 2.54 (SD = 1.803). The mean may be indicative of overall
performance as several accounts generated unsuccessful attempts (mode = 3).
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The position and occurrence of unsuccessful authentication attempts is im-
portant as 3 sequential authentication attempts resulted in an account being
deactivated. Figure 5.11 illustrates the occurrence of successful and unsuccess-
ful authentication attempts with each registration or account. The majority of
accounts (56%) were deactivated while the surviving accounts (44%) remained
active.
The deactivated accounts can be characterised in terms of position of the un-
successful authentication attempts. The majority of deactivated accounts (49%)
represented false starts by users, i.e. the user’s initial account was deactivated but
the user created another account. Therefore, and the deactivated account did not
deter the individual, instead they tried again, re-registered. However, this was not
always the case: there were several deactivated accounts (23%) that represented
casualties of authentication. Such users could not make a successful authenti-
cation attempt and simply abandoned the application entirely. The application
lost users due to authentication. There were also several deactivated accounts
(23%) that represented more traditional authentication failure, i.e. users gener-
ated at least one successful authentication attempt but subsequently could not
authenticate and the account was deactivated. These deactivated accounts can
be characterised with a cap of unsuccessful authentication attempts, e.g. Figure
5.11 account 36. The ‘cap’ should be no longer than 3 unsuccessful authenti-
cation attempts but this is not case for some deactivated accounts, e.g. Figure
5.11 account 9 and 37, have lengthier sequences of unsuccessful authentication
attempts. The presence of these lengthier sequences suggests users were able to
circumvent the limit or the application contained flaws. The remainder of the
deactivated accounts represented a user who had re-registered but did not sub-
mit a single successful authentication attempt. Consequently, several deactivated
accounts (29%) represented users who did not gain access to the application.
Therefore, deactivated accounts essentially represent users who failed to learn
the novel authentication approach or were simply frustrated by it. Consequently,
the majority of unsuccessful authentication attempts (75%) were associated with
deactivated accounts. The remaining unsuccessful authentication attempts (25%)
were associated with active accounts.
Furthermore, the majority of successful authentication attempts (80%) were
associated with active accounts. There are several active accounts (46%) that
have no unsuccessful attempts associated with them. Moreover, many of these
unblemished accounts (69%) consist of several successful authentication attempts,
as illustrated in Figure 5.11. The vast majority (89%) of these unblemished ac-
counts that contain several successful authentication attempts are from users who
initially made a false start. Therefore, the majority of these exemplar accounts
are from users who made disastrous false starts.
The remaining aspect to consider about successful authentication attempts is
the direction. The target images could have been aligned either horizontally, ver-
tically or diagonally. The majority of successful authentication attempts (80%)
were horizontal. The average number of horizontal authentication attempts for
each registration or account was 2.81 (SD = 4.782). The remaining authenti-
cation attempts (20%) were vertical, no diagonal authentication attempts were
submitted by users. The average number of vertical authentication attempts for
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Figure 5.11: The successful and unsuccessful authentication attempts associated
with each registration or account.
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Figure 5.12: The horizontal and vertical authentication attempts associated with
each registration or account.
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each registration or account was 0.71 (SD = 2.317). The reality is that users
overwhelmingly submitted horizontal authentication attempts.
Time
Users spent a total of 423671.55 seconds on 387 authentication attempts or 4.9
days. The average time for an authentication attempt was 1094.76 seconds (SD =
14005.335). However, there was a wide variation in the time taken on each authen-
tication attempt (minimum = 1.43, maximum = 266919.88, range = 266918.44).
There was several authentication attempts that took considerable time.
Therefore, if we limit authentication time to 200 seconds, then only a small
number of authentication attempts (5%) are removed from consideration. The
majority of the discarded authentication attempts (72%) were successful authenti-
cation attempts. The average time for the remaining authentication attempts was
36.66 seconds (SD = 28.24). However, there is still wide variation in the time
taken for each authentication attempt (minimum = 1.43, maximum = 194.31,
range = 192.87). Table 5.4.2 outlines descriptive statistics for the time taken to
complete an authentication attempt from various different perspectives.
The time taken to complete an authentication attempt is reflective of the
use of the authentication approach in a real world task. The wide range in
authentication times is potentially explained by users gaining familiarity with
a novel authentication approach and then becoming increasingly better at the
authentication approach. The concern with laboratory experiments is that users
typically complete an authentication attempt at fixed intervals disconnected from
the stress of completing an actual task. The controlled experiments do not nec-
essarily reflect the cost of an authentication attempt in actual use with an actual
application. The user is arguably motivated in a real world setting to become
superior at the authentication approach to complete the task more efficiently.
Therefore, another key research question is whether the individual is able
to improve or reduce the time taken to complete an authentication attempt as
they become more adept. The expectation would be that initial authentication
attempts would be lengthy due to the novelty of the authentication approach
but then rapidly improve as users become more familiar with the authentication
approach.
Therefore, a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed
to determine if there was any statistical significant difference in the time taken
for users to complete their first, second and third authentication attempts. Only
active accounts with three authentication attempts below 200 seconds were con-
sidered. Figure 5.13 illustrates box plots for each of the three groups of authen-
tication attempts.
The first and third groups appear normally distributed. However, the second
group of authentication attempt times appears to have one case (18) that is more
than 3 box-lengths from the edge of its box, labelled in Figure 5.13 with an aster-
isk. A Shapiro-Wilk’s test suggests the second group of authentication attempt
times is indeed not normally distributed (p < 0.05). There are many different
approaches for dealing with outliers. The decision was taken to simply remove the
offending case from consideration. A subsequent Shapiro-Wilk’s test suggested
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Attempts Mean SD Minimum Maximum Range
Successful 226 671.68 4632.666 4.82 52258.76 52253.94
Unsuccessful 161 1688.64 21033.839 1.43 266919.88 266918.44
Successful
213 45.02 27.975 4.82 194.31 189.49
(<200s)
Unsuccessful
156 25.25 24.406 1.43 168.56 167.12
(<200s)
Horizontal 180 678.10 356.972 4.82 52258.76 52253.94
Vertical 46 646.59 4008.495 11.28 27240.56 27229.28
Horizontal
170 44.18 25.619 4.82 154.75 149.93
(<200s)
Vertical
43 48.34 35.990 11.28 194.31 183.03
(<200s)
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for length of time for authentication attempts.
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Figure 5.13: Box plots of time taken for first, second and third authentication
attempts by users.
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that second group of authentication attempts as well as the first and third group
were normally distributed (p > 0.05). The length of time for each authentication
attempt increased from the first attempt (M = 56.77, SD = 37.718 seconds) to
the second attempt (M = 57.35, SD = 27.684 seconds) but then decreased by the
third attempt (M = 50.02, SD = 27.764 seconds). The assumption of spheric-
ity was not violated as confirmed with a Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity, χ2(2) =
2.184,p = 0.335. However, there was no statistically significant difference in the
time taken to complete each authentication attempt, F (2,36) = 0.236, p = 0.791.
Therefore, the time taken to complete an authentication attempt did not ap-
pear to improve significantly as they completed more attempts. However, such
improvement may be difficult to gauge over the initial three authentication at-
tempts, considering the initial six authentication attempts may reveal improve-
ments. Therefore, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed to determine if
there was any statistically significant difference in the time taken to complete the
first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth authentication attempts. Only active
accounts with six authentication attempts below 200 seconds were considered.
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Figure 5.14: Box plots of time taken for first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth
authentication attempts by users.
Figure 5.14 illustrates box plots for each of the groups of authentication at-
tempt times. The groups all appear normally distributed asides from a case (6)
that is more than 1.5 box-lengths from the edge of its box, as labelled in Figure
5.14 with a circle. The case does not represent an extreme outlier, consequently
will remain in the group for consideration. A Shapiro-Wilk’s test suggests all six
groups are normally distributed (p > 0.05). Figure 5.14 illustrates a trend that
authentication attempts time appear to decrease with each successive attempt.
The length of time decreased from the first authentication attempt (M = 68.90,
SD = 39.208 seconds) to the second attempt (M = 58.97, SD = 34.899 sec-
onds) and continued to decrease by the third attempt (M = 46.72, SD = 31.599
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seconds). The trend persisted as the time decreased further for the fourth at-
tempt(M = 41.64, SD = 23.056) and then for the fifth attempt (M = 37.31, SD
= 9.466) and still decreased by the sixth authentication attempt (M = 28.82, SD
= 14.543). The assumption of sphericity was violated as indicated by Mauchly’s
Test of Sphericity, χ2(14) = 31.590,p < 0.05. Consequently, a Greenhouse-Geisser
correction was applied ( = 0.520). While the trend may have appeared that au-
thentication attempt times were improving with each successive attempt there
were no statistically significant differences in the times taken to complete succes-
sive authentication attempts, F (2.600,23.401) = 2.522, p = 0.090.
However, there may be improvement over time with successful authentication
attempts as users become increasingly familiar and successful with the authen-
tication approach. Therefore, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to
determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the time taken for
users to complete their first, second and third successful authentication attempts.
Only active accounts with three initial, sequential successful authentication at-
tempts below 200 seconds were considered.
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Figure 5.15: Box plots of time taken for first, second and third successful authen-
tication attempts by users.
Figure 5.15 illustrates box plots for each group of authentication attempt
times. The first and third group appear normally distributed. The second group
contains a case (4) that is 3 box-lengths from the edge of its box, as labelled in
Figure 5.15 with an asterisk. Consequently, the case was classed as an extreme
outlier and removed from consideration. A subsequent Shapiro-Wilk’s test con-
firmed that all three groups were normally distributed (p > 0.05). Figure 5.15
illustrates a trend that the time taken to complete a successful authentication
attempt appears to decrease from the initial attempt but not continue. The time
taken to complete a successful authentication attempt decreased from the first
attempt (M = 78.74, SD = 18.89 seconds) to the second attempt (M = 43.49,
SD = 12.688 seconds) but then increased by the third attempt (M = 46.98, SD
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= 29.223 seconds). The assumption of sphericity had not been contravened as
suggested by Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity, χ2(2) = 3.713, p = 0.156. The time
taken for successful authentication attempt was statistically significant depending
on the attempt, F (2,12) = 4.143, p < 0.05, partial η2 = 0.408. Post-hoc analysis
with Bonferroni adjustment displayed a statistically significant decrease from the
first attempt to the second attempt (35.24 (95% CI, 10.30 to 60.18) seconds, p <
0.05).
However, the difference is not particularly surprising as initial authentication
attempts are likely to be higher than others as it will be the first encounter of
the authentication approach for many users. Furthermore, the sample used for
the statistical analysis was particularly small (N = 7). Therefore, the weight or
relevancy of results are debatable. It may be more prudent to consider the time
taken on unsuccessful attempts for that there is a larger sample (N = 24).
Consequently, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine if
there was a statistically significant difference in the time taken for users to com-
plete their first, second and third unsuccessful authentication attempts. Only
inactive accounts with three initial, sequential unsuccessful authentication at-
tempts were considered.
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Figure 5.16: Box plots of time taken for first, second and third unsuccessful
authentication attempts by users.
Figure 5.16 illustrates box plots for each group of authentication attempt
times. The first and second group appear to contain several cases that are more
than 3 box lengths away from the edge of their respective box. A Shapiro-Wilk’s
test confirms that all three groups were not normally distributed (p > 0.05).
Therefore, the respective outliers were removed and subsequent Shapiro-Wilk’s
test confirmed that the first and second groups were normally distributed (p
>0.05) but not the third group (p < 0.05). However, given the third group con-
tained no extreme outliers and the impact is debatable the analysis continued
with all three groups. Figure 5.16 illustrates a trend of the time taken on unsuc-
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cessful decreasing by the third attempt. The time taken for an authentication
attempt increased from the first attempt (M = 10.34, SD = 4.980 seconds) to
the second attempt (M = 13.42, SD = 6.639 seconds) but then decreased by the
third attempt (M = 7.46, SD = 3.136 seconds). The assumption of sphericity had
not been violated as suggested by Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity, χ2(2) = 2.749,
p = 0.253. The length of time for an unsuccessful authentication attempt was
statistically significant depending on the attempt, F (2,30) = 4.506, p < 0.05,
partial η2 = 0.231. Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni adjustment displayed there
a statistically significant decrease from the second attempt to the third attempt
(5.97 (95% CI, 0.61 to 11.32) seconds, p < 0.05).
Therefore, it would appear that in terms of unsuccessful authentication at-
tempts, it is possible for users to improve authentication times. However, sev-
eral cases were removed from consideration and the last group was not normally
distributed, arguably undermining the strength of the statistical analysis. Nev-
ertheless, users do appear to reduce the time taken to authenticate to around
7.46 seconds, on average. However, the key aspect is that users did not actually
authenticate, they did indeed fail to authenticate. The user was unsuccessful in
gaining access to the application. Furthermore, 7.46 seconds for an unsuccessful
authentication attempt is considerably lower than 43.49 seconds for a successful
authentication attempt.
Therefore, it would appear that successful and unsuccessful authentication
attempts are fundamentally different. Naturally, these authentication attempts
are fundamentally different in conclusion but the process and the time taken by
users should be similar as the user is striving to succeed and not fail. Ideally,
there should be no difference between successful and unsuccessful authentication
attempts in terms of time: only the conclusion should be different. Therefore,
another key research question is whether an authentication attempt exhibits a
difference in time depending on whether it is successful and whether it is the
first, second or third attempt.
Therefore, a within-within ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was
any interaction between the success of an authentication attempt and whether
it was the first, second or third attempt. A Shapiro-Wilk’s test on residuals
indicated that groups of times for the first, second, fourth and sixth authentication
attempts were normally distributed (p > 0.05) but not for the third and fourth
authentication attempts (p < 0.05). However, considering the majority of groups
were normally distributed and the impact was considered minimal the analysis
continued with no cases transformed or discarded. The time taken to complete a
successful authentication attempt increased from the first attempt (M = 61.45,
SD = 23.742) to the second attempt (M = 65.01,SD = 37.053) but decreased
by the third attempt (M = 45.29, SD = 27.353). The time taken to complete
a unsuccessful authentication attempt increased from the first attempt (M =
9.53,SD = 3.966) to the second attempt (M = 14.08,SD = 5.531) but decreased
by the third attempt (M = 6.07,SD = 2.150). The assumption of sphericity
was not violated as suggested by Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity, χ2(2) = 0.882,
p = 0.644. There was no statistically significant interaction in the success of
authentication attempt and attempt number on the time taken, F (2,12) = 0.306,
p = 0.742. However, the main effect of the success of an authentication attempt
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suggested a statistically significant difference on time taken, F (1,6) = 440.952, p
< 0.05, η2 = 0.987.
Therefore, there was a difference on time taken between successful and unsuc-
cessful authentication attempts. However, the sample used in the analysis was
small (N = 7). Therefore, the weight of any results are debatable. Nevertheless,
the distinction in time taken between such authentication attempts is curious as
the process should be similar only the outcomes different. The difference suggests
that unsuccessful authentication attempt represent something other than simply
not being able to remember the authentication secret.
However, there is another aspect to consider of successful authentication at-
tempts: the alignment selected by users. The expectation is that users would
favour the most convenient alignment, i.e. the alignment that affordd rapid en-
try of an authentication secret. The reality is that one alignment, horizontal,
was used considerably more than either vertical or even diagonal. The diagonal
alignment was not used in a single authentication attempt and the vertical align-
ment was used rarely in comparison to the horizontal alignment. Therefore, the
expectation is that users make authentication decisions that favour convenience.
Therefore, another key research question is whether there is any difference in the
time taken to authenticate with different alignments.
An independent-sample t-test was conducted to determine any mean difference
between horizontal and vertical attempts. Diagonal attempts were not consid-
ered, as not one single authentication attempt used the diagonal alignment. Few
vertical vertical attempts were made, making a comparison with horizontal au-
thentication attempts difficult. Consequently, only initial vertical authentication
attempts were compared with initial horizontal authentication attempts (N =
14). A Shapiro-Wilk’s test suggested that both groups were normally distributed
(p > 0.05). The time taken for horizontal authentication attempts (M = 73.86,
SD = 43.146) was shorter than vertical authentication attempts (M = 97.741,
SD = 59.400). There was homogeneity of variances for authentication times for
both horizontal and vertical groups, as determined by Levene’s Test for Equal-
ity of Variances (p = 0.972). The reality is that vertical authentication attempts
took 23.88 (SE = 27.749) seconds longer than horizontal authentication attempts.
However, the difference was not statistically significant, t(12) = 0.860, p = 0.406.
Therefore, while vertical authentication attempts exhibit lengthier authentica-
tion times, the difference is not significant. However, few users even experimented
with the different alignments. Therefore, even if the difference was statically sig-
nificant it would be debatable if that is why users favoured horizontal alignment.
The majority of users authenticated using a horizontally alignment with very
little experimentation. It is unclear why users favoured one alignment over all
others.
Memorability
The memorability of the graphical authentication secret can be uncovered by
determining the number of days between the creation and last submission of an
authentication secret. Therefore, if we consider only accounts or registrations
with no duplicates and have at least one successful attempt we have 36 accounts.
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The average number of days for an authentication secret was 39.59 days (SD
= 61.583). However, the average may not be indicative of overall performance
as many authentication secrets were not remembered as long (mode = 0). There
was much variation in the memorability of authentication secrets (minimum =
0, maximum = 333, range = 333). The was several users could not remember
(33%) of authentication were not memorability beyond a day.
However, this can be contrasted with several users (39%) that could remember
the authentication secret beyond 30 days. Indeed specific users (22%) were able
to recall the authentication secret beyond 60 days.
There may be a correlation between the memorability in days and the time
taken to register. The accounts with registration time below 100 second and
memorability above 0 days but below 200 days was considered. A Shapiro-Wilk’s
test suggested the data was not normally distributed (p < 0.05). Consequently,
registration time below 200 second and memorability above 0 days but below
100 were considered. This left 15 accounts to consider, a Shapiro-Wilk’s test
confirms the data is normally distributed (p > 0.05). While there was a small
positive correlation between the time taken and the number of days in terms of
memorability, r = 0.106, the correlation was not significant, p = 0.708.
However, there may be a correlation between the memorability in days and
the time it taken to register for active accounts. The registration time was limited
to 1000 seconds for registration time and memorability above 0 days but less than
300 days. A Shapiro-Wilk’s test suggests the data is normally distributed. While
there was a slight negative correlation between the time taken and the number
of days in terms of memorability, r = -0.101, the correlation was not significant.
There may be a correlation between the number of successful authentication
attempts and registration time. A Pearson correlation was performed on 28 active
accounts. However, registration times greater than 1000 seconds were not consid-
ered, leaving 26 cases. A Shapiro-Wilk test reveals data not normally distributed
for successful authentication attempts (p > 0.05). Therefore, those cases removed
where there was only one successful authentication attempt had been made and
all those who made more than 15 successful authentication attempts. A Shapiro-
Wilk test suggests the data is normally distributed for both registration time
and successful authentication attempts (p < 0.05). There was not statistically
significant correlation between the time taken at registration and the number of
successful authentication attempts, r(15) = 0.183, p = 0.483.
If we only consider active accounts. The average number of days in terms of
memorability for an authentication secret was 43.22 days (SD = 66.241). How-
ever, many authentication secrets were not remembered beyond a day (mode =
0). Indeed there was variation between memorability of authentication secrets
(minimum = 0, maximum = 333, range = 333).
However, the last area of interest, specifically in the wild was the user ex-
pectations. Specifically, those users that have made a successful authentication
attempt and have subsequently returned and been unable to authenticate. The
user expects to be able to authenticate, i.e. assumes they remember their au-
thentication secret. The average number of days between the successful and
subsequent last entry was 41.07 days (SD = 49.842). The mean may not be
indicative of the typical performance though (minimum = 0, maximum = 142,
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range = 142). However, the majority of users (60%) attempted to gain access
after 30 days. There were also attempts at 116 days and 142 days. The reality is
that users expected these great gaps in memorability.
5.5 Discussion
The purpose of the application was to evaluate an alternative authentication
mechanism within its expected context, i.e. as part of a realistic workflow, ex-
ecutable on an actual device, targeted at intended users. The application was
successfully accepted into the Apple iTunes Store and was available to all stu-
dents with an iOS device. Consequently, the application went through the same
process of scrutiny, assessment and deployment as any other application available
for distribution to consumers.
The application laid the foundation for the evaluation of the authentication
mechanism in the field. There were no set intervals, no set requirements; students
could easily abandon the application if they were not impressed. The application
was initially well received as several students downloaded the application. The
entire pool of students were never expected to download and use the application
as sophisticated mobile computers, e.g. smartphones, were not particularly main-
stream at the time. The expectation was that a small but sizeable base of students
would use the application. The application was deployed with expectations but
no guarantees.
However, much like a real-world product it was open to criticism, comment and
discussion. Unfortunately, the reality is that while the application was relatively
well received the authentication mechanism was not. The anecdotal evidence was
that students generally appreciated the application and the ability to download
lectures to their portable computer. Moreover, some students felt the application
would be a useful addition to many other courses and felt the application should
be deployed elsewhere. However, there were no positive comments surrounding
the authentication mechanism.
The criticism directed at the authentication mechanism took two forms. The
first was that some students felt the authentication mechanism was unnecessary.
It was felt that an application that delivered lecture recordings to an individual’s
mobile computer should be free from the shackles of authentication. Authen-
tication seemed gratuitous and some users of the application obviously felt the
authentication mechanism was an unrealistic addition.
However, such an argument can be contrasted with the requirements laid down
by the content owners. The School of Psychology was adamant that the appli-
cation contained an authentication mechanism, during and after the evaluation
period. Therefore, determining a realistic use of an authentication mechanism is
difficult to define. There were users who felt the authentication mechanism was
unnecessary and detracted from the application as a whole, while the client felt
the application could not exist without an authentication mechanism. The second
form of criticism was that the authentication mechanism was simply awful. There
were some anecdotal comments that suggested the graphical authentication was
not well received.
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Figure 5.17: Review of the application from an individual in the iTunes Store.
Figure 5.17 illustrates a review from the iTunes Store that a student posted after
they had downloaded and used the application. Figure 5.17 encapsulates both
forms of criticism. The comments are visceral and emphasise that the authenti-
cation mechanism essentially drove the reviewer away. However, the comments
about the alternative authentication mechanism are not surprising. The authen-
tication approach was novel to user. The novelty of an authentication mechanism
has many connotations, not all positive.
The aforementioned review provides some insight into these negative conno-
tations. The reviewer is arguably distrusting of the authentication mechanism.
The reviewer is not convinced that they entered the authentication secret incor-
rectly or whether the authentication mechanism itself processed it incorrectly.
Alternatively, the comment does make a valid user interface remark that the
user is unable to make corrections as they are not sure what they have entered.
Therefore, the user is not sure what the system actually assessed. In an environ-
ment where exploration is limited by the number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts, there is little room for learning.
Furthermore, the last remark in the review is that the reviewer would not use
the application until the authentication mechanism was removed. The remark
makes another essential point that not only did the reviewer think the authenti-
cation mechanism was expendable but that it was experimental. The reviewer was
not going to waste time dealing with an experimental authentication mechanism,
as something untested would not be used to protect something valuable.
The user base was intelligent and arguably did not appreciate being used as
guinea pigs to evaluate an authentication mechanism to access valuable learning
resources. However, in fairness, students were not forced to use the application
and could use the portal to access lecture recordings: a portal that also required
a password. Furthermore, students were not being treated differently from those
in other schools, as no other school within the university had such an application,
indeed few even made lecture recordings available to students.
Nevertheless, the authentication mechanism clearly alienated some students.
The reality is that several users (23%) abandoned the application after authen-
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tication and did not use it. Therefore, it many respects the alternative authen-
tication mechanism was a failure from the outset. It frustrated too many, drove
too many away. The argument could be made that it was not the concept but
the implementation of the authentication mechanism that alienated users.
However, the application itself was well received, anecdotal evidence suggested
that those students who accessed the application appreciated the quality. Fur-
thermore, the School of Psychology were content with the application and keen
to continue to use it. Moreover, the Apple engineer who assessed the application,
approved it for wide-spread use. Therefore, it is unlikely those who abandoned
the application did so because of the implementation. The reality is that the
alternative authentication mechanism produced many casualties. However, the
remaining students that soldiered on can be used to assess user performance.
The time taken to complete an authentication attempt is a key area of perfor-
mance assessment. The expectation was that as the authentication mechanism
was novel, initial authentication attempts may take time but the user would be
able to reduce time with successive attempts. The time taken to complete an
authentication attempt is an important consideration in determining the conve-
nience of an authentication mechanism.
The statistical analysis did reveal a statistically significant difference between
the initial and second authentication attempts submitted by users. However,
this, in itself, is not particularly surprising as it was expected that users would
initially generate lengthy authentication attempts as the authentication approach
was novel. Users would have taken time to learn how to use the authentication
approach. Therefore, it is not surprising that a subsequent second authentication
attempt reduced the time taken. The assumption was that the time taken would
improve with subsequent attempts. Unfortunately, while there was certainly a
trend in that users appeared to take less time with successive attempts but there
was nothing conclusive.
Furthermore, much of the analysis required the pruning of data to ensure
it was normally distributed. There was wild oscillation in the time taken to
complete an authentication attempt, some authentication attempts took only a
few seconds while others took considerably longer to complete.
These wild oscillations can be explained by the design of the authentication
mechanism, specifically from two aspects. The first aspect was the design of the
authentication mechanism itself. The authentication mechanism was a search-
metric, i.e. users were required to locate target images among distractor images.
Furthermore, the position of target and distractor images was random. There-
fore, unlike a keyboard or keypad, users did not know in advance the position
of the target elements. The user was required to locate them, each and every
time. Moreover, the user not only had to locate the target images, they were
required to align them. Therefore, users had to strategise to determine the best
approach for alignment. Consequently, if images were scattered close together,
surrounded by forgettable faces, the users would find it relatively straight-forward
to locate and align them. If, however, the images were dispersed across the grid
and surrounded by distinctive images, users would find it harder to locate and
align them, increasing the overall time of the authentication attempt.
Therefore, as target images were not fixed and locating them is potentially
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hindered by distinct distractors surrounding them, it is not unexpected that au-
thentication attempt times would essentially oscillate. The argument could be
made that the images be placed in fixed positions. Moreover, the images could
be assessed and analysed to ensure they are suitably distinct from those that
surround them. This design is plausible and not beyond the realms of implemen-
tation. However, such design decisions come at the cost of reduced resilience to
attackers.
If target and distractor images are fixed in positions and not at random when
loaded, attackers do not need to know images, they merely need to monitor in-
teraction and perform the same actions subsequently. The same interactions
performed on the same canvas will produce the same successful authentication
attempt. The tailoring of distractor images that orbit target images to reduce con-
fusion for the user, introduces an element that could be hijacked by an attacker.
Therefore, ultimately the design decisions were taken to deliver an authentication
approach that was resilient to attackers but at the cost of authentication time.
The second aspect of the design, that resulted in wide variation of authentica-
tion time, was the interaction language laid out during the registration process.
The registration process required users to double-tap to enter, i.e. select an im-
age for use in the authentication secret, long-tap and drag to reposition images
within the authentication secret and swipes to move between steps in the process.
The user was required to authenticate once they had completed the registration
process. The first time the user is required to authenticate, they are presented a
screen of text that instructs them how to use the authentication mechanism.
Unfortunately, when users were presented the authentication mechanism the
interaction language used during registration was transferred to the authenti-
cation mechanism. Therefore, the short authentication attempt times suggest
users located target images and double-tapped them. However, during authenti-
cation, a double-tap submitted an authentication attempt. Therefore, users likely
double-tapped and were informed the authentication attempt was unsuccessful.
Then, unsure of what occurred, users likely double-tapped on a target image
again. If the user performed the action one more time, their account would have
been deactivated.
The authentication mechanism was novel to users and efforts were made to
communicate the idea that a double-tap acted as entry and text instructions
outlined how to use the authentication mechanism. Unfortunately, some users
clearly ignored instructions and simply remembered that a double-tap on an
image resulted in action, during the registration process. The statistical analysis
revealed that there was a difference in the time taken between successful and
unsuccessful authentication attempts. This was unexpected as the process for
a successful or unsuccessful authentication attempt should be same: only the
conclusion is different.
Nevertheless, as there was a statistically significant difference between the
time taken to complete a successful and unsuccessful authentication attempt sug-
gests there was something distinct between the two processes that results in the
respective conclusions. The answer is clearly that the interaction language laid
out during the registration process was transferred to the authentication process.
Therefore, the registration process was more important than first thought.
171
The prevalence of horizontal alignment among successful authentication at-
tempts may also be explained by the registration process. The registration process
presented the authentication secret in a horizontal alignment, it did not advertise
or communicate to the user the fact they could make vertical or diagonal authen-
tication attempts. Therefore, arguably the user transferred experience from the
registration process to the authentication mechanism.
The importance of the registration process was not fully realised during the
creation of the application and authentication mechanism. The reality is that
most research on alternative authentication mechanisms simply does not discuss
the registration process. The primary reason for this is that alternative authenti-
cation mechanisms are rarely deployed, negating the need for the consideration of
the registration. However, if anything, evaluation in the field with students em-
phasises the importance of the registration process and how it is the first aspect
of the alternative authentication mechanism that users encounter.
However, one aspect of the registration process that was considered impor-
tant was the time spent completing it. The expectation was that the longer
an individual spent creating an authentication secret, the more memorable it
would become. The assumption was that a lengthy registration process signalled
thorough consideration of the images within the authentication secret. However,
statistical analysis did not reveal any significant correlation between the time an
individual spent completing the registration process and the memorability of the
authentication secret.
Nevertheless, other aspects could be connected to the memorability of the au-
thentication secret, such as the number of authentication attempts made by an
individual. The assumption was that authentication attempts, it would reinforce
the memory of sequence of images. However, statistical analysis revealed no sig-
nificant correlation between the number of authentication attempts an individual
made and the memorability of the authentication secret.
Nonetheless, an authentication secret comprising of faces appeared memorable
for at least some users. Unfortunately, users were not particularly diverse in the
creation of their authentication secret. The reality is that users selected similar
images and some images were more popular than others. The expectation is
that users selected images that were familiar and memorable so as to ensure
that they could authenticate without inconvenience. Consequently, many of the
popular images were of core staff from the first year programme. These members
of staff had been in place for several years. Therefore, every student would
have encountered the members of staff and would likely have enduring memories
of them, as they were some of the first teaching staff they encountered at the
university. The phenomenon of individuals favouring specific images of faces is
not unknown [62].
The explanation of the popularity of specific images is that individuals select
images based on qualities such as race, attraction and similarity. However, these
qualities were not particularly diverse within the image set. The popular images
were of learned and experienced teaching staff being selected by inexperienced
and youthful undergraduates. The assumption is that users were selecting famil-
iar faces. The staff that were selected arguably represent celebrities within the
department. The reality is that users strove to avoid the inconvenience of forget-
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ting the images and favoured images they felt they would be able to remember.
The problem for the authentication mechanism is that the predictability of im-
age choice can essentially be utilised by an attacker. The resulting image set is
essentially suboptimal.
The image set is the foundation of a recognition-based graphical authenti-
cation mechanism. However, even a strong image set is undermined by user
selections, i.e. users will make similar choices. Ideally, an optimal solution would
be to tailor the image set for an individual so that it is distinct. However, the cre-
ation of such an image set would not only require the user to provide images but
also some sort of process or algorithm. The process would have to be kept secret
otherwise an attacker could simply apply it to an image set to undermine the au-
thentication mechanism. Nevertheless, ensuring specific algorithms and processes
are kept private only increases the complexity of the authentication mechanism
and potentially impacts on the scaleability as well as the deployability of the
authentication mechanism.
However, an alternative authentication approach may be for the individual
to create the image set. The user can provide the initial group of images and
then prune and pick images until they have an optimal image-set. This would
potentially increase the complexity and time taken to create an authentication
secret but would tackle the problem of predictability without impacting on the
memorability of the authentication secret.
5.6 Conclusion
The chapter introduced the design of the application and the integration of the
alternative authentication mechanism. Furthermore, the chapter outlined the
evaluation of the entire application in the field with undergraduates psychology
students. The results of the evaluation revealed that authentication time was not
reduced significantly with successive attempts and that the memorability of an
authentication secret did not correlate significantly with the the time taken to
create an authentication secret or with the number of times it had been submitted.
However, the evaluation did reveal that there was a significant difference in time
between successful and unsuccessful authentication attempts.
A potential explanation for the inability of users to reduce authentication
times over successive attempts is that the authentication mechanism was a search-
metric and, as such, required individuals to locate images before they could be
manipulated. The explanation for the difference in time between successful and
unsuccessful authentication is potentially explained by the design of the registra-
tion process that used one interaction language while the authentication mech-
anism used another. The remaining aspect discussed was the fact that users
favoured some images more than others. The popularity of specific images, con-
firms that user choice is predicable, a quality that could be exploited by an
attacker.
These concerns could be addressed in subsequent revision of the authentication
and application by tackling the following issues:
• User specific image collection
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There is no single image set, instead each user defines their own personal
image set. The user provides a group of images and then prunes and picks
images until a set is formed containing target and distractor images.
• Re-invigorate registration process
The registration process needs to be re-designed and re-considered from
the outset as the evaluation revealed that it is an incredibly important
component of an authentication mechanism.
The two aforementioned aspects were tackled in the subsequent revision of the ap-
plication, Dick. The design, implementation and evaluation of Dick are discussed
in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Dick
Tetrad appeared promising when evaluated in a vacuum. Nonetheless, when
framed inside the Tom application and evaluated with actual smartphone users,
Tetrad appeared less than desirable. The reality is that users made predictable
image choices, undermining the image-set used in the initial incarnation of the
application. The ecologically strong evaluation of Tetrad uncovered problems
with the registration process, an area that is rarely discussed in authentication
research. Self-supported registration processes are arguably not needed for con-
trolled investigations. Nonetheless, it was clear there would need to be renewed
focus on the registration process in subsequent iterations of the application.
Consequently, the following chapter outlines an iteration on Tom that (1)
utilises a personalised image-set and (2) refines the registration process. The
ensuing section, §6.1, details the design of the application, focusing on the al-
ternative image set and registration process. The outlined aspects are used to
actualise the application, §6.2. Consequently, a prototype application is produced
and evaluated, §6.3, with results reported, §6.4, then discussed, §6.5. Lastly, con-
clusions are drawn, §6.6, with future steps outlined.
6.1 Design
The previous chapter outlined the various elements of authentication. Figure
6.1 illustrates the various elements, all of these were designed, implemented and
evaluated in the previous chapter. However, the design decisions made for some
elements had undesirable outcomes when evaluated, specifically: authentication
images and the registration process as indicated with dotted lines in Figure 6.1.
Therefore, these elements were revisited in the second iteration of the authenti-
cation mechanism. Furthermore, the application functionality was also revised
to refine it and add additional features. The motivation for adding additional
features was to provide incentives for users to return to the application.
6.1.1 Authentication Images
The previous incarnation of the application relied on an image set comprised of
staff. There was a single image set for all users. Unfortunately, users made pre-
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Figure 6.1: The many authentication elements, the elements in blue are settled
while the elements in grey with dotted lines have to be refined.
dictable choices and some images were more popular than others. Consequently,
a focus of Dick’s design was to determine an alternative image-set.
Section 2.5 outlined and compared various image-types, such as scenes, ob-
jects and faces. The conclusion, §2.5.5, was that faces were the optimal choice
for graphical authentication as they can be recognised rapidly and retained for
decades. Therefore, the initial design decision taken was to continue using of
faces, but to address the concern of predictable image choices.
The immediate element to address is the use of a shared image-set for all
users, as predictable images choices are far more problematic in such a design.
Consequently, an alternative direction was taken and the design focused on use
of a personalised image-set for each user. The problem with a such solution is the
practicalities of an individual sourcing such images. However, social networking
sites such as Facebook can be used to generate the necessary image-set. Con-
sequently, the second iteration of the application generated an image-set using
images from a user’s own social network. The images were generated using the
profile pictures of friends. The profile picture was downloaded and processed to
extract a single face, for use in authentication.
The solution not only has the potential to reduce the concerns of predictable
image choices, but can also potentially improve the usability of the authentication
solution. Ida Gobbini et al. state that familiar faces induce neural activity in areas
traditionally associated with social knowledge. Moreover, Ida Gobbini et al. argue
unfamiliar faces induce activity in areas, hypothesised as a ‘social brake’, when
assessing potential threats [121]. Therefore, a more custom and familiar image-set
may improve the authentication solution.
Nevertheless, there are still concerns that close friends and family may be
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able to circumvent the authentication solution as they can potentially guess the
authentication secret an individual is likely to create. The reality is that many
knowledge-based authentication solutions are circumventable by friends and fam-
ily, as they are highly familiar with an user’s knowledge and taste. Nonetheless,
an authentication solution should ideally be resistant to the efforts of such indi-
viduals. The assumption was that Tetrad already had such resilience as even if
close friends and family were able to determine images used in the authentication
secret, they would not necessarily be able to determine the sequence required to
authenticate.
6.1.2 Registration Process
During registration the user was requested to enter their credentials for the pop-
ular social network Facebook. The user was also asked to grant the necessary
permissions for the system to access the profile pictures of friends. The profile
picture of each friend was downloaded and processed to generate a list of im-
ages. The user was asked to select all 45 images for use in authentication and to
indicate the four images that would act as the authentication secret.
The registration process was more complex than is typically expected for an
authentication mechanism. However, an individual should only need to endure
the registration process once. Nevertheless, an unwieldy and awkward registration
process could drive users away from an application. Therefore, every effort had
to be made to ensure the registration process was as practical and painless as
possible.
The processing of profile pictures to extract faces is increased the complexity
of the registration process. The system had to present a list of images, contain-
ing extracted faces. Therefore, each profile picture had to be downloaded from
Facebook’s servers and processed to extract a single face. The process had to
be performed for every single friend on a user’s friend list. It relied on a steady
Internet connection and powerful processor, if users were to complete the regis-
tration process in a timely fashion. Moreover, users could struggle to understand
the complex process, given the novelty of the registration process. Consequently,
three registration strategies for conducting the process were considered, as fol-
lows:
• Device
The registration process could be conducted on the user’s smartphone. The
concern is the strength of the data connection and the limited resources of
the device. The image processing could take a considerable amount of time
to complete on the device. Moreover, the complex process could confuse
users and result in many not completing the registration process, as there
would be no support at hand to help users.
• On-site
The registration process could be conducted on-site at a specific location.
Users could register on specialised systems that have a powerful central
processing unit as well as a fast and steady Internet connection. The time
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taken to complete the image processing part of the registration process could
be negligible using this strategy. Furthermore, someone could be hand to
support and guide users through the registration process.
• Cloud
The registration process could be conducted on the user’s smartphone but
the image processing part of the process could be completed on the server-
side. The image processing could occur on a cloud instance rather than on
the user’s device. This drastically reduces the time taken to process images.
There are several concerns connected with such a strategy, including cost
and legality. Moreover, concerns still remain that the users may not be able
to complete the complex registration process without guidance.
The initial strategy of expecting users to complete the registration process on-site
is commonly used in biometric- and token-based authentication. However, it is
rarely used in knowledge-based authentication, as these mechanisms can often be
used without necessitating a specialised registration process.
Therefore, adopting an on-site registration process for the experimental au-
thentication mechanism essentially undermined a primary advantage of using
the knowledge-based authentication approach. Requiring on-site registration re-
moved an advantage of the approach, making it less competitive with other au-
thentication approaches.
However, arguably, for the purposes of evaluation the registration process
could be completed on-site, although such a requirement would undermine the
ecological validity of the evaluation. If users had to register on-site in a labo-
ratory, then arguably every aspect of the evaluation could be controlled. The
user could simply return each week to authenticate. The reality is that a realistic
registration process could be so repulsive as to deter actual users from complet-
ing the registration process. An on-site registration process could mask users’
displeasure with a novel registration process.
The remaining registration strategies retain a strength of the knowledge-based
authentication mechanism, as users can complete the registration process with-
out specialised equipment. The user in both strategies conducts the registration
process on their own device but the image processing aspect is either handled
in the cloud or on the device. The motivation for relying on cloud computing,
rather than the device, for the image processing stage is to reduce the time taken
to process images.
Cloud computing offers much better performance than modern smartphones.
The time taken to complete image processing and thus the registration process
could be dramatically reduced.
The inclusion of a cloud computing component within the registration process
to improve it may be far more complex than first anticipated. However, the reality
is that even if the cloud computing aspect were employed the resources would still
cost considerably more than entry of a simple alphanumeric authentication secret.
The transmission, storage and processing of alphanumeric authentication secrets
would be dramatically less than that of graphics.
Therefore, even if an cloud solution were possible the cost might be too high
when contrasted with other solutions. Companies are ultimately answerable to
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shareholders. The drive to cloud computing is to avoid high capital expenditure
and push for a manageable operating expenditure. However, there is the possibil-
ity that organisations could drive to push application power to users themselves.
The organisation could harness the power of user devices and push the costs to
them. Furthermore, a key advantage of pushing the processing down to the user’s
device is that the personal information resides only on the user’s device. There-
fore, all analysis, processing and storage is on the user’s device. Consequently,
the approach is privacy preserving. Therefore, the analysis and creation of images
will happen on the user’s device rather than on an external cloud architecture.
6.1.3 Application
The initial design of the annotation user interface in ‘Tom’, was focused on process
rather than product. The design aimed to enable students to enter notes effectively
and efficiently. Unfortunately, the design was less than optimal when it came to
reviewing notes.
The initial design of the chapter list interface only required users to tap on
an element to edit it. Therefore, an individual only needed to tap an image to
change it or tap the chapter title to change it. The chapter list is in permanent
edit mode. The minute the user taps an image or title belonging to a chapter,
they are immediately presented with a keyboard or image chooser. The design is
perfectly acceptable as long as the user does not accidentally tap objects.
It is unrealistic to expect precise interaction from users is expecting too much.
The reality is that users regularly make accidental taps [208]. Furthermore, en-
countering image choosers and keyboards can be incredibly irritating when users
are not expecting them, especially when they are trying to review lecture notes.
The user may be in a stressed state, preparing for examinations, and does not
need the hassle of dealing with an awkward interface.
Furthermore, aside from interaction in the chapter list view, the annotation
view, as illustrated in Figure 5.5, is also in permanent edit mode. The design of
the annotation interface, on reflection, is terrible. The motivation for using a faux
yellow sticky note and Marker Felt font was to emphasise a sense that the notes
were short, simple and unformed. The sticky note was used to communicate the
idea that users had limited space to make a note, they they should consider what
they are typing. However, users were not actually restricted: they could create
notes of almost any length.
However, such motivations clashed with the actual design of the interface. The
design was focused on entering and editing information quickly but we expected
users to produce considered and insightful notes. Moreover, if users do create
a lengthy note they have to swipe up and down through text as the view was
restricted between the top of the faux sticky note and the top of the keyboard.
Therefore, the design squandered space that was already precious [148]. The
surrounding screen real estate was scarified purely to represent a sticky note that
had no real perceivable value, on reflection.
Consequently, the design of the annotation interface was refined to be optimal
for editing and reviewing. The first step was to implement a drill-down interface.
The chapter-list user interface still presented a list of chapters, each with an
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associated colour, image and title. The user taps an element in the list to view
annotations associated with the chapter.
Both the chapter-list and annotation user interface default to review mode,
rather than to edit-mode. The user can tap and swipe anywhere on the screen
and no keyboard or image chooser will appear. Instead an edit control in the
form of a button, titled ‘Edit’, is now located in the top right hand corner of the
interface. The user simply taps the button to enter editing mode; upon tapping
the button is relabelled to ‘Done’. The user taps the same button to exit edit
mode and automatically save changes.
The annotation user interface simply consists of three simple elements. A
colour banner with space for a single image, the chapter title and space and a
notes area for annotations. When entering text into the notes area, the canvas
slides up to accommodate the keyboard, ensuring that the text does not flow
behind the keyboard. Furthermore, when reviewing the text the user can use the
whole screen and swipe up and down: no space is wasted.
The aim of these changes is to provide a simple and clean interface to users.
The changes should make it easier for users to review and edit content without
encountering an unexpected keyboard or image chooser. Moreover, the design
enables the introduction of the chapter-sharing feature. Annotations shared with
other users are not editable. Therefore, shared chapters appear in the chapter-
list alongside the chapters generated by the user. However, users can drill-down
on any shared chapter to view annotations associated with it. When the user is
presented with associated annotations, the edit button is absent.
Hence, user interaction is consistent across all chapters, except that the addi-
tional edit operation is absent for shared chapters.
6.1.4 Proposed Solution
The proposed solution is an application that allows individuals to download and
annotate lecture recordings. The annotations are shared across users to provide
the sharing of content. The feature addition was meant to promote regular use
of the application and consequently the authentication mechanism.
The authentication mechanism relies on a personal image collection. The
decision was taken to download and analyse images on the user’s device rather
than use a cloud component. The motivation was to preserve privacy as the
user’s personal information would not be transferred and analysed on external
cloud components. Furthermore, another motivation was to reduce the costs
associated with performing analysis on external cloud components.
The implementation of the application and alternative authentication mech-
anism are discussed in the next section.
6.2 Implementation
The implementation of the application and authentication mechanism is detailed
over the next few sections.
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6.2.1 Registration Process
The registration process consisted of four stages. Dick’s registration process is
more complex than Tom’s, as it requires the user to provide the image collection
used in the graphical authentication mechanism. The decision was taken to rely
on an individual social networking account, specifically Facebook. Consequently,
users were required to have a Facebook account. The application would essentially
download the profile picture of each friend in an individual’s friend and extract
a face from the image. The user was then expected to create an image set for
the authentication mechanism. They then selected four of the images as their
authentication secret. The steps involved in the registration process are detailed
below:
1. Enter Facebook Credentials
The implementation relied on the Facebook SDK to connect with the user’s
Facebook account. The SDK provides a standard user interface for connect-
ing external applications with an individual’s Facebook account. Users tap
the button to initiate the connection process. Facebook manages the con-
nection process.
The initial step in the connection process requires the user to enter their
Facebook credentials. Once authenticated, Facebook presents additional
dialogues informing the user that the iOS application is seeking access to
their Facebook account. Furthermore, the dialogues outline the specific
permissions the application is seeking, e.g. access to photos. The user is
free to allow for the application to be connected to their Facebook account or
deny such connection. Once the user grants the connection the registration
process can proceed. Facebook generates a session for the application and
provides the necessary data to access the user’s account. The application
must store and present information to gain access to the account later.
Users are free to subsequently sever the connection at anytime via the Face-
book website. If users choose to deny access in the first instance, the reg-
istration process does not continue and they are unable to use register and
use the application.
2. Select 45 friends for use in authentication
The second step essentially involves downloading and processing the profile
picture of every friend on the user’s social network. Users are presented an
empty UITableView, in the second step.
The table view header contains a prompt that instructs users to select 45
images for use with the authentication mechanism, as illustrated in Figure
6.2. Underneath the prompt is a progress bar with accompanying label.
The label indicates how many friends, or rather profile pictures, have been
processed. The table view is populated with selectable entries as each profile
picture is processed. An entry comprises of the extracted face and the name
of the friend used to generate it.
The image processing subtask continues until all images have been processed
or the user has selected 45 images. The prompt in the table view header
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is updated inline with the number of images selected by the user, e.g. if
the user has selected 5 images, the prompts states “Please select 40 Friends
from the list...”. When the user has selected 45 images, a button is enabled
for the user to progress to the next step of the registration process.
If the user chooses to progress to the next step, the image processing task is
terminated, regardless of whether the profile pictures have been processed.
Figure 6.2: An example of user interface in step two of the registration process.
3. Select 4 of the 45 as the authentication secret
The user merely has to identify 4 of the 45 images that will comprise their
authentication secret.
Users are presented a UITableView containing the 45 images they selected
during the previous step. Users are instructed to select 4 of these images to
act as their authentication secret. Once an individual has selected 4 images,
a button is enabled for the user to progress to the fourth and final step.
4. Sequence is important, re-order before confirming
The final step of the registration process requires the individual to determine
the sequence of the images in the authentication secret.
The user is presented a UITableView containing the four images they se-
lected in the previous step. The interface object allows individuals to re-
order entries within a table view. Users tap and hold the ‘sequence control’
to detach the entry from the table view and reposition it. The user can
reposition entries until they are content with the sequence of their authen-
tication images.
The user taps a button labelled ‘Done’ in the table view header to complete
the registration process.
Image Generation
The second step of the registration process is the most complex step. An overview
of the three key steps performed in the second step are outlined, as follows:
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1. Query Social Network
The registration submits two queries to Facebook. The first query request
the user’s friend list, i.e. a list of the all the relationship an individual has
on the social network. The second query requests a profile picture for each
associate, on the list returned from the first query.
The implementation submitted queries using the Facebook Query Language
(FQL). The social network does not use the de facto Structured Query
Language (SQL) and instead favours its own variant FQL. The returning
results are parsed to produce an array of unified resource locators (URLs)
to download the necessary images.
2. Generate Image
The profile picture associated with each friend is processed to locate faces
within the image. The image processing subtask returns an array of co-
ordinates for each face located within an image. The system is not recog-
nising faces, merely identifying face-like objects within an image. Therefore,
the face located within an image is not necessarily that of the profile owner.
The system may locate several faces within an image but only one is re-
quired. Consquently, the system simply selects the first set of coordinates
from the array.
The general assumption is that a face will be extracted and will likely be
that of the profile owner. Nevertheless, the extracted object, may not be
that of the owner, it may not even be an actual face.
3. Display Image
The extracted image is presented along with the name of the profile owner,
as an entry in a table view. Therefore, users see the actual image before
they confirm selection.
The face problem did consider building an interface that allow individuals to see
the images located and change locations but this complicates the situation even
more. A user interface displaying images and allowing users to edit would also
represent a cost.
Performance
The analysis and extraction of faces was especially intensive. However, every
effort must be made to ensure the process is as efficient as possible to ensure
the user does not need to spend considerable time completing the registration
process. The following aspects of iOS development are expensive[138], as follows:
• NSManagedObject
• Saving to disk
• Network
• Parsing
183
The aforementioned aspects are all involved in the creation of the user’s personal
image set. Therefore, the process must be careful considered and structure to
ensure the process is efficient. The steps involved in the image processing are
discussed in the next section.
Image Processing
The decision was taken to use a multi-threaded approach to maximise perfor-
mance on smartphones, such as iPhones. The steps are as follows:
(a) Generate NSManagedObject
A NSManageObject, essentially a record, is generated for each profile pic-
ture. The NSManageObject is contains information pertaining to the profile
picture.
(b) Download Profile Picture
The URL for the profile picture was used to download the image onto the
user’s smartphone. Establishing, maintaining and using a network connec-
tion is expensive and is dependent on the speed of the connection. The
optimal scenario is for a user to complete the task using a strong Internet
connection. The connection would preferably be over a wireless local area
network rather than a cellular network. A cellular connection would re-
quire considerably more energy to maintain and opens the user to potential
expensive data costs.
The image itself was not written to disk as the entire image is not needed,
merely a single face from it. Furthermore, the process of writing an image
to disk is expensive, even on a separate background thread. Therefore,
writing to disk unnecessarily would only increase the overall time taken to
complete the registration process. Consequently, the image is passed for
image processing once downloaded.
(c) Locate face(s) within profile picture
The OpenCV library is packaged with the application to make use of several
optimised routines, functions and algorithms for image processing. How-
ever, even when using such specialised and refined routines, the image pro-
cessing subtask still consumes a reasonable amount of resource. The de-
mand on resources only increases with the size and quality of the actual
profile picture. There is a concern that large profile pictures could exceed
memory allocations and lead to the termination of the entire application by
the device’s operating system.
Therefore, the size and quality of images are determined before image pro-
cessing commences. Profile picture exceeding a specific threshold are re-
jected before image processing commences.
Those images not exceeding the threshold are passed to the image processing
subtask. The subtask does not recognise specific faces but merely locates
potential faces within the profile picture. When a potential face is located,
the coordinates are added to a results array. The processing technique does
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not necessarily locate all faces, neither does the process only locate faces,
it may well incorrectly identify face-like object as faces.
(d) Extract face from profile picture
The coordinates array generated in the previous step is used to extract a
face from the profile picture. The array may contain several coordinates:
only one face is necessary from each profile picture. Therefore, the first
set of coordinates in the array were used to extract a face from the profile
picture.
(e) Image written to disk
The extracted face is not inserted into the NSManagedObject, as this would
increase the resources needed to subsequently load the managed object.
Instead, the extracted face, generated in the previous step, is written to
disk and the profile picture used to generate it.
(g) Discard profile picture
The entire profile picture consumes precious resources and is no longer
needed once a face has been extracted. Therefore, the profile picture is
discarded once a face is extracted.
(h) Update NSManagedObject
The NSManagedObject is updated with the physical location of the image
written to disk.
(i) Merge
The changes made to the local NSManagedObject are merged with the
central NSManagedObjectContext.
(j) Discard thread
The thread is discarded and resources released.
The aforementioned steps are used to create the user’s personal image set. The
process was part of the registration process and was packaged with the applica-
tion.
6.2.2 Application
Dick’s essential functionality was essentially unchanged from the previous incar-
nation, Tom. The main change was the reinvigoration of the chapter component,
specifically the chapter list. The chapter list component needed to accommodate
the sharing of chapters with other users.
The annotations created by an individual are shared with all others. The aim
is to reduce the complexity of managing privacy controls and settings. The user
is advised that if they do not want to share annotations with others, they should
simply not create them.
The previous incarnation of the chapter component assumed the user was in
edit-mode. The new approach assumed the user was in ‘consumption-mode’ and
users could browse their own annotations and the annotations of others. The
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user could enter ‘edit-mode’ by selecting a chapter and tapping the edit button.
The user could not edit annotations by other users. Furthermore, while users
could attach an image to their own annotations, these images were not shared
with others. The primary motivation for this design decision was to reduce the
traffic being exchanged between devices and associated cost.
The application was distributed and evaluated on students, as discussed in
the next section.
6.3 Evaluation
The details of the evaluation are outlined over the following sections.
6.3.1 Subjects
The application was distributed and evaluated on undergraduate students en-
rolled at The School of Psychology at the University of Glasgow. The application
required individuals to have a Facebook account. Furthermore, students had to
give permission to allow the application access to their Facebook account.
Consequently, the user-base had the potential to be small as users may not
have met such requirements. The reality is that many individuals likely have a
Facebook account as the social network service is incredibly popular. However,
students may be less the willing to connect their personal social networking ac-
count with an experimental application. Nevertheless, Nielsen argues that even
five users provide enough feedback to evaluate a system [192]. Consequently, the
decision was taken to continue with the evaluation, accepting that while a small
participation group was undesirable, it still had the potential to be useful.
6.3.2 Apparatus & Material
The apparatus and materials are similar to the evaluation of Tom, see §5.3.2.
6.3.3 Procedure
Similarly, the procedure for the evaluation is also akin to the previous evaluation
for Tom. The primary difference was that the application was not distributed via
the Apple App Store but via an independent testing platform called TestFlight.
The TestFlight system was used to distribute the application to students. The
platform required the installation of specific technical profiles on the user’s device.
Consequently, using the application was more complicated than the previous
iteration the added complexity was unavoidable if we used TestFlight.
6.4 Results
The results are discussed in terms of the registration process and authentication
process.
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6.4.1 Registration
There were 9 registrations over 55 days. The majority of these registrations (67%)
occurred within 30 days and few registrations (22%) occurred after 40 days.
Similar to the previous iteration, i.e. ‘Tom’, the application did not collect
any personal information, such as an individual’s email address and did not re-
quest individuals to create usernames. The application also did not log personal
information associated with an individual’s Facebook account. The application
instead relied on the device UDID as the individual’s username. The device UDID
was associated with each registration. Consequently, the number of unique users
can be estimated from the number of distinct UDIDs. The total number of dis-
tinct devices that completed the registration process was 6.
Furthermore, similar to Tom, there was no recovery process. Users unable
to authenticate were expected to delete the application, download it again and
conduct the registration process again. Similarly, if the application encountered
a problem or malfunctioned, the user was expected to remove the application
and complete the registration process again. Therefore, while several users (50%)
completed the registration process once, several users (50%) completed the reg-
istration process twice. The registration process was not completed more than
twice by any individual.
The majority of registrations (44%) were initiated between midday and six
o’clock in the evening. In fact most registrations (78%) occurred between midday
and midnight. Furthermore, no registrations occurred during the night and few
(22%) occurred between six o’clock in the morning and midday. Moreover, the
majority of registrations (78%) occurred on a weekday rather than at the weekend
with most registrations (44%) happening on a Wednesday.
Time
Individuals spent a total of 108885 seconds or approximately 30 hours on the
registration process. The average time taken to complete the registration process
was 201.64 minutes (SD = 418.387). However, the mean may not be indicative of
overall performance as there was wide variation in the time taken to complete the
registration process (minimum = 18.01, maximum = 1307.93, range = 1289.92).
The time taken, on average, is considerable, longer than many films, e.g. individ-
uals could watch Titanic or the finale of Lord of the Rings in the time it takes to
complete the registration process.
However, the majority of individuals (89%) completed the registration in un-
der 200 minutes. Inspection of the registration times revealed that the average
performance was potentially distorted by an extreme outlier, a single individual
that took 1308 minutes or 21.8 hours to complete the registration process. The
average time taken to complete the registration process was 63.35 minutes (SD =
57.97). However, the mean may not be indicative of overall performance as there
was wide variation in the time taken (minimum = 18.01, maximum = 181.43,
range = 163.42). Furthermore, the majority of individuals (75%) completed the
registration process in less than 60 minutes.
The time taken may be reduced if only initial registration attempts are con-
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sidered. The average time taken to complete the registration process for each
user was 82.85 minutes (SD = 67.29). However, the mean may not be indicative
of overall performance as there was wide variation in the time taken to complete
the registration process (minimum = 24.81, maximum = 181.43, range = 156.62).
The reality is that the registration process took a considerable time to complete.
6.4.2 Authentication
Users made a total of 151 authentication attempts over a period of 77 days.
The majority of authentication attempts (53%) ended in success. The remaining
(47%) authentication attempts were unsuccessful.
A total of 7 users made at least one authentication attempt. The average
number of authentication attempts was 21.57 (SD = 38.109). However, many
users made far fewer authentication attempts (mode = 2). The number of au-
thentication attempts generated by users was mixed (minimum = 2, maximum =
107, range = 105), suggesting the distribution of authentication attempts among
users was more varied than indicated by the mean.
Furthermore, all users made at least one successful authentication attempt
(N = 7). The average number of successful authentication attempts was 11.43
(SD = 14.513). However, the mean may not be indicative of actual performance
for most users (mode = 2). There was a large span in the number of successful
authentication attempts (minimum = 1, maximum = 42, range = 41). The
average number of unsuccessful authentication attempts was 10.14 (SD = 24.210).
However, the mean may not indicative of overall performance for most users
(mode = 1) as there was a wide variation in the number of unsuccessful attempts
among users (minimum = 0, maximum = 65, range = 65). Moreover, several
users (57%) did not make a single unsuccessful authentication attempt.
Similar to Tom, users were constrained in that each registration was limited to
3 sequential unsuccessful authentication attempts. The account was deactivated
once the limit was reached, and users had to re-register to use the application.
However, users were also expected to complete the registration process again
if the application encountered problems or if they removed it from their device.
Therefore, several users (50%) completed the registration process more than once.
Users completed a total of 9 registrations (N = 6), all individuals bar one, were
accounted for in authentication attempts. Similar to Tom there was an individual
that was not accounted for in the registration logs. The individual generated a
total of 10 authentication attempts.
Furthermore, none of the accounts or registrations appeared to have been
deactivated as no individual submitted a sequential number of unsuccessful au-
thentication attempts. Therefore, users appeared to have re-registered as the
application malfunctioned or did not behave as expected. Alternatively, users
may simply have removed the application and endured the registration process
for other reasons.
Moreover, there were several authentication attempts (63%) generated by a
individual that could not be associated with a specific registration. Therefore,
these attempts were simply not logged on the server. However, the authentication
attempts exhibit anomalies that suggest the application or mechanism may have
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malfunctioned in these cases. The authentication attempts are discussed in §6.4.2
and were removed from consideration.
Therefore, a total of 46 authentication attempts were generated over 9 regis-
trations (N = 6). The vast majority (89%) of these were successful with a few
(11%) unsuccessful.
The average number of authentication attempts for each registration or ac-
count was 5.11 (SD = 5.302). However, many accounts generated far fewer au-
thentication attempts (mode = 1). Furthermore, there was wide variation in the
number of authentication attempts associated with each account (minimum = 1,
maximum = 16, range = 15). The average number of successful authentication
attempts for each registration or account was 4.56 (SD = 4.953). Similarly, many
accounts had far fewer successful authentication attempts (mode = 1) associated
with them. Moreover, the number of successful attempts submitted varied among
accounts (minimum = 1, maximum = 15, range = 14). The average number of
unsuccessful authentication attempts for each account or registration was .56 (SD
= .527). In this case, the mean may be indicative of performance (mode = 1) as
few unsuccessful authentication attempts were submitted by users (minimum =
0, maximum = 1, range = 1).
Time
Individuals spent a total of 181130.69 seconds on 46 authentication attempts or
2.1 days. The average time for an authentication attempt was 3937.62 seconds
(SD = 20420.913). However, there was wide variation in the time spent on
each authentication attempt (minimum = 11.00, maximum = 131063.97, range
= 131052.97). There was several authentication attempts that took considerable
time.
There were two extreme outliers lasting 47968.16 and 131063.97 seconds or
13.32 and 36.41 hours, respectively. The two authentication attempts were suc-
cessful and generated by the same individual. Both of these distort typical perfor-
mance. Therefore, both outliers removed. Consequently, the average time taken
for an authentication attempt was 47.69 seconds (SD = 27.901). However, there
was wide variation in the time taken for each authentication attempt (minimum
= 11.00, maximum = 127.12, range = 116.12) suggesting the overall mean may
not be indicative of performance.
Further inspection of authentication times revealed two potential outliers that
lasted longer than 100 seconds. These two authentication attempts are unlikely
to make a dramatic impact. However, with both were removed, and the av-
erage time taken for an authentication attempt reduced to 43.97 seconds (SD
= 22.450). However, there was still wide variation in the time taken for each
authentication attempt (minimum = 11.00, maximum = 97.14, range = 86.14).
The time taken for authentication attempts may improve, when considering only
successful authentication attempt.
The average time taken for a successful authentication attempt was 44.79
seconds (SD = 22.711). Here too, there was wide variation in performance in
successful authentication attempts (minimum = 16.47, maximum = 97.14, range
= 80.67). The authentication times for unsuccessful authentication attempts may
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be shorter. The average time taken for a unsuccessful authentication attempt was
37.88 seconds (SD = 21.682). There was wide variation in performance in unsuc-
cessful authentication attempts (minimum = 11.00, maximum = 64.74, range =
53.74). The time taken for unsuccessful authentication attempts appears to be
shorter successful authentication attempts but there were far fewer unsuccessful
attempts. However, there were far fewer unsuccessful authentication attempts
to consider when contrasted with successful authentication. The typical perfor-
mance for unsuccessful authentication attempts may approach that of successful
authentication if more were considered.
The higher number of successful authentication attempts is a relief, as users
were required to select target and distractor images. Therefore, it would appear
that requiring users to select distractor images may not have impacted on perfor-
mance. However, while users may be able to successfully authenticate, it may take
them longer. An increase in authentication attempt time would be undesirable
as authentication times were already considerable. Therefore, a paired samples t-
test was conducted to determine if there was in difference in performance between
the two authentication mechanisms.
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Figure 6.3: Box plots for each of the authentication times for each mechanism.
Figure 6.3 illustrates the authentication time for the first attempt generated by
users in both versions of the authentication mechanism. The difference between
both authentication attempts generated by users was normally distributed as
suggested by a Shapiro-Wilk’s test (p > 0.05). An authentication attempt took
longer to complete using the second iteration of the authentication mechanism (M
= 52.66, SD = 19.180) when compared to the first authentication mechanism (M
= 13.66, SD = 5.327). There was a statistically significant difference of 38.998
seconds, 95% CI [9.8624 to 68.1336], t(4) = 3.716, p < 0.05, d = 1.66. Therefore,
users took longer to complete an authentication attempt in the second iteration
of the authentication mechanism.
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The difference is surprising as the authentication would be initially novel
to users. Therefore, it is expected the authentication times using the second
iteration will be shorter. However, many of the initial attempts submitted by
users with the first iteration of the authentication mechanism were unsuccessful,
they were short as users suffered from interaction errors and getting to grips with
the mechanism. Therefore, authentication times for the second iteration are more
likely to be representative of actual performance with confident users comfortable
with the approach. Consequently, it may be better to contrast authentication
times for the second iteration with initial attempts from successful users of the
first authentication mechanism.
An independent t-test was conducted to determine if there was difference
between performance in both authentication mechanisms. Box plots of the au-
thentication times for ‘Tom’ and ‘Dick’ were inspected and there was no extreme
outliers. The authentication attempt times for each authentication mechanism
was normally distributed as suggested by a Shapiro-Wilk’s test (p > 0.05). An
authentication attempt took less time to complete using the second iteration
of the authentication mechanism (M = 54.67, SD = 17.850) than the first au-
thentication mechanism (M = 54.67, SD = 17.850). There was homogeneity
of variances for authentication attempt times for both groups as determined by
Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances, p = .632. An authentication attempt
took 12.27 seconds (SE = 12.201) longer using the initial iteration of the au-
thentication mechanism. However, the difference in performance between both
authentication mechanism was not significant, t(10) = 1.006, p = .338.
Nevertheless, while the difference may not be significant, users are able achieve
similar performance using the second iteration of the authentication. Therefore,
expecting users to select distractor images as well as target images does not appear
to impact on the performance of users. However, the sample size is small, making
the relevance of any analysis questionable. Nonetheless, users appear not only
able to authenticate successfully with the second iteration but without an impact
in performance. However, users selecting their own distractors may impact on
the memorability of the authentication secret.
Memorability
The memorability of the graphical authentication secret was determined by cal-
culating the number of days between the creation and last submission of an
authentication secret. The average of memorable of the graphical authentication
secret was 17.22 days (SD = 24.493). However, there was wide variation in the
number of days in the memorability of the authentication secret (minimum =
0, maximum = 61.07, range = 61.07). However, if duplicates are removed, the
average of memorability of the graphical authentication secret increases to 24.59
days (SD = 27.555). Nevertheless, there was still wide variation in the number of
days in the memorability of the authentication secret (minimum = 0, maximum
= 61.07, range = 61.07).
Nonetheless, memorability is difficult to assess as users were not assessed at
fixed intervals but rather when they decided to authenticate. Therefore, several
users did not authenticate beyond a few days. Furthermore, users of the second
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authentication mechanism were fairly successful: there were few unsuccessful
authentication attempts. There was no sequence of unsuccessful authentication
attempts that would suggest failure in memorability, rather many users simply
did not use the application.
Nevertheless, there were still many unsuccessful authentication attempts that
seem to suggest the authentication malfunctioned rather than that the user could
not recall the authentication secret.
Excess Attempts
105 authentication attempts were generated by two individuals and were not asso-
ciated with any registration record. The majority (63%) of these authentication
attempts were unsuccessful. Furthermore, the authentication attempts exhibit
anomalies that suggest the application as whole or the authentication mechanism
was not functioning properly.
The success of an authentication attempt does not appear to lead to the
on-screen dismissal of the authentication mechanism. Therefore, users appear to
have submitted several authentication attempts, both successful and unsuccessful,
but could still not access the application. The flaw could stem from incomplete
registration. The missing registration records suggest that the registration process
may have failed in these instances and led to the generation of these unusual
authentication attempts.
The average time taken for each of the authentication attempts was 713.87 sec-
onds (SD = 7099.587). There was wide variation in the time taken for the authen-
tication attempts (minimum = 3.96, maximum = 72768.11, range = 72764.14).
However, there were extreme outliers that likely distorted the typical time taken.
Consequently, all five authentication attempts were removed from consideration.
The average time taken for each of the authentication attempt was 14.43 seconds
(SD = 8.135). However, there was still wide variation in the time spent on each
authentication attempt (minimum = 3.96, maximum = 44.88, range = 40.91).
The authentication attempts can be parcelled into essentially five misfired
attempts with four generated by one user. The initial parcel comprised of 45
attempts, the second comprised of 39 attempts, the third parcel compromised
of 4 attempts, the fourth parcel compromised of 7 attempts and the last parcel
comprised of 10 attempts. An interesting aspect of these attempt parcels is that
users initially submit a successful authentication attempt and then continually
submit them, confident in their selection and most likely the system confirms they
are correct. However, after submitting several attempts to no avail, user begin
to experiment and submit several unsuccessful authentication attempts. In spe-
cific parcels users try alternative alignments. The experimentation illustrates the
tenacity and determination of users to overcome the authentication mechanism
and access the application.
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6.5 Discussion
The purpose of the application was to evaluate the authentication mechanism
within an actual workflow, on actual target devices with actual users. The pre-
vious incarnation of the application, Tom, presented an image set comprising
of images of staff faces. Individuals were expected to select target images and
use these to authenticate by aligning them within a grid. The concern with the
approach was predictability of choice.
There are many potential solutions to the problem, such as tailoring image sets
to individuals or requesting individuals to provide target images. However, there
are also many potential drawbacks to using such solutions, namely any algorithms
used to tailor images could be used nefariously by attackers and user-provided
target images could be easily identified from system distractors. Alternatively,
individuals could provide their own collection of images and subsequently prune
and pick images until they have an image set of target and distractor images for
use in graphical authentication.
However, there are two primary concerns with using the aforementioned ap-
proach, namely (1) sourcing of a sizeable image collection from each individual
and (2) expecting individuals to select distractors as well as target images. The
first concern was addressed in Dick by requiring an individual to own and operate
a social networking account.
The profile picture of each friend in an individual’s friend list was downloaded.
The image was analysed for faces and one was extracted and used for use in the
image set. The images of faces were presented to users in a vertical list during
registration and individuals were requested to generate an entire image set for
use authentication. Once users had generated the image set they were required
to select four of the images as targets, these four targets would form the user’s
authentication secret.
The generation of the initial image collection was performed entirely on the
individual’s device. The images were not stored on servers or residually in any
other location. The images that were generated from use in authentication ap-
proach resided on the individual’s device. Therefore, once the individual deleted
the application, the images were destroyed alongside the application. The archi-
tecture was meant to preserve privacy and reduce any concerns surrounding the
collection and use of personal images and information.
However, the design decision resulted in the registration process being very
expensive in terms of time and energy. The limitations of mobile computers also
limited the pace of the registration process. Therefore, registration time was
considerably longer than previous incarnations of the application, namely Tom,
but the expectation was that users would only have to endure the process once.
The application was, not well received. While there was considerable effort to
ensure the application did not collect personal information, some users still per-
ceived the authentication mechanism negatively. Indeed, upon presentation of
the concept to one individual, they remarked the concept was ‘creepy’. Further-
more, on reflection, the registration process expected and required a considerable
amount of effort from individuals.
An individual was expected to own a modern and powerful iOS device, have
193
an active social networking account with at least 100 friends and a strong data
connection to the Internet. Users were also expected to devote 10 to 30 minutes
to completing the registration process. The energy and effort required to use
the authentication mechanism was out of balance with the application. The user
was expected to do too much, that became clear in hindsight. The reality is
that many students simply refused to endure the registration process and ignored
the application. It was used by few individuals because the registration process
expected too much.
Therefore analysis can only be performed on the few individuals that did use
the application. The key area of interest is whether there is a difference in the
time taken to complete an authentication attempt in the alternative version of the
authentication mechanism. The requirement of users to select distractors and as
well as targets could well increase the time taken to complete an authentication
attempt. The statistical analysis revealed that users performed better on the
authentication mechanism in Tom than in the second authentication mechanism
in Dick. Consequently, the use of distractors could potentially impact on the time
taken to complete an authentication attempt.
An independent group comparison between similar performing users suggests
that users did not improve their authentication times with the authentication
mechanism used in Dick. However, the authentication time does not appear to
be impacted from the use of distractors that the individual selected. Therefore,
personal image collections could be used in an alternative authentication mech-
anism. However, the analysis was performed on a small sample. Therefore, the
weight of such analysis is debatable. Nevertheless, those users who authenticate
appear to be able to authenticate successfully and in a timely fashion.
The impact of distractors is arguably irrelevant as the registration process
was incredibly intensive for users. There was also the concern that an attacker
could easily identify likely friends within the grid and determine the sequence of
images used to authenticate. This may be difficult for an attacker who has little
knowledge of the user. However, it may be relatively painless for an acquaintance
or associate who observes several authentication attempts.
There was also the concern of ‘traffic shaping’ that was not fully appreciated
during the design phase of Dick. Cellular networks regularly use traffic shaping to
reduce the burden and payload on their networks. The operators of the cellular
network can interfere with large elements of data such as video and images to
reduce the demand on their network. An image or video can be severely reduced
in quality. The concern for the authentication mechanism is that high-quality im-
ages are reduced in quality to meet the needs of the network. These lower quality
images would be stored during registration and presented during authentication.
The ‘traffic shaped’ images could potentially impact on the time taken to com-
plete an authentication attempt, if not make it impossible to use the graphical
approach.
These concerns must be overcome to improve the authentication mechanism.
However, it is still not clear how the registration process can be improved to
reduce the burden on users. Silicon inside smartphones will become more powerful
and efficient but the real bottleneck is the data connection to the Internet and
that can not be guaranteed. The images still need to be downloaded before being
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analysed. The analysis could occur in the cloud but it would require a strong
data connection. The reality is that specific users may enjoy incredibly strong
and powerful data connections while others have to rely on sporadic and unstable
data connections. Even if the concerns of the data connection are resolved, user
data would need to reside on external systems and computers. These computers
will have backup routines, replication and any number of strategies that will
ensure that images and personal information could linger on external services for
several months.
The authentication mechanism must preserve privacy otherwise users will dis-
trust the process and may assume it is merely being used to collect personal data.
However, there are other ways to generate a personal collection of faces that do
not occur on the individual’s device. The Facebook service specifically outlines
individuals to tag and edit images of individuals online. Therefore, rather than
analysing images on device to extract friend’s face, the tagged images on Face-
book can be used to generate a collection of personal images. The collection
could be downloaded to the user’s device and once again when the application
is deleted the images would be destroyed alongside it. Furthermore, additional
images of each friend could be downloaded and oscillated through to reduce the
likelihood on an observer being able to identify the target images.
6.6 Conclusion
The chapter outlined the design, implementation and evaluation of an alternative
authentication mechanism that relied on a personal image set. The user was
required to provide a personal image collection that they subsequently pruned
and picked to create an image set comprising of target images and distractors.
There was concern that authentication time would be impacted as users were
required to discern between distractors and the targets they selected. Users did
not appear to struggle with these specific requirements.
However, there were too few individuals to analyse because the registration
process was too intense. The authentication mechanism required too much from
users and, as a consequence, the registration process was expensive in terms of
energy and time. Few users were generous with their time and few registrations
were completed. There was also concern that close acquaintances or associates
would be able to identify target images. Lastly, there were some concerns that
images may be interfered with and compressed by the data connection, resulting
in images that were unsatisfactory for use in the authentication process. The
authentication mechanism showed promise but these concerns had to be addressed
and investigated if the authentication mechanism was to be a practical alternative
to passwords.
Therefore, the following two issues had to be investigated and tackled in the
subsequent revision of the authentication mechanism:
• Alternating image collection
The target and distractor images would alternate between authentication
attempts to ensure the mechanism was resilient to attackers that were close
acquaintances or associates.
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• Image quality
The data connection used by the individual to complete the registration
process would be recorded and subsequent authentication attempts anal-
ysed to determine if there is any impact on authentication time.
These concerns and aspects are investigated in the next iteration of application,
Harry. The design, implementation and evaluation of Harry is outlined in the
next chapter.
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Chapter 7
Harry
Tetrad appeared weak after two successive ecologically strong evaluations. The
authentication solution, while promising in a controlled evaluation, simply did
not appeal to actual smartphone users. The crossover to the smartphone context
was arguably not the root of all problems, but rather the lengthy and complicated
registration process. The alternative authentication mechanism clearly created a
conflict within the application that resulted in users either ignoring the applica-
tion entirely or abandoning it.
Consequently, the following chapter outlines an iteration on the previous ap-
plication that (1) attempts to refine the registration process and (2) extends into
another context. The ensuing section, §7.1, details the design of the applica-
tion, focusing on the alternative image set and registration process. The outlined
aspects are used to actualise the application, §7.2. Consequently, a prototype
application is produced and evaluated, §7.3, with results reported, §7.4, then
discussed, §7.5. Lastly, conclusions are drawn, §7.6, with future steps outlined.
7.1 Design
The primary design focus of the third iteration of Harry was (1) iterative improve-
ment and (2) context expansion. The original plan was to extend Tetrad across
contexts. The alternative authentication mechanism may have been designed to
be optimal on televisions but had to at least be functional on other devices. The
motivation was that as tasks cross context so does an authentication mechanism.
Consequently, the ground work was laid in transitioning the application to tablets
during the second evaluation.
Unfortunately, the second evaluation exposed several problems with the au-
thentication solution that had to be addressed. Therefore, more effort had to be
applied to the third application to address the uncovered concerns. Nevertheless,
the design decision was taken to continue with expansion to tablets. The motiva-
tion was that much of the work had already been completed in transitioning the
application to tablets during the second evaluation. Furthermore, the assumption
was that considering the design that worked for both smartphones and tablets
may produce an acceptable the solution. Moreover, it was felt that offering a
tablet application may attract more users. Therefore, the decision was taken to
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continue with context expansion and target the iPad.
The primary focus was improving on the second iteration of the application.
Figure 7.1 illustrates the various elements of authentication. Many of these ele-
ments have been defined in previous iterations of the application. However, some
need to be addressed to improve the authentication mechanism. Similarly to
the previous iteration, the elements that need improved are the authentication
images, registration process and application itself.
AUTHENTICATION
PROCESS
USER
IDENTIFICATION
APPLICATION
AUTHENTICATION
IMAGES
REGISTRATION
PROCESS
RECOVERY
PROCESS
AUTHENTICATION
INTERACTION
Figure 7.1: The many authentication elements, the elements in blue are settled
while the elements in grey with dotted lines have to be refined.
The transition from the television was relatively straight-forward as only the
experimental authentication mechanism existed. The other elements of authen-
tication were never envisioned for the television, never mind manifested. The
registration process and application were designed for a smartphone. These de-
signs may not be easily transition from the iPhone to the iPad.
The iPhone and iPad has no windowing environment: there is no desktop.
The user is presented a screen at a time. Consequently, applications designed
for the iPhone target a screen. The design decision makes sense considering how
precious screen space is on smartphones. The operating system does not sacrifice
screen space to windows and menus. Applications are designed to span screens
with clear focus and simple interaction. The approach ensures an individual can
continue to use the device while on the move.
The approach was then translated to the iPad. Consumers clearly value the
use of screens of content, large buttons and modal interaction as the iPad is
popular.
The authentication mechanism is transferred relatively painlessly as it was
a single screen of content. However, transferring the registration process and
application the design had to consider the fact they were leaping from a small
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screen to a large screen. The registration process, for example, consisted of several
small screens that could have all been easily presented at the same time, on a
large screen.
Therefore, considering the design of the iPad interface forced focus on the
user interface for registration. The process previously consisted of steps, users
were presented a series of small screens. However, a superior solution may be to
present the entire process as a single screen. The focus should be to ensure an
individual can register while walking through the high-street on a mobile phone.
The registration process defines the context to the user. The design of the
registration process needs to engage the user as they need to memorise the au-
thentication secret they generate. The focus of the design should be to ensure the
registration process feels fast and responsive, engages the users but also ensures
users memorise authentication secrets.
Therefore, the registration process and application were designed to be op-
timised for tablets, rather than be tablet-specific. The aim was to create single
screen experiences that work well both on smartphones and tablets.
7.1.1 Authentication Images
The previous iteration of the application relied on a personalised image-set created
from an individual’s social network. The motivation was that a personalised
image-set would be relatively distinct for each user. The aim was to reduce the
impact of predictable image choices. This threat that is exasperated when a single
image-set is shared among all individuals. Furthermore, a personalised image-set
of faces may be more desirable as it has the potential to improve the usability of
Tetrad. Ida Gobbini et al. state familiar faces, belonging to friends and family,
exhibit a stronger response than famous or unfamiliar faces [121]. Consequently,
an image-set of familiar faces would seem a wise choice.
Unfortunately, the process used to generate the personalised image-set in the
previous incarnation of the application was costly and complex. The process
simply took too much time and was awkward and demanding on resources. Nev-
ertheless, a personalised image-set of faces still had potential. Therefore, the
design decision taken for the current incarnation of the application was to use an
alternative process to create the personalised image-set of faces.
The primary difference, in process between both applications, is that instead
of downloading and analysing profile pictures of friends, the authentication ap-
proach relied on tagged images from Facebook. Consequently, the application
no longer spent resources analysing images: it simply downloaded them directly
from Facebook. The authentication mechanism downloaded at least one tagged
image and extracted the tagged segment for use in authentication, up to three if
available for a given individual. If no tags existed for a specific friend then they
were not selectable. The authentication mechanism would randomly alternate
between the images downloaded for a given friend.
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7.1.2 Registration Process
The registration process requires users to select 45 friends for use in authentication
and select 4 of those friends to form an authentication secret. The image tags
associated with the 45 friends on the popular social network Facebook are used
to generate images for use in the graphical authentication mechanism.
The previous incarnation of the graphical authentication mechanism relied
on images from Facebook. However, image tags were not used; instead images
were generated using image processing techniques to locate and extract images
of faces for use in the graphical authentication mechanism. The images used in
authentication were generated during the registration process.
Therefore, the previous registration process was complex and expensive, in
terms of time, resource and user-effort. The previous registration process was
similar in that users were expected to select 45 friends for use in authentication
and then to select 4 of those friends to form an authentication secret. However,
users had to wait until images were generated through the processing techniques
before they could complete registration.
Under the previous registration process users were guided through several
steps to complete the process. The second step took considerable time as users
had to wait for the image to be generated. The users were unable to complete
any other steps. Users had no incentive to engage with the registration process.
The reality is that users would likely perform some other task as they waited for
images to be generated, such as watching television or browsing the web.
Users disconnecting or disengaging with the registration process is concern-
ing, as the registration process is crucial. The user not only needs to generate
an authentication secret, they need to memorise it. An individual who is dis-
engaged from the registration process may struggle to complete authentication
subsequently. Therefore, the registration process of an authentication mechanism
must engage users.
However, the registration process for the current incarnation of the authenti-
cation mechanism was still fairly complex. Consequently, effort had to be made
to ensure the design engaged users and maintained attention until the process was
completed. The design of the registration process had to encompass the following
elements: a list of friends, an interface to construct and order the authentication
secret, an interface for viewing image tags as well as the image themselves.
Therefore, the user interface for the registration process had to encompass
many elements, as well as span small and large screens. A design targeting a
windowing environment may have opted for separating each element into separate
windows. The user could then manage the windows on a smaller screen or have all
present on a larger screen. However, managing several windows on a screen could
detract focus from the registration process itself. Nevertheless, the design was
not targeting a windowing environment but rather the screen of a smartphone
and tablet.
The registration process could be presented, using screens, using various ap-
proaches. The three potential approaches identified and considered are:
1. Single full-screen
The user interface consists of a single screen that is contained within the
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dimensions of the actual physical screen. Therefore, all elements of the
interface would need to be accessible within the screen of the smartphone
and tablet. The presentation of all the elements within a single screen may
be plausible on a table with a large screen but seems unrealistic on a small
smartphone device.
2. Several full-screens
The user interface consists of several screens that the user navigates between
or is guided through. The approach is well suited to a small screen device
but is awkward for a large-screen device, as there may be considerable
wasted space on certain screens that have little content.
3. Single screen
The user interface consists of a single screen that is not contained within
the dimensions of the actual physical screen. Therefore, the screen could
be very large and contain many elements comfortable. The user would
navigate the screen using gestures, such as pans and swipe to see different
aspects of the screen.
The initial option seems unrealistic as presenting all the elements within a single
screen would make them difficult to use, as well as understand. The second and
last option are for all intents, the same approach. Users access different elements
either through controllers, such as tab views, or gestures, such as pan and swipe.
However, while the approaches are certainly similar the latter option translates
better between screen sizes than the second option. The second option still relies
on segmenting the process into several screens for the user to navigate, as the
screens increase in size, screen space is wasted.
Furthermore, the second approach would require permanent on-screen navi-
gation controls, an undesirable requirement as screen space on small devices is
far too valuable to waste on such controls [150]. Moreover, any permanent on-
screen object, such as headers, panels, prompts or any other interface ‘chrome’ is
undesirable as it consumes precious screen space [88]. Admittedly, such concerns
are less prominent on devices with larger screens, such as tablets. Nevertheless,
the design needs to span form factors and a consistent design would be desirable
across all devices.
The final approach is better suited for translating between screen sizes. The
design of the user interface can remain largely intact as users merely see more of
it when using a bigger screen. Therefore, the final approach was selected for the
design of the registration process. Consequently, all elements of the registration
process were encapsulated within a single user interface that users had to pan
and swipe to navigate.
However, Jones et al. argues that designers should reduce the amount of
scrolling within an user interface, as it interrupts the primary task [139]. There-
fore, the design of the user interface must be throughly considered to ensure that
users remain engaged with the process. Moreover, Jones et al. argues users are
inclined to scroll vertically rather than horizontally [140].
The interface design of Apple’s iOS certainly reflects the expectation that
users prefer scroll vertically rather than horizontally. The primary applications
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bundled with the operating system, expect users to scroll vertically. The Mail
application presents a vertical list of email messages for users to scroll through.
The Messages application presents a vertical list of conversations for users to scroll
through. The Music applications presents a vertical list of songs for users to scroll
through. The Notes application presents a vertical list of notes for users to scroll
through. Indeed, the operating system rarely expects users to scroll horizontally,
one of the few occasions is to navigate between pages of applications on the home
screen. However, Apple places bundled applications on the front page, negating
the need for users to scroll horizontally in the first instance. Moreover, Apple has
promoted the use of a larger screen to display more application icons [16], again,
deemphasising the need to scroll horizontally.
Therefore, the design of the user interface needed to be considered throughly
to ensure the amount of panning, scrolling and swiping was kept to a minimum.
Moreover, the position of each element of the registration process needed to be
considered to ensure the correct prominence. The four key elements of the regis-
tration process are, as follows:
(a) Friend list
The list of the user’s friend on the popular social network, Facebook.
(b) Authentication Secret Editor
The user interface for adding friends to the authentication secret, as well
as determining the position of the friend within the authentication secret.
(c) Tag Viewer
The generated images that will be used in authentication.
(d) Image viewer
The images used to generate image for use in authentication.
Figure 7.2 illustrates the design of the registration process. The large black
rectangle represents the physical screen of an iPad or tablet. The registration
process presents elements (a) and (b) when first presented to the user. He/she
is able to access elements (c) and (d) by scrolling vertically and horizontally,
respectively. The last element, the image viewer, is considered the least important
user interface in the registration process and consequently requires a horizontal
scroll to access. The third element, the tag viewer, is considered more important
than element (d) but less important that elements (a) and (b). Therefore, users
need to scroll vertically to access the tag viewer.
The registration process is presented slightly differently on a smartphone or
iPhone. The interface and interaction are largely intact on a smartphone. How-
ever, a primary difference is that users are initially only presented with element
(a) and need to scroll horizontally to access element (b). Users need to scroll
either horizontally or vertically from element (b) to access elements (c) and (d).
The rest of the design is the same across smartphone and tablet screens.
The four elements in the registration process are discussed in the ensuing
sections.
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Friend List
Figure 7.2 (a) illustrates the list of friends. The friend list is essentially the base of
the entire user interface. The remaining elements of the user interface, elements
(b), (c) and (d), all react to selections made in the friend list.
The list presents all the friends an individual has on the popular social net-
work, Facebook. Users are instructed to select 45 friends for use in authentication.
The individuals in the friend list may have images associated with them on Face-
book, indicated by image tags. When users select an individual from the friend
list, associated pictures are downloaded. The images used in authentication are
generated by extracting picture segments, according to image tag coordinates.
The registration process does not download all images associated with all
friends in advance. The strategy would not only be expensive in terms of time
and resources but would involve handling numerous images that are not even
used in authentication. Moreover, users tend to have many more friends, than
the required forty-five. Therefore, pictures used to generate images for use in
authentication are downloaded and processed when required.
Users essentially initiate a subtask when they select an individual from the
friend list. A query is then submitted to the social network requesting images tags
associated with the selected friend. The image tags are then used to download
images and extract segments from them. The image segments are associated with
the selected friend and used in authentication. The exact steps involved in the
subtask are discussed in §7.2. There also the possibility that the query submitted
to the social network may return no results.
Therefore, no images associated with the individual can be used in authenti-
cation. Consequently, the individual is not used in authentication and can not
be selected.
Authentication Secret Editor
Figure 7.2 (b) illustrates the authentication secret editor. The appearance of the
user interface can be compared to the felt top of a crap table in a casino. Casino
craps is a dice game were individuals gamble on the outcome of rolling pairs of
dice. Individuals place bets by laying special chips on designated areas, outlined
on the top of the craps table.
Similarly, users create and edit the authentication secret within the registra-
tion process by placing chips on special designated areas within the user interface.
The user interface presents six designated areas to users, as illustrated in Figure
7.2 (b). The six rectangles are effectively used to create and edit the authentica-
tion secret. A chip represents a friend of the user, on the popular social network
Facebook.
The board or editor is initially empty when presented. The user generates
a ‘friend chip’ by selecting an individual from the friend list. If the friend is
approved, i.e. image tags are associated with them, then an active friend chip is
added to the board. The friend chip is automatically placed below the line in the
second rectangle.
The six rectangles are used to manage images within authentication and each
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rectangle has a distinct purpose. The purpose of the second rectangle is to add
friends to the authentication image set, i.e. image tags associated with the spe-
cific individual. The box below the second rectangle, containing four additional
rectangles, is used to add a friend to the actual authentication secret. The four
colour rectangles represent one of four positions within the authentication secret.
The orange rectangle is first position in the authentication, purple rectangle the
second position, cyan rectangle the third position and the red rectangle the final
position. All the rectangles below the line are associated with authentication.
The single rectangle above the line, the first one, is used to remove a friend from
the authentication image set.
Users long press and drag a chip to reposition it on the board. The chip
animates and increases in size to communicate to the user that it can be repo-
sitioned. If the user attempts to reposition the chip on a non-designated area,
the chip merely repositions itself automatically to the closest, suitable designated
area. A friend remains part of authentication as long as the chip is positioned in
a rectangle below the line. If the chip is below the line and inside the box, then
it is part of the authentication secret.
A friend chip below the line and inside the box remains part on the board,
at all times. However, when users select another individual from the friend list,
the chip becomes inactive. An inactive friend chip can still be dragged and
positioned by users. However, inactive friend chips can only be repositioned
within the box, i.e. repositioning a friend within the authentication secret. An
inactive friend chip is unable to be removed from the authentication secret or
authentication. Therefore, active chips can be placed on any rectangle on the
board while inactive chips can only be placed on rectangles within the box, below
the line. Users seeking to remove an inactive friend chip from the authentication
secret, would need to select the individual associated with the inactive chip from
the friend list. Users would then reposition the now active friend chip, on the
second rectangle or the first rectangle if they want to remove the friend entirely
from the authentication secret.
The process for creating an authentication secret and managing the images
used in authentication is fairly complex when contrasted with creation of a tradi-
tional alphanumeric authentication secret. Therefore, there may be some concern
that users of differing abilities may not be able to create an authentication se-
cret. However, through using lessons of how casinos design props to aide users in
playing complex games of chance may make the process accessible to a majority
of users.
Tag Viewer
Figure 7.2 (c) illustrates the tag view. The tag viewer presents the images used
in the authentication mechanism. An image tag is associated with a larger parent
image, the tag coordinates are used to extract the segment from that image.
Users access the tag viewer by vertically scrolling downwards from the au-
thentication secret editor, element (b). The interface and interaction is the same
across smartphones and tablets. The user can continue scrolling vertically down-
ward to view all images used in the authentication mechanism.
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Image Viewer
Figure 7.2 (d) illustrates the image viewer. The image viewer merely presents all
the parent pictures used to generate images for the authentication.
Users access the image viewer by scrolling horizontally to the right. The
amount of scrolling required, depends on the dimensions of the physical screen.
Smartphone and iPhone users initially select an individual from the friend list,
element (a), then scroll horizontally to the right to access the authentication
secret editor, element (b). Users then continue scrolling horizontally to the right,
past the authentication secret editor to the image viewer. Similarly, tablet and
iPad users select a friend from the friend list and simply scroll horizontally to the
right, once, from the authentication secret editor.
The user then continues scrolling horizontally to the right to continue viewing
more pictures. The user can return to the authentication secret editor by simply
scrolling horizontally to the left, past all the previously viewed parent pictures.
Smartphone and iPhone users need to perform an additional horizontal scroll to
the left, from the authentication secret editor to access the friend list.
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7.1.3 Application
The application was to be revised as an iPad application and the initial design
had to be scaled to fit the iPad and iPhone. However, when considering the initial
design there were many aspects that seemed less than optimal when revisited and
scrutinised. There were four aspects that were less than optimal when refreshing
the design for iPads. The four aspects were:
• Document Browser
The document browser contains all the lecture recordings an individual has
downloaded to their device.
• Lecture Store
The lecture store is essentially a list of all the available lecture recordings
for download.
• Download Queue
The download queue represents the progress of all the lecture recordings
currently downloading.
• News
Important course information and news to keep student up-to-date.
Document Browser
The document browser allows users to browse all the lecture recordings they have
downloaded. The user swipes right to left to browse through downloaded lecture
recordings. Each lecture recording is represented as a piece of paper with an image
of an audio player in the centre. The scaled down piece of paper is positioned in
the centre of the screen, with the title and author displayed underneath. A button
is located underneath each lecture recording, labelled ‘Open’. The user taps the
button to open the lecture recording. Consequently, the piece of paper animates
to fill the screen and the audio player with corresponding lecture recording is
loaded. The user taps the button in the centre of the audio player to listen to
the lecture recording.
The interaction is acceptable when a user is managing a few lecture recordings
but as the list grows it becomes unwieldily. An individual seeking to open the
penultimate lecture recording, for example, in a list of thirty, would need to make
several swipes. The process is tiresome and inefficient, considering a simple list of
lecture recordings could vastly improve navigation as it would reduce the amount
of interaction to required to find and listen to a lecture recording.
The initial design, on reflection, appears to be very much style over substance,
valuing appearance rather than function. Moreover, the interface is not particu-
larly stylish or even visually informative. The only information that changes as
the user swipes left and right through lecture recordings is the title and audio of
each recording. Such information may change only slightly: a lecturer will often
give several lectures on the same topic, e.g. ‘Cognitive Neuroscience 1’, ‘Cogni-
tive Neuroscience 2’, ‘Cognitive Neuroscience 3’ etc. In these scenarios the only
changing aspect as the user swipes left and right is a single number. Therefore,
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the process can be monotonous and does not really harness the power of the
device, several pixels and screen wasted for no reason at all.
Therefore, the design of the document browser was not stylish, visually in-
formative or particular inefficient. The design was cumbersome, awkward and
tiresome and there no real benefit in continue to use it, never mind transition the
design to the iPad.
News
The news component of the application was an additional feature, an incentive
designed to promote frequent use of the application. However, while other fea-
tures, such as chaptering and annotation, were inline with the central workflow
of downloading and annotating lecture recordings, the news feature seemed mis-
aligned.
The lecture store section of the application featured a news carousel. The fea-
ture was relatively inoffensive but it was debatable if the feature offered enough
benefit to justify the screen space it consumed. The School of Psychology com-
municated with the user-base across a variety of channels and was keen to reach
students in as many ways as possible. However, inserting news into every space
is not desirable, especially at the expense of user experience. Moreover, removing
the news carousel is unlikely to have an impact on distribution of news, as the
client communicates across so many different channels.
The client was also very aware that the addition of news made the application
bloated and made it deviate from the central workflow. The School of Psychology
did not want the application to replace the portal, or even constitute a mobile
version of it. The application was envisaged as a compliment to existing services
and resources, not a replacement. The client simply wanted to provide a more
efficient and elegant solution to the problem of accessing lecture recordings on a
mobile device.
The news carousel was not simply a feature, additional or otherwise, that was
required to achieve the primary aim of the application. Moreover, it consumed
valuable space that could be used to list more lecture recordings.
Lecture Store
The aim of the lecture store was distribution of lecture recordings. However, there
was some concern about referring to the distribution aspect of the application as
the ‘lecture store’. The word ‘store’ has many connotations but the client was
concerned about students viewing the interface, as an actual store akin to the
iTunes or Amazon Store. Students may interpret use of the word as a signal that
The School of Psychology plans to start charging for lecture recordings in the
future.
The word ‘store’ is clearly potent in the world of modern consumer electron-
ics, as Apple and Amazon are battling over the use of it [258]. Moreover, Google
recently rebranded the ‘Android Market’ to‘Google Play Store’ [104]. The re-
naming is not surprising as the word ‘market’ has inappropriate and undesirable
connotations, i.e. users should not expect service and support as the stall holder
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may not be around the following week. The word ‘store’ on the other hand has
connotations of curated and considered content, where users can receive service
and support if they encounter problems. Therefore, the word is important.
However, the School of Psychology was not running a store, not even a lecture
store. The client simply wanted to provide students with lecture recordings, incase
they missed a lecture or needed to revisit a topic. The store of lecture recordings
would not scale beyond the School of Psychology. Therefore, the name is not
only undesirable it is inaccurate. Consequently, while the feature was referred
to as the ‘lecture store’, it was decided the name itself would not appear in the
application.
Therefore, on the navigation tab the lecture store was accessed through the
tab labelled ‘Featured’, similarly labelled tabs have been used in the iTunes and
App Stores, for perusing the latest content. Students were expected to tap the
tab, browse the list of lecture recordings and select the lecture they wanted to
download. The file was then downloaded to the user’s device. The process was
similar to that of purchasing a song from the iTunes Store. Therefore, while
users may not see the word ‘store’, they encounter a similar user experience.
The word had clearly influenced the initial design of the application. The design
treated students, as potential customers when in actual fact they were essentially
subscribers.
Therefore, when refining the design to cross between the iPhone and iPad,
basing the design of the lecture store on a subscription-based application may
be a better direction. There are several examples applications where the user is
essentially a subscriber, they are:
• Netflix
Netflix is a movie subscription service that requires individuals to pay a
monthly fee to access a range of television programmes and films. The
Netflix iOS application presents users a single view, containing a list of
content. Users tap an element in the list to stream the selection to their
device.
• Podcasts
The Podcasts application is a client for listening and viewing podcasts on
smartphones and tablets. The application present a single view, containing
all the active podcast subscriptions. The application automatically down-
loads the latest episode of a podcast to the user’s device.
• Metro Newspaper
The Metro Newspaper is a daily newspaper that users can view on smart-
phones and tablets. The Metro Newspaper applications presents users a
single view, containing a list of issues. Users download with a single tap to
a list element. The same list manages all issues: when one is downloaded,
the button label changes from ‘Download’ to ‘Open’.
The subscription-based applications all share the same simplicity of a single view
of content but differ when it comes to consuming that content. Streaming and
automatic downloads were undesirable options as they may lead to inadvertent
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use of expensive mobile data [22]. Therefore, the design used by the digital
newspaper seemed a suitable solution to base the refined design on. The only
remaining aspect to be revisited was managing downloads.
Download Queue
The user experience of downloads was particularly poor in Dick. Students could
download as many lecture recordings from the lecture store as they wanted. The
lecture recordings were all added to a single download queue. The progress of
the download queue was presented within the lecture store, while the queue was
being processed. The progress queue had a cancel button to the right of it.
The management of downloads essentially consisted of the single progress
bar and cancel button. Lecture recordings in the download queue were labelled
as ‘Downloading’. However, users had no insight into state of each download,
users did not know the progress of a specific lecture recording or if it had even
commenced. Moreover, users were unable to cancel individual downloads, they
could only cancel the entire queue of downloads.
Furthermore, asides from actual management of the downloads, presenta-
tion of the progress bar only further restricted the space for browsing available
lecture recordings. The combination of the progress bar, navigation area and
news carousel, essentially leaves little space for browsing or view available lecture
recordings. There is a poor use of screen space in the current design.
Therefore, the refreshed design needed to resolve the issues surrounding down-
load management.
Proposed Solution
The application from the outset was separated into two segments that the user
navigated between. The first segment belonged to the user. The second second
segment belonged to the School of Psychology. Consequently, the first segment
contained the document browser, as well as the chaptering and annotation tools.
The second segment contained the lecture store and news carousel.
However, reconsideration of the initial design reveals that such separation
was needless. The main insight was that students were initially treated as cus-
tomers, when in actual fact they were more like subscribers. Therefore, a redesign
of the application is better based on a digital newspaper application or similar
subscription-based service, than a digital store.
Figure 7.3 illustrates the redesigned interface for the iPhone and iPad. The
first step was to remove the news carousel and refocus all attention back on
content, i.e. the lecture recordings. The new design consolidated all aspects of
the application, i.e. document browser, lecture store and download manager, into
a single view.
The view presented all available lecture recordings to user. The list was up-
dated every time the application was opened. Each lecture recording is repre-
sented in a similar fashion to the initial design with a major difference: icons now
offer live previews of all user-generated chapters. The user can now at glance see
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the lecture recordings they have chaptered. The lecture recordings not on the
device appeared opaque, indicating they were not downloaded.
The application did not download lecture recordings automatically due to the
following concerns: (1) expensive mobile data charges and (2) sparse onboard
device storage. Instead users were required to initiate all downloads but they
could download as many as they wished. Users initiated download of a lecture
recording by tapping an opaque icon. A download progress bar would then be
overlaid on top of the icon. The user can initiate download of a lecture recording
and listen to another recording at the same time. Users opened a downloaded
document by pinching on an icon or simply tapping it.
The refreshed design for iPad and iPhone consolidated all aspects into a sin-
gle view. The design no longer wasted space on navigation controls or chrome to
explain views and interfaces. The user no longer needed to swipe between doc-
uments: instead a swipe moved between multiple documents. The entire focus
and user interaction was now content, on the lecture recordings.
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7.2 Implementation
The implementation is outlined in the following sections.
7.2.1 Registration Process
The registration process for the authentication mechanism is as follows:
1. Enter Facebook Credentials
The initial step, as was the case with Dick, was for users to allow the
registration process access to their Facebook account. The registration
process, once connected, submitted a query to Facebook requesting a list
of all the user’s friends on the social network.
2. Generate Authentication Secret
The second step in the registration process requested the user to create an
authentication secret, using images of their friends downloaded from the
popular social network, Facebook. The friend list received in the previous
step is parsed and presented to the user in a table, each table entry contains
the profile image and name of each friend.
The user is instructed to select 45 friends from the friend list for use in
authentication. The user simply taps a table view entry to select a friend.
The user selects 45 friends before they can complete the registration process.
However, unlike the previous version of the registration process the user is
not guided through separate stages to generate the authentication secret.
The user is able to alter and edit the authentication secret all within the
second step. Section 7.1.2 outlines the design of the user interface for the
registration process. The specific user interface for managing and editing
the authentication secret is to the right of the table view.
Once the user has selected 45 friends from the friend list and indicated the
four friends that comprise the authentication secret, the user is permitted
to complete the registration process. The table view automatically scrolls
to the bottom and reveals a button to complete the registration process.
The user can press the button to complete the registration process or they
can make additional alterations and then press the button to complete the
authentication process.
Image Processing
The image processing component is different from the previous incarnation of
the application. There are several steps that occur when an individual selects a
friend for inclusion in the authentication mechanism.
1. Query Social Network
The initial step in the image processing subtask is to query Facebook for all
image tags associated with the selected friend. An FQL query is submitted
to Facebook, requesting all the image tags associated with a specific user
identification string.
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2. Approved for inclusion
If the response returned from Facebook in the previous step is not empty,
then the friend is approved. The approval is communicated to the user.
However, if the response from Facebook is nil, the user is informed the
friend was not successfully selected and they will have to make another
selection.
3. Parse response
The returned response from Facebook is then parsed to generate an array of
objects, each object comprises of an image URL and a set of tag coordinates.
4. Download Images
The number of tags returned for each friend varies. The implementation
used a specific threshold value, ensuring only a few images were downloaded
for each friend. While not the case in the current implementation, there
is no reason why the threshold value could not be based on the current
device or available resources, e.g. a powerful device with a strong Internet
connection could have a higher threshold value and consequently download
more images.
5. Extract tags
The image tags associated with the selected individual are then used to
extract a segment of the downloaded image. The tag coordinates identify
the segment to be extracted.
6. Write to disk
The downloaded image as well as the segmented extracted images are both
written to disk.
7.3 Evaluation
The evaluation is outlined in the following sections.
7.3.1 Subjects
The application was distributed and evaluated with undergraduate students en-
rolled at The School of Psychology at the University of Glasgow.
7.3.2 Apparatus & Material
The apparatus and materials are similar to the evaluation of Tom, see §5.3.2.
7.3.3 Procedure
The procedure is similar to the evaluation for Tom, see §5.3.3.
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7.4 Results
The results are discussed in terms of the registration process and authentication
process.
7.4.1 Registration
There were 12 registrations, over 41 days. The majority of these (92%) occurred
in the first 5 days and only a single registration occurred after 30 days.
The application did not collect personal information, such as an email address,
or request individuals to create a username. The previous incarnations of the
application, namely Tom and Dick, relied on the device UDID as the individual’s
username. The intention was to continue with the same approach in Harry.
However, Apple Inc amended guidelines and policies that advocated against the
use of such tactics due to privacy concerns and instead favoured generation of a
temporary UDID. Therefore, Harry continued to rely on an alphanumeric string
for the individual’s username but this was a temporary UDID and not the device
UDID.
Furthermore, as with Tom and Dick there was no recovery process. Users un-
able to authenticate were expected to delete the application, download it again
and conduct the registration process again. The device UDID was previously
used to determine if users had completed the registration process more than
once. However, as the device UDID could no longer be used, tracking was cur-
tailed. However, Harry, as unlike previous iterations of the application, collected
additional information such an individual’s device type, data connection type, the
registration code used and the number of friends they had on Facebook. More-
over, Harry also had no limit on unsuccessful authentication attempts. Therefore,
users were not forced to re-register because they made too many unsuccessful au-
thentication attempts. The interpretation of the registration records coupled with
the fact that the majority of registrations occurred within 5 days, suggested only
a single individual re-registered. Consequently, the assumption is that there was
11 distinct users of the application.
50% of registrations were initiated between midday and six o’clock in the
evening. Indeed most registrations (83%) were initiated between midday and
midnight. Some registrations (8%) occurred during the night between midnight
and six o’clock in the morning. The remaining registrations (8%) occurred be-
tween six o’clock in the morning and midday.
The assumption was that users would favour inexpensive wireless Internet
connections over potentially slower and more expensive cellular data connections.
The strength and speed of the data connection was important as images were be-
ing downloaded over the data connection. The majority of registration attempts
(58%) were completed over a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), essentially
a ‘WiFi’ connection. However, many registration attempts (42%) were completed
over a Wireless Wide Area Network (WWAN), essentially a cellular connection.
Therefore, many users felt comfortable using a cellular connection.
There was interest in whether the user group has been soured by the prior ex-
perience of the authentication mechanism. The registration codes used indicated
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the year group of the user. The majority of registration attempts (67%) were gen-
erated by first-year undergraduates. The remaining registration attempts were
generated by second-year (25%) and third-year (8%) undergraduates. There were
no registration attempts generated by fourth-year undergraduates as Harry was
released at the start of an academic session, the majority of users were new to
the application and authentication mechanism.
The Harry application supported the entire ecosystem of Apple products, i.e.
iPhone, iPod and iPad. All individuals used iPhones with no individual using
an iPod or iPad to complete the registration process. The application, much like
Dick, required individuals to have an active Facebook account to populate the
authentication mechanism with images. Consequently, there was concern that
individuals might not have enough friends to use the authentication mechanism,
as 45 slots had to be populated and not all friends would be suitable. The regis-
tration process logged the friend count for each individual. The average number
of friends for each user was 344 (SD = 130.987). However, there was wide varia-
tion in the number of friends that each user had on the popular social networking
service (minimum = 157, maximum = 548, range = 391). Nevertheless, it seems
that most users had more than enough friends.
Time Taken
Individuals spent a total of 15537.06 seconds or approximately 4.31 hours on the
registration process. The average time taken to complete the registration process
was 21.58 minutes (SD = 29.472). However, the mean may not be indicative of
overall performance as there was wide variation in the time taken to complete
the registration process (minimum = 6.70, maximum = 113.71, range = 107.01).
The time taken, on average, although arguably still lengthy is a considerable
improvement on the average previous performance using Dick.
The majority of registrations (75%) took less than 15 minutes to complete.
Inspection of registration times revealed that average performance was potentially
distorted by an extreme outlier, a single individual that took 113.71 minutes or
1.90 hours to complete the registration process. Therefore, the extreme outlier
was removed from consideration. The average time taken to complete the regis-
tration process was 13.20 minutes (SD = 5.428). However, the mean may not be
indicative of overall performance as there was wide variation in the time taken
(minimum = 6.70, maximum = 24.79, range = 18.09).
The time taken may be reduced if only initial registration attempts are con-
sidered. The average time taken to complete the registration process for each
user was 13.45 minutes (SD = 5.674). The variation in performance was not as
dramatic as previous incarnation of the application (minimum = 6.70, maximum
= 24.79, range = 18.09). The reality is that the registration process still took
time to complete but was vastly improved over the previous incarnation, Dick.
However, another aspect that was difficult to determine over the previous
incarnation, Dick, was the data connection used to complete the registration pro-
cess. The previous application did not record the data connection type. However,
the type of data connection could impact on registration times as the images had
to be downloaded from servers. Therefore, considering only initial registration
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attempts, the typical time taken for each data connection was determined. The
average time taken to complete the registration process over a wireless LAN con-
nection was 13.01 minutes (SD = 6.117). There was wide variation in the time
taken to complete registration among users (minimum = 6.70, maximum = 24.79,
range = 18.09). The average time taken to complete the registration process over
a cellular connection was 34.04 minutes (SD = 44.81). However, there was wide
variation in the time taken to complete registration among users (minimum =
9.85, maximum = 113.71, range = 103.86).
Users took longer to complete the registration process on a cellular connection
than on a wireless LAN connection. However, ultimately in terms of time to
complete the specific data connection type is not necessarily as relevant as the
speed and strength of the data connection. Nevertheless, registration time was
indeed impacted by the use of cellular connections in this instance.
Target Image Selection
The user interface for the registration process allowed individuals to select dis-
tractor and target images from a single interface rather than from several steps.
The assumption is that individuals would select target images as they selected
distractor images. The distractor count was logged when individual confirmed
an image as a target image. The reality is that for the majority of registrations
(58%), individuals selected all the distractor images and then determined target
images. In another registration, an individual selected all the target images before
selecting all the distractor images. The majority of individuals simply created
steps within the single interface. Consequently, users did not mix interaction by
selecting some distractors then a target. Therefore, staged, stepped interaction
for creating an authentication secret may be more than enough.
7.4.2 Authentication
Users made a total of 111 authentication attempts over a period of 77 days. The
vast majority of authentication attempts (60%) were unsuccessful. However, sev-
eral authentication attempts (40%) did end in success. The majority of successful
authentication attempts used a horizontal alignment (60%), several used a verti-
cal alignment (38%) and one authentication attempt used a diagonal alignment.
The average number of authentication attempts associated with each registra-
tion or account was 9.25 (SD = 5.276). Nevertheless, there was a wide spread in
the number of attempts associated with each account (minimum = 3, maximum
= 19, range = 16). The number of successful authentication attempts associated
with each account was 3.75 (SD = 3.415). However, a few accounts had far more
successful authentication attempts (minimum = 0, maximum = 12, range = 12)
associated with them. The number of unsuccessful authentication attempts as-
sociated with each was 5.50 (SD = 3.826). Similarly, a few accounts had far
fewer unsuccessful authentication attempts associated with them (minimum =
0, maximum = 12, range = 12). However, authentication attempts can only be
considered in terms of users rather than simply accounts.
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A total of 11 users made at least a single authentication attempt. If only
initial registrations are considered then there are 100 authentication attempts.
The average number of authentication attempts was 9.09 (SD = 5.504). The
number of authentication attempts generated by users was varied (minimum =
3, maximum = 19, range = 16), suggesting the distribution of authentication
attempts among users was more varied than indicated by the mean.
Furthermore, although all users made made an authentication attempt, not
all authentication attempts were successful. The average number of successful
authentication attempts was 3.91 (SD = 3.534). There was a large span in the
number of successful authentication attempts (minimum = 0, maximum = 12,
range = 12). However, many users submitted far more unsuccessful authentica-
tion attempts.
The average number of unsuccessful authentication attempts was 5.18 (SD
= 3.842). However, the mean may not be indicative of overall performance for
most users as there was a wide variation in the number of unsuccessful attempts
among users (minimum = 0, maximum = 12, range = 12). Therefore, it would
appear users submitted more unsuccessful authentication attempts that success-
ful attempts. However, a few users (18%) did not submit any unsuccessful au-
thentication attempts. There were several unsuccessful authentication attempts
generated by individuals and the composition of these are discussed in §7.4.2.
The previous incarnations of the application, i.e. Tom and Dick, both had
rogue authentication attempts that were not associated with any registration
record. No rogue authentication attempts made with Harry: all authentication
attempts were made with the application were associated with a specific regis-
tration record. This suggests that inconsistencies and flaws in the previous reg-
istration processes may have allowed for the generation of rogue authentication
attempts.
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Time
Individuals spent a total of 145546.83 seconds on 111 authentication attempts
or 1.68 days. The average time for an authentication attempt was 1311.23 sec-
onds (SD = 8732.269). However, there was wide variation in the time spent on
each authentication attempt (minimum = 3.83, maximum = 70325.84, range =
70322.00). There were several authentication attempts that took considerable
time.
There were two extreme outliers lasting 59964.53 and 70325.84 seconds or
16.66 and 19.53 hours, respectively. The two authentication attempts were suc-
cessful, one vertical the other diagonal. Both of these distort typical performance.
Therefore, both extreme outliers were removed. Consequently, the average time
taken for an authentication attempt was 139.97 seconds (SD = 569.438). How-
ever, there were still several extreme outliers that, while not as severe as the
aforementioned, could potentially distort typical performance. Consequently, 7
authentication attempts that were greater than 250 seconds were removed from
consideration.
Figure 7.4 illustrates a scatterplot of authentication times, displaying suc-
cessful horizontal and vertical authentication attempts as well as unsuccessful
authentication attempts below 250 seconds. The average time taken for authen-
tication attempts was 57.91 seconds (SD = 51.00). However, there was a wide
variation in time taken for authentication attempts (minimum = 3.83, maximum
= 230.57, range = 226.74). The authentication time may be improved when
considering the success of an authentication attempt.
The average time taken for successful authentication attempt was 59.34 sec-
onds (SD = 46.822). However, there was wide variation in the time taken on
successful authentication times (minimum = 5.10, maximum = 221.80, range
= 216.70). Furthermore, vertical authentication attempts (M = 51.09, SD =
53.149) appear shorter than horizontal authentication attempts (M = 63.61, SD
= 43.644). Overall, unsuccessful authentication attempts (M = 56.96, SD =
53.993) appear to take longer than horizontal and vertical authentication at-
tempts.
Nevertheless, there were far more unsuccessful authentication attempts than
successful. There could be several reasons for an individual generating an unsuc-
cessful authentication attempt.
Composition of Unsuccessful Authentication Attempts
An interesting aspect of Harry was that there was no restriction on the number of
unsuccessful authentication attempts that users could submit. Furthermore, the
application, unlike previous incarnations Tom and Dick, logged the composition
of the submitted authentication attempt. Therefore, unsuccessful authentication
attempts could be probed and inspected to determine the root of the problem.
The expectation is that an unsuccessful authentication attempt would com-
prise of a grid with target images scattered across it, unconnected and completely
incorrect. However, few unsuccessful authentication attempts (11%) actually ap-
proach this scenario. Figure 7.5 illustrates a pie chart displaying the number of
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Figure 7.5: Pie chart illustrating the images aligned together in unsuccessful
attempts.
images aligned in unsuccessful authentication attempts.
Many unsuccessful authentication attempts (36%) contain 4 images that are
aligned but are out of sequence. There were several unsuccessful authentication
attempts (21%) that contained 3 images aligned and many unsuccessful authen-
tication attempts (32%) contained 2 images that were aligned.
Therefore, sequence appears to be an incredibly important factor in the fail-
ure of an authentication attempt. In many of the unsuccessful authentication
attempts the problem is not necessarily memorability with the images but the
memorability of a specific sequence. The majority of unsuccessful authentica-
tion attempts are the product of an inability to recall a sequence not the images
themselves.
Nevertheless, those unsuccessful authentication attempts that contain 2 and
3 images aligned suggest an individual was unable to authenticate due to images.
However, many unsuccessful authentication attempts compromise of sessions of
several authentication attempts that often conclude with a successful authentica-
tion attempt. Users were not limited to a number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts. Consequently, in some cases, users made several unsuccessful authen-
tication attempts before concluding the process with a successful authentication
attempt. The process suggests that users were refreshing the grid of images,
awaiting the arrival of an image they recognised to authenticate.
Time Difference between authentication approaches
An independent-samples t-test was performed to determine if a difference existed
in the time taken to complete an authentication attempt between Tom and Harry.
Therefore, the time taken for the initial authentication attempt from 10 users of
each version of the authentication mechanism was used. Figure 7.6 illustrates
box plots of the data and suggested there was no outliers. The authentication
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Figure 7.6: Box plot of time taken for initial authentication attempts using Tom
and Harry.
times for each group were normally distributed as suggested by a Shapiro-Wilk’s
test (p > .05). The assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated as
suggested by Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances (p = .006). Consequently, a
Welch-Satterthwaite correction was used. The time taken to complete an initial
authentication mechanism with Tom was (M = 68.90, SD = 39.208) shorter
than Harry (M = 145.60, SD = 78.278). The initial authentication attempt
times for Tom were 76.71 seconds (SE = 27.685) shorter than those on Harry.
The difference was statistically significant t(13.249) = -2.771, p = .016.
However, several authentication times are far longer in the Harry group than
in the Tom group. Furthermore, there were also much shorter authentication
times in the Tom group that may distort typical performance. Therefore, if only
authentication times below 120 seconds and above 30 seconds are considered there
are 7 authentication times for each authentication mechanism. A box plot of data
revealed an extreme outlier in the Harry group was 3 box lengths from the box
edge. Consequently, the case was removed from consideration and the longest
authentication attempt was removed from Tom to produce 6 cases in each group.
An independent-samples t-test was performed to determine if a difference
existed in the time taken to complete an authentication attempt between Tom
and Harry. Figure 7.7 illustrates box plots of the data and suggested there was
no outliers. The authentication times for each group were normally distributed as
suggested by a Shapiro-Wilk’s test (p > .05). The assumption of homogeneity of
variances was not violated as suggested by Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances
(p = .689). The time taken to complete an initial authentication mechanism
with Tom was (M = 68.73, SD = 17.604) shorter than Harry (M = 88.77, SD
= 9.189). The initial authentication attempt times for Tom were 20.03 seconds
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Figure 7.7: Box plot of time taken for initial authentication attempts using Tom
and Harry that are under 200 seconds and extreme outliers removed.
(SE = 11.666) shorter than those on Harry. The difference was not statistically
significant t(10) = -1.717, p = .117.
Images on registration
7 registrations were completed over WiFi and 5 registrations completed over
WWAN. The duplicate registration performed over WiFi were removed from
consideration as well as outliers from both groups. Consequently, there was a
balanced, albeit small sample of 4 individuals in each group or 8 cases overall.
An independent-samples t-test was performed to determine if a difference ex-
isted in the time taken to complete an authentication attempt between Tom and
Harry. Figure 7.8 illustrates box plots of the data and suggested there was no
outliers. The authentication times for each group were normally distributed as
suggested by a Shapiro-Wilk’s test (p > .05). The assumption of homogeneity of
variances was not violated as suggested by Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances
(p = .898). The time taken to complete an initial authentication mechanism was
shorter for those individuals who completed registration over WiFi (M = 117.88,
SD = 75.210) than than those who completed registration over WWAN (M =
193.95, SD = 86.012). The initial authentication attempt times for those indi-
viduals who completed registration over WWAN was 76.07 seconds (SE = 57.12)
higher than those individuals who completed over WiFi. However, the difference
in authentication time among the two groups was not statistical significant, t(6)
= 1.332, p = .231.
7.5 Discussion
The purpose of the application was to evaluate an alternative authentication
mechanism that relied on a personal image collection that alternated during au-
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Figure 7.8: Box plot of time taken for initial authentication attempts for individ-
uals who completed registration over WWAN or WiFi.
thentication. The authentication mechanism relied on a Facebook account, much
like the previous incarnation, Dick. The user was expected to have an active
Facebook connection with at least 100 friends. The user was required to create
an image set that comprised of target and distractor images. The user simply
selected friends from their friend list. The application would then download at
least one of image of the friend tagged on Facebook, up to three if more were
available. If there was no tagged images available the friend was not selectable.
The image set comprised tagged images of friends the user selected from the
friend list. Therefore, the registration process was more agile and efficient from
the previous incarnation of the application as no analysis was performed on im-
ages. Instead the registration process merely downloaded tagged images. How-
ever, while the application was no longer as demanding as previous incarnations,
on reflection the alternative authentication mechanism expected a lot more of
users during registration than a traditional authentication approach. The user
had to have an active Facebook account with 100 friends as well as active Internet
connection and several minutes to complete the registration process.
Therefore, while the application attracted more users than Dick, it was un-
popular with the user base. There were clearly many users who felt either the use
of Facebook images was ‘creepy’ or the registration took too long. Alternatively,
many users may have simply felt that the registration process and authentication
mechanism was too demanding for an application that some felt should not have
had an authentication approach in the first instance.
Therefore, analysis could only be performed on individuals that were not alien-
ated by the demands of the authentication approach. The key area of interest
was if there was any impact on authentication times from the initial authentica-
tion approach used in Tom. The analysis revealed that there was no significant
impact on the time taken to complete an authentication attempt between the
initial version of the authentication mechanism and the version used in Harry.
However, it should be noted that the sample was small and this makes the weight
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of such analysis debatable.
Furthermore, while the time taken may not have been impacted, users made
several unsuccessful authentication attempts. Therefore, users clearly still strug-
gled with the alternative authentication approach and the alternating images.
Many of the logs suggest the impact may result from expecting users to memo-
rise a sequence as well as images. There were many unsuccessful attempts that
were the product of an incorrect sequence rather than alignment of incorrect
images.
The other concern was that users who completed the registration process
over a cellular connection may have been subjected to lower quality images as a
result of traffic shaping. The statistical analysis revealed there was no significant
difference in the time taken to complete an authentication attempt between those
who registered over a cellular connection or wireless connection. Therefore, either
traffic shaping was not a problem in this instance or the quality was acceptable
enough for users. However, the sample used in the analysis was small and as such
makes the weight of any analysis debatable.
Nevertheless, traffic shaping policies depend on the network and operator.
Therefore, while traffic shaping does not appear to have impact in the current
evaluation, it is still an important issue to investigate. The real world aspects
of traffic shaping are something that is rarely discussed, even investigated in the
realm of graphical authentication research. The issue would need to be researched
and discussed further with possible solutions devised to overcome it. Otherwise,
traffic shaping could be another item on the ever growing list of reasons as to why
graphical authentication mechanisms are simply not practical, especially with an
increasingly mobile user base.
7.6 Conclusion
The chapter outlined the design, implementation and evaluation of an alterna-
tive authentication mechanism that relied on an alternating image set. While
the authentication mechanism used in Harry was arguably more successful than
that used in Dick, the mechanism was still too demanding, on reflection. The re-
quirement to select distractors as well as target images did not appear to have an
impact on authentication time. However, users ultimately made many unsuccess-
ful authentication attempts, suggesting that they struggled with the alternating
images. Nevertheless, logs revealed that sequence may be more important that
first thought, as several unsuccessful attempts were the product of incorrect se-
quence rather than alignment.
The effect of traffic shaping may not be as important as first thought, as there
was significant difference in the time taken in authentication attempts between
users who completed registration over a cellular connection and a wireless con-
nection. However, the sample used for analysis was small and the traffic shaping
policy very much depends on the network and operator.
The reality is that Tetrad continued to represent a conflict for most users,
evident from the low number who actually used the current application. Efforts
made to improve Tetrad in the current iteration of the application were sim-
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ply not enough. Consequently, Tetrad was unsuccessful in all three application
iterations and all field tests. Therefore, the relevancy of the alternative authen-
tication mechanism must be scrutinised as it would appear that any practical
implementation of the authentication mechanism is not suitable for most candi-
date applications. The relevancy of the authentication mechanism as well as all
three implementations are outlined and discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 8
Discussion
The alternative authentication mechanism deployed in all our evaluations was
indeed throughly considered. The design of the alternative authentication mech-
anism was research driven. The approach was, at heart, knowledge-based and
merely required an individual to memorise the authentication secret. The knowledge-
based approach relies on images as they have superior memorability than the
words that name them. The images used were faces, due to the inherent ex-
pertise all individuals possess for recognising them. Lastly, the authentication
mechanism was a searchmetric, i.e. it was fundamentally recognition-based as
recognition is one of the most effective ways to probe memory. Consequently, the
authentication mechanism literally presented all the pieces of a user’s authen-
tication secret and required users to align them. The mechanism was designed
to afford users the ability to align them without fear of onlookers observing the
actual authentication secret.
The authentication mechanism was the product of typical design processes.
A concept was mapped out, prototypes built, variations developed and explored.
The process was organic and all elements were considered. The initial shared-
space prototype was assessed in a controlled evaluation. The authentication
mechanism was initially well received and showed promise, as users responded
positively.
Nevertheless, when the authentication approach was deployed in field evalua-
tions, i.e. in an actual context of use, many problems became apparent. There-
fore, while the design of the application may have been driven by research, the
result was an authentication mechanism that was poorly received and labelled as
‘creepy’ and ‘terrible’. There were several problems with the alternative authen-
tication mechanism, the three primary problems being:
• Inconvenience
There was wide variation in the time taken to complete authentication
attempts. Even worse, authentication times did not appear to improve over
time. Authentication attempt time generally remained unacceptably high.
• User choice
Some images were considerably more popular than others, confirming that
users make similar choices and thus undesirable predictability.
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• Interaction
There were several unsuccessful authentication attempts suggesting poor
understanding of the actions used to interact with the authentication mech-
anism.
There are several potential explanations for the aforementioned problems. How-
ever, before such explanations are offered and discussed, many may argue that
the alternative authentication mechanism did not need to be deployed into the
field to uncover these issues.
Consequently, the merits of controlled and field investigations at uncovering
each of the aforementioned problems is discussed in the ensuing section, §8.1.
The thesis statement is then reviewed and accepted or rejected, §8.2. Then the
potential problem sources are discussed, §8.3, before concluding that observation-
resilience is the root of many problems. The discussion continues with the notion
that observation-resilience is may not be as important as once thought and alter-
natives are proposed, §8.4. The discussion concludes by outlining aspects of the
field investigations that could have been improved.
8.1 Controlled vs Field Investigations
Controlled evaluations could reasonably be expected to have uncovered many of
the problems the field studies uncovered. If this is so, the motivation for several
field studies is not necessarily clear. There are some compelling reasons why
controlled evaluations would not have delivered these insights. It is not clear
that the same problems would have been uncovered in controlled evaluations.
Therefore, each problem is reviewed in terms of a controlled evaluation uncovering
issues associated with it.
8.1.1 Inconvenience
The time taken to complete an authentication attempt could have been captured
in a laboratory setting. There are several research papers that report and discuss
authentication times captured through controlled evaluations. However, the eco-
logical validity of such evaluations is questionable and subsequently the weight
of such captured metrics debatable. The authentication mechanisms in question,
are often evaluated in isolation, devoid of context and executing on non-target
devices. Such laboratory evaluations frequently substitute mobile computers for
paper and pen or Java-based web browser mockups. It is not clear how mouse
interactions or pen movements mimic that of touch on a smartphone. Moreover,
the silent and steady laboratory environment may not be representative of the
actual expected environment, such as a train-carriage or bus-stop.
Therefore, any captured metrics have to come with the caveat that they were
recorded in ideal conditions, not actual or realistic conditions. However, in fair-
ness, many controlled investigations of authentication mechanisms do state that
further research in the field is required. Unfortunately, follow-up field investiga-
tions are rarely, if ever, reported. Consequently, as authentication times in one
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setting are not necessarily representative of performance in another, the value of
such controlled evaluations is not clear.
Nonetheless, the primary rebuttal would be that controlled evaluations are
necessary to determine the viability of an alternative authentication mechanism
before committing to a complex field investigation. Indeed, Tetrad was exposed
to a controlled evaluation to determine the viability of the approach before com-
mitting to a field investigation. However, the controlled evaluation explored the
ability of the user to contend with the novel approach rather than exploring
realities such as authentication time.
Nevertheless, arguably if authentication time had been a focus of the initial
controlled investigation, the authentication time concern could have been uncov-
ered sooner. Then there would be no need to develop an application or to deploy
the mechanism on target devices. However, in many respects this suggests a pre-
defined upper limit on the time an authentication attempt can take. Naturally,
many would argue that such limit is the time it takes to enter a PIN on an ATM
or a typical password on a personal computer. However, such a preconceived
notion of authentication time does not respect the context of authentication.
The pre-defined upper limit on authentication time essentially assumes all
tasks involving authentication are similar and all steps within the task are per-
formed sequentially. In fairness, many experimental authentication mechanisms
are outlined to solve a similar sequential task: regulating access to a virtual
learning environment. Therefore, the process is sequential, e.g. an individual
must authenticate before they can see a list of class notes. However, while tasks
involving authentication may be performed sequentially from the perspective of
the user, the technical architecture does not need to adopt the same structure.
Consider an alternative task, such as purchasing a digital film. The digital
film would need to be buffered or downloaded to the individual’s device before
it could be watched. The digital film will take time to download. There is no
reason why the technical implementation does not simply initiate the download
immediately. The user is simply prevented from viewing the digital film until
they have authenticated. Therefore, the upper limit on authentication time is
not that of PIN entry on an ATM but the window of time between the download
being initiated and the availability of the film to watch. If the film takes 100
seconds to buffer, for example, as long as the authentication time does not take
longer, then the task as a whole has not been delayed by slow authentication.
Therefore, using a controlled evaluation focused on authentication time, with
notions of an upper limit, could lead to the premature dismissal of a potentially
viable alternative authentication mechanism. Therefore, while authentication
time could have been captured in a controlled setting, the value and use is not
necessarily equivalent to that collected from a field experiment with strong eco-
logical validity. The danger is that an authentication mechanism may simply be
abandoned purely due to the concern of some preset limit on authentication time.
Authentication time was not a focus of the initial controlled evaluation of Tetrad.
Nonetheless, if the initial controlled evaluation had focused on authentica-
tion time, arguably it could have been used to improve the overall application. A
potential improvement would have been initiating the download of lecture record-
ings when the application is initiated rather than after the user had successfully
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authenticated. The conclusion would be the same as the user would not be able
to listen to the lecture recordings until they had authenticated. In this way the
overall task time would have been reduced.
The next primary problem to consider was that of user choice. There are
several research papers that report and discuss user image choice.
8.1.2 User Choice
The controlled evaluations exploring user choice often expect individuals to select
images in solitary environment, free from onlookers. Nevertheless, such evalua-
tions have fairly strong ecological validity as most registration processes in the
wild could reasonably expect a similar context. However, the registration process
would still need to designed for and evaluated on target devices. The reason is,
as was reported earlier: that the design of the registration process could actually
influence user choice rather than just the images themselves.
An example would be if the registration process expected users to scroll
through several sets of images to select target images. There is the possibil-
ity that users simply may not realise they are able to scroll through images and
then simply select the first images they encounter. Moreover, some users may
select the first images they encounter rather than waste time and energy scrolling
through a lengthy list of images. Consequently, the design of the registration pro-
cess could impact on subsequent user actions. There are several examples of how
the design of an interface can impact on user choice. The Microsoft Windows web
browser ballot screen is one such prominent example: producers of web browsers
argued that position on the ballot screen could impact on user choice [290].
Therefore, the design of the registration process would need to mimic that
of the registration process in actual use to ensure the design does not influence
the choices made by users. Nevertheless, arguably the registration process could
have been designed and evaluated in a controlled setting, avoiding the need for
a field investigation. However, in some respects, it is not clear that controlled
evaluations would have been possible for versions of Tetrad that relied on personal
image collections culled from Facebook. The data downloaded and analysed in
the evaluations resided on the individual’s personal device and nowhere else.
Consequently, if an individual wanted to abandon the application and destroy
the downloaded data, all they had to do was the delete the application from
their personal device. If a controlled evaluation were used, data would need to
be stored and protected on external devices that the user had no control over.
Moreover, such external storage would be open to standard processes and policies
of back-up and recovery. Consequently, if an individual did decide to leave the
evaluation, their data could reside within a network of storage solutions for far
longer than desirable. Indeed, there may be no way to concretely confirm their
data was destroyed. Furthermore, many may argue as long as the individual is
informed of such caveats and consents, then there is no real concern.
However, others may object, such as the organisation, i.e. Facebook. The
external company has spent money marketing and developing services and could
be unhappy with the prospect of another entity simply amassing data out-with
their control. Moreover, Facebook will have terms of service and conditions that
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apply to the use of their service. These can change frequently and while it may
be acceptable for an external organisation to amass data one day, it may not be
acceptable the following day. Lastly, even if an external organisation, such as
Facebook, allowed an external organisation to amass data it collected initially,
the laws and regulations of the region or country may not allow it. Therefore,
data generated and collected in America may not be exported to servers in the
United Kingdom. These concerns make a controlled evaluation challenging.
Furthermore, the ecological validity of a controlled evaluation that requires in-
dividuals to provide an image collection from their social network is questionable.
If an individual attends a controlled session, they may feel coerced to provide the
personal image collection and create an authentication secret as there will be
an incentive, such as payment or course credit. However, when the incentive is
merely access to an application, users may not feel pressured to provide an image
collection. Moreover, they may simply not trust the application as much as an
evaluator in a white coat. Alternatively, users may feel the process is too intru-
sive for the purposes of authentication. Therefore, a registration process relying
on a personal image collection assessed in a controlled evaluation would have
relatively weak ecological validity. Consequently, a field evaluation that presents
the registration process to the individual is probably a better approximation to
actual user behaviour.
8.1.3 Interaction
The remaining issue was interaction. There was much confusion about how to use
the novel authentication approach and arguably much of this stemmed from the
design of the registration process. The ad-hoc exploration of different interaction
approaches for the authentication mechanism did not reveal any specific problems.
However, when deployed in the field, several users struggled with the necessary
actions to complete authentication. The problem arguably stemmed from the
fact that specific instructions on how to use the mechanism were presented only
once and then dismissed; there was no way to recall them. Predictably, users did
not read the instructions and were unsure about what action to perform. They
merely resorted to the actions they had previously used during the registration
process.
The assumption is that a controlled evaluation could have rooted out all the
interaction errors and that a field evaluation was not necessary. However, if
the authentication mechanism was merely evaluated in isolation, separate from
the registration process, it is not clear that users would have made any inter-
action errors. The errors themselves are arguably a product of users relying on
the language of action presented during registration rather than interacting with
the authentication mechanism without any baggage. The registration process
required users to double-tap an image to select it as a target image, i.e. part
of the user’s authentication secret. Unsurprisingly, when users were presented a
grid of images they probably simply double-tapped the images. However, during
authentication, double-tap was used to submit an attempt. Consequently, the
authentication attempt would be unsuccessful as users had not yet aligned their
images.
231
The interaction errors also further emphasised that an authentication mech-
anism is more than simply the process itself and that is why the entire product
needs to be evaluated, in context, on target devices with actual users. Never-
theless, arguably a controlled evaluation would have sufficed in extracting the
aforementioned interaction errors.
However, arguably the only reason a registration process was developed was
because the application was destined for deployment in the field with actual
users. The process had to be thoroughly considered as users would be expected
to self-support, as is the case with many application and services. A controlled
evaluation would rely on a prototype registration process handled by an evaluator.
If this was the case, arguably no interaction errors would have been uncovered.
Nevertheless, a controlled evaluation could have sufficed for uncovering inter-
action errors. However, this is the case only where the product was developed
and designed for actual deployment for self-supporting individuals. Crafting an
experience for users to operate on their own takes considerably more time and
careful consideration than a prototype, partially controlled by an evaluator in a
lab. Therefore, once a product is developed for actual deployment, there seems
little motivation to perform a controlled evaluation, other than to catch errors
with a small group before exposing it to a much larger group in field investigation.
Considering all three field investigations, it is not clear that controlled evalu-
ations would necessarily have unearthed the aforementioned issues with Tetrad.
Furthermore, even if controlled evaluations were possible, it is debatable whether
they would have been any less complex or costly to manage as compared to field
investigations. Nevertheless, the primary concern is determining the root of the
aforementioned problems. There could be several explanations for the problems
uncovered but a primary explanation may be the reliance on images.
8.1.4 Summary
The reality is that controlled evaluations are typically less costly and complex
than equivalent field investigations. Therefore, controlled evaluations may be
more desirable in many situations, purely in terms of cost and complexity. Fur-
thermore, a controlled evaluation could be just as effective as a similar field
investigation. Indeed, a reasonable argument is that controlled evaluations could
have uncovered many of the aforementioned issues that were exposed in the field
evaluations of Tetrad.
Nevertheless, field investigations are advantageous in that they force thought
on many aspects, that often go unsubstantiated in controlled investigations. A
clear example in the field evaluations of Tetrad is the registration process. The
design and development of a self-supporting registration process is arguably not
necessary for a controlled evaluation. The cost and complexity spent in developing
such a self-supporting process can be avoided in a controlled investigation and
replaced with a simple manual process involving an experimenter.
Therefore, controlled evaluations are arguably favourable in many situations,
purely as they are less expensive and complex than field investigations. Neverthe-
less, field evaluation of software is reaching a point where it is less expensive and
complex than it ever has been. The distribution of software has been streamlined
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and many individuals, especially smartphone users, are trained to download and
install software. Furthermore, individuals are increasingly purchasing sophisti-
cated devices that are connected to the Internet. Moreover, a healthy economy of
systems and services are emerging to support a growing base of sole traders and
garage developers in analysing and assessing software. Consequently, developing
and deploying a software solution can arguably be assessed with actual users for
little more energy than it costs to create a controlled experiment.
Nonetheless, the field evaluations of Tetrad were still problematic and ar-
guably the evaluations would have benefited from listening to users more. The
reality is that more effort could have been spent in engaging with users to deter-
mine their experience and problems. The use of social channels, such as Twitter
and Facebook, could have been harnessed to gain rapid feedback from users. Fur-
thermore, traditional evaluations techniques, such as think alouds and surveys,
could have been used to understand more about the experience of users. These
techniques could have been used to get a quick and firm grip on what users were
experiencing as well as the problems they were encountering.
In short, field evaluations are a strong direction for the evaluation of alter-
native authentication mechanisms but more effort must be spent to engage with
users and to set boundaries on what users are willing to use and experiment with.
8.2 Thesis Statement Review
The thesis statement, initially outlined in the Introduction chapter, is:
The viability of a recognition-based graphical authentication mecha-
nism can only be evaluated in the wild.
Thesis Statement
There are two keywords in the thesis statement, namely viability and wild. The
viability of the authentication mechanism was assessed using a series of research
questions outlined in the Introduction and discussed over the various discussion
chapters for each of the field investigations.
The alternative authentication mechanism, Tetrad, is clearly not viable. The
primary reasons are:
• The authentication mechanism was inconvenient, authentication times were
simply too long. Moreover, authentication times did not improve over time.
• The memorability of the authentication secret did not appear to improve
with increased use or inline with the time taken to create the authentication
secret.
• There was a difference in the time taken to complete a successful and un-
successful authentication attempt.
• Lastly, while expecting users to select distractors as well as target images
may not have impeded performance, cycling through images did impact on
performance.
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Unfortunately, it became clear that the root of all these problems essentially
stemmed from the observation-resilient design. There are two potential explana-
tions for the lack of convenience: (1) searchmetric design and (2) the observation-
resilient entry. The searchmetric design required users to locate images among
distractors every time they made an authentication attempt. The position of dis-
tractors and targets were randomly positioned for each attempt. Moreover, the
observation-resilient entry approach required users to strategise to determine how
to align the targets they uncovered. Consequently, the authentication approach
always had a sense of uncertainty associated with the user locating the pieces of
the authentication secret and aligning them.
Furthermore, the difference in time between successful and unsuccessful au-
thentication attempts is arguably due to users simply not understanding how to
interact with, and use, the authentication mechanism. Many of these problems
stem from the registration process. An interaction language was introduced and
then an entirely different set of actions required to complete the authentication
process.
The registration process is clearly a far more important component of a novel
alternative authentication mechanism than previously understood, as it essen-
tially introduces the authentication mechanism to the user. Moreover, registra-
tions processes are rarely discussed, never mind designed and implemented, as
alternative authentication mechanisms are rarely evaluated in the field.
This brings us to the second keyword in the thesis statement, namely wild.
The authentication mechanism was evaluated using a controlled investigation
as well as several field investigations. The field investigations did have strong
ecological validity for the following reasons:
• The authentication task was considered and evaluated for risk and an in-
dependent client and user base was sourced.
• The various elements of authentication, such as the application and regis-
tration process, were designed and implemented.
• The application that incorporated the authentication mechanism was placed
against competition that offered the same resources. Users were not held
to ransom with perverse incentives such as course credit.
• The authentication mechanism was deployed on target devices to non-
technical users.
The argument could be made that similarly structured controlled evaluations may
have produced similar outcomes to the field investigations. Indeed, these argu-
ments were made and discussed in the previous section, §8.1, with the conclusion
being that even if controlled evaluations were possible, they would probably not
produce similar results as users would feel inclined to focus and perform actions.
Furthermore, the controlled evaluation of the authentication mechanism in-
dicated that users did not encounter any dramatic usability challenges with the
observation-resistant entry approach while all the field investigations of the ap-
proach indicated that users struggled with the mechanism. Therefore, the out-
comes of the evaluations were very different, clearly the field evaluations more
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accurately reflect that of an actual application using authentication. Users un-
deniably encountered problems with the approach.
The difference in performance suggests that the authentication mechanism
evaluated in the field investigation was practically fully formed. The approach
was designed to be an authentication solution for actual mobile applications. Un-
fortunately, the various elements required to make the recognition-based graphical
authentication approach practical ensured it was simply not viable. The various
elements required, such as the registration process and image source, are consid-
erable hurdles for what appears to be very little gain.
Therefore, the thesis statement is supported as while the controlled inves-
tigation indicated minimal user problems, several field investigations indicated
otherwise. Consequently, while field investigations effectively killed the mech-
anism, they also indicated how valuable it is to construct the many pieces of
authentication and assess with users in the wild before deciding that an alterna-
tive authentication approach is viable.
8.3 Sources of Problems
There are potentially many sources for the problems encountered using the au-
thentication mechanism. However, two primary areas that are arguably the root
of many of the problems are the images themselves and observation-resilient entry.
8.3.1 Images
A graphical alternative authentication mechanism does not necessarily need to
rely on images, at least not images that have to be sourced or previously gener-
ated. A graphical alternative authentication mechanism could rely on an individ-
ual actually drawing the authentication secret, e.g. DAS. However, Tetrad relied
on images of faces and the reality is that there are many problems associated
with such images, in regards authentication.
The primary problem with using images was bootstrapping the authentication
mechanism with them, i.e. essentially sourcing suitable images for the authenti-
cation mechanism to use. The complexity of sourcing image sets is exacerbated
by the fact that users make predictable choices based on attraction, race and
familiarity. Furthermore, sourcing images is difficult due to concerns of image
quality and ownership. Therefore, the images in an image set need to be picked
and pruned to ensure they are suitable. Moreover, the image set must be scalable
and practical in actual use.
However, while these aspects can be undesirable in some respects, such as
predicability, they can be desirable in other respects, such as memorability. For
example, increased familiarity with an image can actually improve retention.
Consequently, a desirable image set should not elicit predictable user choices but
also comprise of familiar images. Therefore, the initial controlled evaluation of
Tetrad relied on images of celebrities. The assumption was that such images
would be familiar to all individuals.
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However, the image set was deemed unsuitable for use in the field evaluations.
The solution was deemed not scalable due to concerns of attaining permission
for use of each of the celebrity images. Furthermore, there is the complexity
of celebrities potentially being viewed as endorsing the application as well as
approving of the use of the authentication mechanism.
Furthermore, there was concern that celebrity images were not a distinct set
that any one application could necessarily own. Consequently, similar image
sets could be used across several applications, affording individuals the ability
to create the same authentication secret across applications. Password reuse,
a primary password problem, would persist with the alternative authentication
mechanism.
Therefore, an image set that an organisation could retain control over, but
was familiar to users, was deemed the most desirable image set. Therefore, the
application used an image set of staff profile pictures from the School of Psychol-
ogy. The assumption was the images were essentially of ‘local celebrities’ to the
user base. Furthermore, permission was obtainable for the images and the solu-
tion was scalable as other organisations could simply offer similar profile pictures.
Consequently, there would be no opportunity for individuals to reuse authentica-
tion secrets as they would not be available outside the application. Nevertheless,
there was concern that users would make predictable choices based on attraction,
race and familiarity. However, the assumption was that the image set was not
particularly diverse in terms of appearance and all individuals would have likely
be familiar to all individuals using the application.
Unfortunately, the reality is that users did make similar choices and some
images were considerably more popular than others. The outcome is not par-
ticularly surprising as individuals favoured images of staff that were prominent
in the first year teaching programme. Users simply selected images they had
confidence in, that they could easily remember, to ensure they were spared the
inconvenience of not being able to authenticate. Therefore, while the image set
was of familiar images, the set clearly contained images that were far more fa-
miliar or famous than others. Therefore, an alternative image set was needed for
the authentication mechanism to be viable.
Consequently, the second iteration of authentication relied on users essentially
providing the image set for Tetrad. It required users to connect their Facebook
account to the application. The image collection was all the public profile pic-
tures of a user’s friends on the popular social network service. The images were
downloaded and analysed to extract face images for users to select for use in au-
thentication. Users were expected to select the entire image set, distractors and
target images. However, there was concern that authentication times may ballon
as users may struggle to quickly discern target images from distractor images.
Fortunately, authentication times were not impacted by the inclusion of user
selected distractor images, although the sample was small and further investiga-
tion was deemed necessary. Therefore, there is promise in an individual providing
their own image collection for use in authentication. Nevertheless, the reason the
sample was small was partly due to the complex and lengthy registration process
required to create the authentication secret. The entire process of downloading,
analysing and extracting images was lengthy and all this was before an individ-
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ual selected images for use in authentication. Asides from these problems there
was also the concern that close associates may be able to discern the friends an
individual had selected for their authentication secret.
Therefore, while expecting users to select distractor and target images may
be viable, the registration process was less than optimal. Consequently, the
next iteration of the authentication approach tried to reduce the time taken to
complete the registration process and the energy spent sourcing images from
Facebook. The decision was taken to use tags of individuals in images from
Facebook. This negated the need for the analysis step on the device as Facebook
could provide the location of tags within images. The location of each tag was
used to extract images for each friend. The user would then create a personal
collection of friends for use in the authentication approach both distractors and
targets. Moreover, since the analysis step had been removed, the decision was
taken to create three images for each individual, if possible. The authentication
mechanism could then cycle through different images for each friend in the image
set.
There were two reasons for cycling through images. The first reason was to
tackle the concern that close associates might able to discern the friends selected
as part of the authentication secret. Cycling through images was assumed to make
it harder for close associates to make the connection. The second reason was that
observing faces from different poses and positions can improve the retention of
the authentication secret.
However, while removing the analysis step may have reduced the burden of the
registration process, it still took considerable time to complete the registration
process. The assumption was that although a longer registration process might
take time, it would lead to memorable and observation-resilient authentication.
Unfortunately, users also struggled with the third iteration. Moreover, several
attempts were incorrect due to sequence, i.e. users were able to group some, if
not all, the images together but not in the correct sequence.
Nevertheless, the third iteration was still less than optimal and it seems simply
too intensive for accessing lecture recordings. Furthermore, while it may appear
that many of the problems of the authentication mechanism may be due to images,
arguably many of the problems stemmed from the need to protect entry of the
authentication secret.
8.3.2 Observation-resilience
The need to offer an observation resilient authentication mechanism was neces-
sary not because the approach was graphical or image-based but because it was
recognition-based.
The elements of the authentication secret were literally presented on-screen.
Therefore, distractor elements were needed to confuse attackers but ideally this
should have little impact on users. The distractors come at a cost though since a
user has to filter and ignore distractors and locate targets, a process that comes
at the cost of time and energy. The process is necessary as the authentication
mechanism is recognition-based. Therefore, arguably there may be little benefit
in offering a recognition-based approach, if it comes at the cost of having to filter
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through distractors to locate targets. The process is costly in terms of time and
energy.
Furthermore, many of the problems associated with the approach stem from
the use of the elaborate and complex process of entry. Consequently, another
argument could be that the process was simply incorrect, that an alternative
observation-resilient process could have been used to enter the images. There is
certainly an argument that an alternative process could have been used but it
would have ultimately relied on a collection of distractor and target elements.
There is the possibility an alternative process could not use distractors and rely
solely on targets but that would still require some sort of procedure to deter
attackers at some cost, including time, training and education. Moreover, while
a superior process is entirely possible and not suffer from the same problems, it
could potentially suffer from a range of other problems.
Thus, software-based observation-resilience still comes at some cost to the
user in terms of time and energy. Consequently, it may be worth considering the
need for observation-resilience techniques in the first instance.
Argument against observation-resilient entry
The biggest mistake security researchers can make is assuming that user effort is
free [116]. The benefit of shielding an authentication secret, for example, must
not come at an exorbitant cost. Therefore, the real question becomes: How big
a threat is shoulder-surfing? The threat needs to be fairly big to be worth the
hassle of dealing with a mechanism such as Tetrad, instead of alphanumerics.
The prototypes forced thought on deployment issues, such as how the mechanism
would be bootstrapped with personal images and what sort of application it would
protect.
The original scenario we envisioned was a user purchasing a movie in front of
friends and family. The reality, however, is that most users do not care if these
people know the password they use to purchase movies. They want to share a
movie in their living room, the password is secondary and less important. If a
friend or family member does use someone else’s password, then they will work
it out. The same way they would, for example, if someone took the last beer or
slice of pizza. Shoulder-surfing in this context is a non-issue, something we failed
to recognise.
Therefore, for the prototypes we envisioned the scenario of an individual ac-
cessing a digital store, being exposed to the wider world. For example, purchasing
a movie on a smartphone while having a coffee at Starbucks or waiting for train
in a station. These places are bursting with strangers and a user would not
want any of them to observe entry of their password. However, users are likely
to authenticate on a 4-inch screen, not a 40-inch one. Therefore, they can easily
position themselves and the screen to prevent observation or use a privacy screen.
Lets say a stranger does, somehow, manage to observe the password being
entered in such a space. What are the actual consequences, in the case of a digital
store? If an attacker does manage to purchase several items from a service, such
as iTunes, Apple can de-activate the purchases.
Therefore, the focus on digital stores might have been the wrong scenario.
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Tetrad could have been used to protect email or a financial service. However, no
individual would check their personal email account or personal finance account
on a television in front of friends and family. Not necessarily because the infor-
mation is sensitive, but because it is boring and uninteresting. Large screens are
for sharing and although some users might want to read email and check bal-
ances on a big-screen, they would wait until the television were free, rather than
interrupting a movie.
Constructing prototypes that are meant to be the manifestation of a practical,
deployable product require us to focus on the actual application used, the people
using it and the places where it will be used. Authentication is a package, it
is not something that is spooned on top of a finished product: it is part of the
product. The time and energy taken to create a Tetrad secret is not necessarily
worth the hassle because shoulder-surfing is not really something to be concerned
about in many contexts.
In the end we did not actually tackle an authentication problem: we tackled
a password problem. Tetrad was not designed thinking about the users and the
tasks they wanted to complete but in order to right the wrongs of passwords.
Tetrad was burdened with the legacy of the password approach. The design
process did not start with: people want to buy movies in the living room. Instead
it started with: these are the problems with passwords in the living room.
8.4 Access and Accountability
The aforementioned ideas were presented and discussed at BCS HCI 2012 [174].
Many ideas were put forward but the consensus suggested that authentication
could essentially be improved by removing users from the authentication loop,
probably using biometric-based authentication. Therefore, a graphical authenti-
cation approach may have been entirely the wrong research direction. A different
direction may be to remove users from the authentication loop or rather remove
their awareness of authentication. The strategy has been used by various technol-
ogy companies, such as Apple and Google, as to improve the usability of software,
one such example is management of files.
In the personal computer era, users were expected to manage the files gen-
erated by applications. However, a different direction has been taken on mo-
bile devices and on the web, where users do not manage files, instead applica-
tions manage files. The approach was common on personal computers but not
widespread, e.g. Apple iTunes was an early desktop application that managed
music files, rather than the user. The need to manage files, construct hierarchies
and monitor storage space still continues but the user’s involvement is essentially
curtailed to the creation or purchase of files. The deletion of files is a command
users can still issue but seems increasingly associated with hiding a file from sight
rather than its actual destruction.
Similarly, biometric sensors could afford subtle, almost invisible, authentica-
tion. An example would be the unlock button on a mobile phone. The unlock
button could double as a biometric sensor. Consequently, the authentication pro-
cess would begin when the users comes into contact with the sensor. If the user
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is the owner of the device it will unlock, otherwise the individual will be de-
nied access. Therefore, ideally the user would never encounter the authentication
approach.
The main barrier to the deployment of such biometrics approaches has been
the specialised hardware required to use them: users simply do not want to be
weighed down with equipment specifically for authentication. However, several
companies are in a position to deliver such solutions as part of their hardware
offerings. Apple, Google, Microsoft and Amazon could all deliver subtle authen-
tication to millions of individuals at a very rapid pace. Moreover, there is also
a concern surrounding speed and accuracy, the situation could be improved by
using the output of several sensors embedded in watches, eye-glasses and clothes.
Again, several large technology companies would be best positioned to deliver
such ecosystems to individuals.
However, while removing users from the authentication loop may be accept-
able for the purposes of regulating access, it is arguably unthinkable for the
purposes of accountability. How can an individual be accountable for an action,
when they did not deliberately authorise it?
8.4.1 Consequences of Authentication
An authentication mechanism often embodies a decision. If an individual pur-
chases a digital product, such as a film or song, they are instantly prompted for
their password. The user is confirming their decision to purchase a product. They
are accountable for their actions. An authentication mechanism is not necessar-
ily required for such actions, a dialogue box could just as easily substitute for
the authentication mechanism but users may not understand the weight of the
consequences from a mere dialogue box.
Users may simply not read text or absorb actions, they may not realise their
are consequences. An authentication mechanism can communicate consequences.
The mere presentation of an authentication mechanism can communicate to an
individual that they are making a decision, that actions will follow that they
will be accountable for. An example would be the presentation of the password
prompt on the Apple iPhone. Apple have made a concentrated effort to only
display the password prompt when an individual is being charged hard currency.
The password prompt rarely appears otherwise, expect when you install software
etc.
The benefit to the approach is that the password prompt could appear at any
time and it indicates to the individual that entry of the password will result in a
charge. An individual could be watching a film, for example, and if a password
prompt appears, the user understands that they will be charged once they enter
their password. However, arguably, once again, an authentication mechanism is
not necessary for such actions, a dialogue box could suffice.
However, many users may disagree and appreciate the weight and gravitas of
an authentication mechanism. Apple recently settled a lawsuit with users who
complained that it was too easy and not entirely clear that they were making
chargeable purchases [11]. The complaint was caused, in part, by a design deci-
sion.
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The password prompt is presented when an individual is required to make a
payment. However, when users enter their password a 15 minute authorisation
window is also activated. Consequently, chargeable purchases made within the
window are automatically authorised without subsequent password entry. The
approach merely presents a dialogue box, asking users to confirm payment.
8.4.2 Client vs Users
A business may want to use biometrics, for example, to provide seamless and
secure access to enterprise files but users may feel it is too intrusive. In the
consumer market users are free to abandon applications and services where they
feel the authentication process is simply too intrusive or intensive. Indeed, all
the field investigations of Tetrad illustrate that users are quite happy to abandon
applications that are too demanding.
An important aspect of all the field investigations was that users were not
forced to use the application. Users could attend lectures without entering any
authentication process and could access a web portal offering the same lecture
recordings using a traditional light-weight password. Consequently, users had
options, our application and authentication mechanism, essentially had real com-
petition in the field. Users were not carolled into using our authentication mech-
anism, arguably if we offered course credit or were the only source of lecture
recordings, users may not have been so quick to dismiss the application.
However, the reality is that developers creating applications do face compe-
tition from many sources and if an authentication mechanism dissuades users,
then developers will drop it. There is no art or science in protecting information.
The problem is not protecting information. If that was the case, destruction of
information is the best direction, as information that is destroyed is not accessible
to anyone. An authentication process is necessary to protect information from
attackers but make it accessible to users.
Biometric-based authentication is probably the best solution for the afore-
mentioned problem. The process has the potential to be invisible to users but
inconvenient for attackers. Nevertheless, the legal case with Apple indicates that
at least some users feel it necessary to be deliberately involved in the authentica-
tion loop. The Apple example speaks to the other use of authentication, namely
accountability and arguably users need to be involved in the authentication pro-
cess to be accountable.
Furthermore, there is arguably no authentication approach better for account-
ability than a knowledge-based approach. The authentication secret literally re-
sides within the individual and they have to participate in the authentication
process to complete it. Moreover, users can pass knowledge to others to act on
their behalf, the user can remain accountable but assign another individual to act
of their behalf. An example would be a pensioner entrusting another individual
to collect cash from an ATM on their behalf, they simply tell the other individual
their PIN.
Unfortunately, passwords and PINs are the only viable knowledge-based au-
thentication approaches. There are simply too many unknowns with the numer-
ous proposed knowledge-based alternatives. The lack of progress is due to the
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lack of investigation of the various components of authentication, such as the
registration process and application as well as field investigations with strong
ecological validity.
The field evaluations of Tetrad were deployed on actual devices, such as
iPhones and iPads, to non-technical students. There was no preserve incen-
tive such as course credits, online assessments or exclusive access to teaching re-
sources. The application was deployed against competing products and options,
no user had to use the application or the authentication mechanism. Moreover,
the application and authentication was delivered to a client. The investigators
and evaluators were separate from the client requesting the application. Con-
sequently, the application and authentication mechanism had strong ecological
validity and arguably closely mirrored an actual scenario.
However, arguably the field evaluations of Tetrad were timid and did not go
far enough. The application had potential but it was simply not capitalised on.
The reality is that tried and true metrics, e.g. time taken, that had been used
in controlled evaluations of other alternative authentication mechanisms were es-
sentially relied upon in the field investigations of Tetrad. However, there was
so much more potential in assessing different aspects of how users actually use
authentication in the wild. The location of where they authenticated could have
been recorded, devices nearby, whether users are in motion or not and the time
spent on the entire task etc. Unfortunately, while the field investigations were
novel the metrics were not and clearly more effort is required to outline frame-
works and metrics for adequately assessing alternative authentication mechanisms
in the field.
There must be more investigation into the actual performance of authentica-
tion mechanisms in their entirety, rather than reporting simply on the process
itself. Many alternative authentication mechanisms are evaluated and reported
much like stars in films. Scripts can be written to make the solution sound won-
derful but when considered in actual use, it is not clear the characters could
function.
Tetrad was terrible and creepy, undesirable adjectives that fell from the mouths
of users. The focus has arguably been assessing authentication in a vacuum, ad-
dressing a problem with an ageing mechanism that is increasingly becoming irrel-
evant not because of research but because users are shifting away from desktop
computers.
The only direction for alternative authentication mechanisms is to refocus on
the user, refocus on the problems the user is encountering and give due consider-
ation to context. The time is quickly approaching where users will be unable to
perform certain tasks not because the password approach has so many problems
but because there is simply not a viable alternative.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
The Background chapter opened with the notion that an alternative knowledge-
based authentication solution had the potential to solve the problems of pass-
words. Consequently, Tetrad, an authentication solution that relied on face im-
ages, was proposed as such an alternative. The initial controlled evaluation sug-
gested that we might have taken the correct path as Tetrad was deemed a success.
Users did not struggle with the shared-space prototype. Moreover, the approach
stimulated discussions and conversations about the need for such an observation-
resilient method when presented at conference. However, several subsequent field
investigations revealed Tetrad was not only suboptimal, it was awful. Therefore,
Tetrad is not a solution to the problems of passwords.
The reality is that the password will probably be around, in the same format,
a decade from now [116]. Herley argues that researchers have failed to realise that
the password is actually the best authentication solution in many contexts [116].
The password is powerful, accessible and versatile [194]. Passwords, in their first
incarnation, performed exactly as planned. Many of the problems we have today
are a consequence of indiscriminate and excessive usage thereof, more so than the
nature of the mechanism itself. Consequently, rather than attempting to replace
the password, a near-term solution may be to accept it but to find a better way
of mediating its use, of tackling the gratuitousness of password usage.
Therefore, the future direction of authentication research may not be the
replacement of the password approach but rather by minimising the footprint of
authentication on task and devices [222]. This topic is discussed further in the
Future Work section, see §9.2.
Nevertheless, there are many problems with passwords and the list will only
grow longer as computers take increasingly different forms. Passwords simply do
not make sense on eyeglasses or watches as there is no physical keyboard and
limited screen space. Furthermore, while biometrics may be the solution on such
devices, the solution must not be invisible as accountable actions need to keep
the user in the authentication loop. The strength of knowledge-based authenti-
cation approaches is the suitability to accountable authentication, primarily as
the authentication secret has to be extracted from the individual.
Secret sharing is often considered a problem with passwords: that an indi-
vidual can share knowledge used to authenticate. However, in certain instances,
the ability to share a password can be incredibly important and is a strength of
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an authentication approach. Nevertheless, many organisations would view this
as a concern as they need to ensure accountability. This typifies the divide be-
tween what users want from authentication and what the developer deploying the
mechanism is trying to achieve.
Therefore, arguably there is still a need for a knowledge-based authentication
approach replacement for passwords. Tetrad is just not that replacement.
9.1 Contributions
Nevertheless, while Tetrad was not a viable alternative authentication mechanism,
its research and development provided many lessons and contributions:
1. An authentication mechanism can not be studied in isolation
The research demonstrated that even carefully considered components can
be flawed and impact on the process of authentication itself. An authenti-
cation mechanism may simply be a series of steps but the ingredients and
products of each step can have an impact on the overall performance of the
process. Consequently, the viability of an authentication mechanism can
not be determined in a vacuum with other aspects removed. Every aspect
and element must be designed and developed to assess performance.
2. A controlled evaluation can erroneously suggest that an impracticable alter-
native authentication mechanism is viable.
Controlled evaluations are incredibly important at determining specific as-
pects of an authentication mechanism. However, in determining the viabil-
ity of an authentication mechanism for actual use, controlled evaluations
must be carefully crafted to mimic actual conditions. Nevertheless, con-
trolled evaluations can be structured and performed to suggest an authen-
tication mechanism is fit for purpose when in actuality many caveats en-
sure an authentication approach is not practical. Indeed the shared-space
prototype assessed using a controlled evaluation was published and pre-
sented, concluding that the observation-resilience authentication approach
was promising. However, after field investigations, we found that the mech-
anism was awkward and suboptimal, arguing that observation-resilience was
the root of problems.
The research and development of Tetrad has been a journey in itself. The start-
ing point was a successful shared-space prototype that showed promise. The
observation-resilient authentication approach was well received when presented
and discussed at BCS HCI 2009. However, several years later after intensive de-
velopment and field investigations we presented at the BCS HCI 2012 conference
only to announce that observation-resilience may not have been as important as
initially considered. These ideas were outlined and discussed in the Discussion
chapter.
The reality is that by focusing on observation-resilience we delivered a sub-
optimal authentication approach that was provably not viable. However, it is
still not clear how a viable a recognition-based authentication approach can be
without protecting the authentication secret from the wandering gaze of others.
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Our journey to tackle the problems of passwords continues, albeit in a different
direction, as discussed in the next section.
9.2 Future Work
Researchers have spent a great deal of effort coming up with new authentication
mechanisms e.g. alternative alphanumeric approaches and graphical alternatives.
The motivation appears to be to find a more memorable alternative to supplant
the password. Having found one, researchers publish details, with evidence of the
alternative mechanism’s superiority. Yet the password persists.
The widespread use of passwords has accustomed users to access control as a
necessary evil. Unfortunately, the very familiarity of the mechanism has also been
its undoing. A clear indication of the failure of the password is the prevalence of
policies and procedures that use words such as comply, sanction and disciplinary.
Unfortunately these policies, instead of convincing users to walk the developer’s
intended path, often do more harm than good [116].
As authentication researchers, we have often been obsessed by the mechanism
itself, rather than its placement within a workflow, task or path. Developers define
such workflows and lay down paths for navigating them, users merely react. Hence
developers determine the position, use and frequency of authentication challenges.
We need first to understand their perspective, the paths they create, and how
these can better be designed to overlap with the paths users prefer.
Paths in the grass
Siracusa talks about users making paths in the grass: paths which allow humans
to achieve their goals while expending as little extraneous effort as possible [252].
He says:
“Any viable solution must work within the (often inconvenient) bounds
of reality. It must be constructed in such a way that the moti-
vations and actions of the participants — both the good and the
bad...especially the bad — serve tobalancethe system as a whole.
Suggesting that all would be well, if only certain people would act
differently or alter their desires in some way is wishful thinking, not
an actual solution.”
John Siracusa [252]
This strikes a chord. Wishing that people “would only behave securely” has al-
most been the mantra of security practitioners world-wide for at least the last
decade. Siracusa argues that socialism, communism and libertarianism have failed
because they attempt to create artificial systems which ignore the nature of par-
ticipants, or which insist that they change their nature. Siracusa relates that
when the University of California at Irvine campus was first built, they did not
lay sidewalks: they planted grass. The next year, they returned and laid the
sidewalks where the trails were in the grass. We must find ways to consider how
users want to authenticate, and design to accommodate their “paths”. Trying to
coerce them into walking down our paths is futile.
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Consider Wikipedia, a collaborative encyclopaedia launched shortly after the
millennium. The articles on the website are generated by the man and woman
in the street, not by experts. Wikipedia is the 6th most visited website on the
planet. The authors are not owners of articles per se: instead articles are gen-
erated through user collaboration, by crowd-sourcing. Users are not vetted; any
individual is able to generate or edit an article. In summary, Wikipedias develop-
ers had people (everyone), problem (building a knowledge resource), and context
(accountability is less important than encouraging contributions). They chose a
novel approach: no authentication.
Malicious users are always a concern and the obvious solution would have
been to require authentication. Yet that would probably have discouraged con-
tributors, and Wikipedia seemingly wanted to be sure that no obstacles impeded
the creation of a knowledge resource, so they created a new path of unhindered
access. It turns out that the developers path coincided with the path users pre-
ferred, as demonstrated by the efforts of millions of contributors. Investigations
have found the pages to be of high quality [99] similar to traditional encyclopae-
dias. Vandalism attacks do occur [282] but users are unaware of this because
tools, such as watch lists [186], make contributors aware of changes so that they
can be corrected. Wikipedia has essentially outsourced both creation and polic-
ing. Their approach perfectly matches the risk problems of their context, and it
works. Wikipedias approach is unusual.
Nevertheless, a future direction of our authentication research could be the
development of usage patterns for developers that would serve to reduce the de-
ployment of authentication to sufficiency rather than extravagance. It is worth
considering how many times an individual is required actively to unlock their
device during any given day. They may infrequently perform actions with serious
or risky side-effects. Nevertheless, whether or not they want to use their device
to check the time or to stop music playing, they are presented with an authenti-
cation hurdle. This traditional approach can be referred to as “exhaustive access
control”.
Therefore, a future direction could be to consider the numerous tasks per-
formed on devices and determine when authentication should be presented and
when it should be avoided. These ideas were presented and discussed at HAISA
2013 [222].
9.3 Concluding Remarks
The research and development of Tetrad was a long and arduous journey. The
alternative authentication mechanism was designed for a context rather than
attempting to be another pseudo silver bullet password replacement applicable
in all scenarios. This research has concluded that there is no longer a battle for
an authentication solution on desktop and laptop computers, passwords won that
war.
However, there is a new frontier: the next generation of computers that no
longer look like computers, namely: watches, eyeglasses, cars and clothing. The
iPhone is not so much a phone as a highly portable computer as is the iPad. These
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devices will be technically the same. However, the introduction of such devices
into a wide range of contexts changes everything, as everyday tasks increasingly
incorporate Internet access and computers.
Passwords simply do not make sense on such devices. It is not clear that
passwords can make the leap to such devices and fulfil authentication needs for
so many different contexts. Nevertheless, what is the alternative? There are few
choices but a clear authentication alternative for such devices has yet to appear.
In many ways this is due to lack of focus, in authentication research, on context.
There are many lessons to be drawn from the research and development of
Tetrad. Many of these lessons apply to all authentication mechanisms, not sim-
ply recognition-based graphical authentication mechanisms. The context of an
alternative authentication mechanism must be designed, implemented and eval-
uated for a given context. This dissertation outlines the extensive work done to
create evaluations that target specific contexts and had strong ecological validity.
Nevertheless, the field investigations were complex, hard work and did not push
far enough.
Tetrad’s journey should act as an inspiration and a warning. Alternative
authentication mechanisms must be evaluated in the field and while researchers
may not enjoy the response to their hard work, such criticism must be taken on
board and used to develop solutions for the next generation of computers.
If alternative, viable authentication solutions can not be created for the next
generation of computers, then everyday users will not be able to complete their
own journeys.
Passwords have brought humanity this far and empower users everyday. The
concern is that the password is struggling and nothing new is emerging to take
over the reins.
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